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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of 2007/8 has had a significant impact on the place of social policy 
objectives in the Common Market. As laws have been reformed over the years since the 
failure of Lehman Brothers1 set in motion a domino effect among high risk investment 
banks and financial institutions throughout the economically advanced nations of this 
world, both employment protection and corporate rescue have been found, at times, in 
the spotlight. While the corporate rescue culture of the European Union2 promotes the 
rehabilitation of businesses in financial distress in preference to liquidation where 
possible, it also emphasises reducing unemployment and social exclusion.3 The social 
implications of corporate rescue must therefore be considered, rather than taking a 
purely economic approach, emphasising creditor wealth maximisation during insolvency 
proceedings.4 EU social policy has generated a number of employment regulations, such 
as the Acquired Rights Directive,5 which are arguably the greatest obstacle to promoting 
corporate rescue. Thus there is an enduring conflict that subsists between the aims of 
corporate rescue and employment protection regulation. 
Substantial employment protection damages the effectiveness of corporate rescue by 
deterring acquisitions in view of the potential liability attached to transferring 
employees.6 Ineffective corporate rescue may then have an adverse effect on the 
economy and job security due to increased company failures and job losses.7 Employees 
attached to the sale of a business in a corporate rescue procedure can represent a 
liability, reducing the intrinsic value of that business and potentially reducing the 
number of businesses successfully rehabilitated through the use of corporate rescue 
mechanisms. The obstruction to successful corporate rehabilitation represented by 
employment protection must therefore be balanced with corporate rescue in order to 
successfully promote the rescue culture. An examination of the approaches taken by 
different jurisdictions, in this case the United Kingdom and France due to their 
important influence in the EU as well as their archetypically different legal systems 
should help elucidate how the tension could be managed in order to achieve a balance 
between them.  
The form of examination is particularly important if an effective reform is to be 
introduced. As such, a comparative historical methodology concentrating on the path 
dependent legal developments of both jurisdictions will be applied in order to discover 
the fundamental historical, economic, social, political, and cultural differences between 
the UK and France that have influenced their approaches to social policy and corporate 
insolvency law. Legal developments cannot be explained by examining a legal rule in 
                                                          
1 See The Economist “The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course” (7 September 2013)  
<http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article>  accessed 17 
December 2015.  
2 Hereafter referred to as the “EU”.  
3 KG Broc and R Parry, Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (Kluwer 2003) 5-6. 
4 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 14-15.  
5 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] 
OJ L82/16 (hereafter referred to as the “ARD”). 
6 H Collins, “Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency” (1989) 18 ILJ 144. 
7 Ibid. 
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isolation, but must account for the social and economic pressures operating on the law 
from the outside as well as the established ways in which the issues are dealt with 
internally. Even when economic and social conditions are similar at the time that a 
parallel rule is promulgated, the differences in historical journeys to arrive at similar 
rules can explain why different jurisdictions do not approach new problems in the same 
way.8  
This thesis will analyse the legal position of employment protection and corporate 
rescue in the UK and France through a historical comparative analysis of the political, 
social, and economic developmental context. Based on the understanding of each 
jurisdiction’s path dependent position within the legal framework of the EU, reform of 
the ARD will be recommended that attempts to balance the aims of corporate rescue and 
employment protection in the event of business transfers occurring during corporate 
rescue procedures. Given that the regulation of this policy intersection is made within 
the EU legal framework, the comparative historical analysis methodology will assist in 
identifying the most effective reform that will fit within the varied legal systems of the 
EU Member States, and also help to predict how such a reform may be implemented 
over time.  
This Thesis will provide an innovative contribution to the existing knowledge and 
literature in the area of social policy in insolvency by using a comparative, historical, 
path dependent methodology to reveal a potentially effective approach  to introducing 
unique legal reform to the conflicted intersection in the ARD of the promotion of the 
rescue culture by ensuring effective business transfers in corporate rescue procedures, 
while providing a balanced protection for employees affected by corporate restructuring.  
  
                                                          
8 J Bell, “Path Dependence and Legal Development” (2012) 87 Tul L Rev 787, 788. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
PATH DEPENDENT COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION AND CORPORATE RESCUE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
FRANCE1 
 
“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”2  
~ Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview and Aims  
1.1.1 The financial crisis of 2007/8 and the difficult, slow economic recovery experienced by 
the European Union3 have invited a renewed focus on the economic impact of business 
failure and unemployment over the decade that followed.4 The EU promotes both a 
rescue culture that encourages the rehabilitation of businesses in financial distress, and 
social policies that aim to reduce unemployment and social exclusion.5 While social 
policy regulation and laws relating to the rescue culture are not mutually exclusive in 
their aims, they are often seen to conflict when regulations dealing with corporate rescue 
procedures intersect with those aimed at protecting employment. A balance between 
these two often competing policy areas is necessary to cope with the impact of critical 
financial circumstances with greater economic efficiency, while promoting social justice 
in the modern socioeconomic context of the EU. As such, the social implications of 
                                                          
* Please note that where more than one sentence has been used to paraphrase from a single source, footnotes will appear at the end 
of the group of sentences, rather than after each sentence derived from that single source.  
1 Some content of this chapter was used in a short presentation at the INSOL International Academics Colloquium in The Hague in 
May 2013, and in a full presentation at the NACIIL Global Academics Conference in Amsterdam in May 2013 in a paper entitled 
“Introduction to Research Focus”. 
2 The quote continues: “The felt necessities of time, the prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed 
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do that the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed.” Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (first published 1881, 
Gutenberg 2000) <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-h/2449-h.htm> accessed 11 June 2015. 
3 Hereafter referred to as the “EU”.  
4 See C Barnard, “The Financial Crisis and the EURO Plus Pact: a Labour Lawyer’s Perspective” (2012) 41(1) ILJ 98; B Vis, K van 
Kersbergen and T Hylands, “To What Extent Did the Financial Crisis Intensify the Pressure to Reform the Welfare State?” (2011) 
45(4) Social Policy & Administration 338; D Burdette, R Parry and A Walters, “The Global Financial Crisis and the Call for Reform 
of Insolvency Law Systems” (2012) 4(1) IRI 13; and B Moro, “Lessons from the European Economic and Financial Great Crisis: A 
Survey” (2014) 34 Eur J Pol Econ s9.  
5 KG Broc and R Parry, Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (Kluwer 2004) 5-6. 
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corporate rescue must be considered, rather than taking a purely monetary approach that 
emphasises creditor wealth maximisation as the fundamental goal of insolvency.6  
1.1.2 Underpinned by traditionally opposing socioeconomic values, the juxtaposition of 
corporate rescue and employment protection can be difficult to reconcile. As corporate 
rescue procedures often require the sale of all or part of a business undertaking, the rules 
dealing with the preservation of employment in business transfer situations are of 
particular importance. This specific area is governed by the implementation of the EU 
Acquired Rights Directive7 as interpreted by EU Member States, which contains 
provisions for the transfer of employment contracts in the event of the transfer of a 
business undertaking to which those contracts are associated, including those transfers 
occurring within corporate rescue procedures. The ARD has been met with varying 
implementation results among the Member States. The United Kingdom8 and France 
provide particularly divergent examples of this implementation, also demonstrating the 
extreme variance in the fundaments of legal systems within the EU. In order to strike a 
balance between the rescue culture and social policy in this precise area, it would be 
necessary to introduce EU level reform, thus the way in which such reforms are received 
in Member States is also an important consideration.  
1.1.3 This thesis will analyse the legal position of employment protection and corporate 
rescue in the UK and France through a historical comparative analysis of the political, 
social, and economic developmental context of the two legal areas. Based on the 
understanding of each jurisdiction’s path dependent position within the legal framework 
of the EU, reform of the ARD will be recommended, which will attempt to balance the 
aims of the rescue culture and the provision of employment protection during business 
transfers occurring during corporate rescue procedures.  
1.1.4 The intersection of these legal areas is contentious due to competing interests of social 
and economic policy, but it is necessary to consider both pressing social issues and the 
                                                          
6 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 14-15.  
7 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] 
OJ L82/16 (hereafter referred to as the “ARD”). 
8 Hereafter referred to as the “UK”. 
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need for economic efficiency in the analysis of employment protection and corporate 
rescue in order to achieve a balance between them. Given that the regulation of this 
policy intersection is formulated within the EU legal framework, the comparative 
historical methodology described below will assist in identifying the most effective 
reform that will fit within the varied legal systems of EU Member States, using the UK 
and France as initial examples, and also help to predict how such a reform may be 
implemented over time. 
2 Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 The Right Method for the Particular Problem 
2.1.1 Understanding a legal system is a difficult task, particularly when viewing it as a foreign 
system from outside the familiar. Legal history, comparative law, positivist and holistic 
constructs, economic efficiency analysis, and any number of other methodological 
approaches can help to reveal the underlying purposes of specific legal rules. However, 
the appropriate choice of methodological construct must be connected to the prospective 
outcome to be achieved. The proposed outcome of this treatise is to formulate EU level 
legal reform that will achieve a balance between employment protection and corporate 
rescue, which can be implemented throughout the EU with the result of preserving 
competition within the Common Market, rather than allowing the persistence of 
differing levels of protective regulation. In order to create a new legal framework that 
will appeal to each Member State as beneficial to their particular systemic approach, a 
full understanding of their regulatory aims in the area of employment law and corporate 
rescue procedures is needed.  
2.1.2 While the scope of this treatise must be limited to only two jurisdictions, the choice of 
the UK and France present two systems with significantly different legal foundations 
that should provide a basis upon which legal reform can be built and potentially applied 
to the benefit of all Member States. Given the different characteristics that must be 
considered for the UK and France, it should be possible to create a broad enough 
framework such that most unique Member State characteristics may also be included. 
However, it is also envisaged that work following this project will continue to apply the 
13 
 
methodology herein described to other Member States in order to create a tighter 
framework within which legal reform can be tested. 
2.1.3 A comparative method based solely within a positivist9 or functionalist10 approach is 
limited in its examination to the surface aspects of legal reality.11 As such, a positivist 
focus on internal legal rules misses external influences on the law that should be taken 
into account in order to make worthwhile comparisons of legal phenomena. Similarly, if 
functionalist approaches are solely relied upon, it would be difficult to recognise the 
purposes and aims of law, which are defined using terms of reference provided by 
particular cultures that cannot be satisfactorily abstracted or generalised. The meaning of 
a law may not be apparent on the surface, but deeper inquiries that include context in 
history, culture, economics, shared beliefs, traditions, and political and social interests 
may reveal its true meaning.12 Thus, although comparative law has long searched for 
functional equivalents as a foundational method, it is not enough to rely only upon this 
kind of approach to ground an academic analysis in the circumstances of this particular 
problem, and far less relevant to rely on a positivist approach. 
2.2 Legal Origin: Also not a Methodological Solution 
2.2.1 The UK and France provide archetypal examples of the common and civil law legal 
traditions, as such some discussion of the differences in the structure of these two 
systems is relevant. The structure of a legal system influences how social control is 
applied to economic life13 and can influence national regulatory styles,14 which will 
affect jurisdictional approaches to the development of legal rules as well as the effects of 
implementing EU law. There are a number of systemic characteristics that can be 
attributed to the legal origin of a jurisdiction.  
                                                          
9 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP 1961). 
10 See R Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law” in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law (OUP 2006).  
11 R Cotterrell, “Comparative Law and Legal Culture” in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 710. 
12 Ibid, 710-712. 
13 R LaPorta, F Lopez-de-Silenes and A Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins” (2008) 42(2) J Econ Lit 286, 286. 
14 S Deakin, P Lele and M Siems, “The Evolution of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes” (2007) 46(3-4) 
Int'l Lab Rev 133, 133. 
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2.2.2 In addition to the fundamental characteristic of legal codification, civil law systems tend 
to adopt Montesquieu’s theory15 of the separation of powers that gives specific roles to 
legislators, who create the law, and judges who apply it. Jurisprudence in a common law 
system can create new legal rules according to specific facts, providing a principal 
source of law. Common law jurisdictions also apply the doctrine of stare decisis that 
compels lower courts to follow the judgments of higher courts. Judges in civil 
jurisdictions enjoy the authority of reason, exercising independence in decision-making 
from similar cases that may have come before. Though previous judgments may at times 
be viewed as persuasive, they are generally viewed as merely explanatory.16 Civil law 
codes also tend to be specific and thorough, while common law jurisdictions can allow 
an element of vagueness as the judiciary can be depended upon to alleviate most 
uncertainty. The differences in jurisprudential and legislative approaches between 
common and civil law systems can be problematic for the implementation of EU law. 
As EU law tends toward a civil law style, implementation in common law jurisdictions 
such as the UK can be problematic from an interpretative standpoint.17  
2.2.3 There are also perceived differences in economic aspects of civil and common law 
countries. Civil law countries tend to have heavier, more economically interventionist 
regulation, while most common law countries tend toward a more economically liberal 
style.18 There are other important historical and cultural factors that also have a 
significant influence on the regulatory styles of different jurisdictions. The theory of 
legal origins attempts to explain differences in regulatory style through an examination 
of the systemic differences between common law and civil law systems and has done so 
through a number of empirical observations.19 However, the data has been challenged on 
the basis that it has failed to take account of functional equivalencies in the formal laws 
                                                          
15 Charles de Secondât, Baron de Montesquieu, L’Esprit des Lois (first published 1748, Gutenberg 2008) 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27573/27573-h/27573-h.htm> accessed 11 August 2013. 
16 W Tetley, “Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified)” (1999) 4 Unif L Rev 877. 
17 J Bell, “Path Dependence and Legal Development” (2012) 87 Tul L Rev 787, 796.  
18 EL Glassner and A Shleifer, “Legal Origins” (2002) 117(4) QJ Econ 1194. 
19 See R LaPorta and others, “Law and Finance” (1998) 106(6) J Pol Econ1118; EL Glassner and A Shleifer, n19; R LaPorta, F 
Lopez-de-Silenes and A Shleifer, n13; R LaPorta and others, “Legal Determinants of External Finance” (1997) 52 J Fin 1131; EL 
Glassner and A Shleifer, “The Rise of the Regulatory State” (2003) 41(2) J Econ Lit 401; JC Botero and others, “The Regulation of 
Labour” (2004) 119(4) QJ Econ 1339; and S Deakin, P Lele and M Siems, n14.  
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measured in the research, leaving too many relevant considerations out of the final 
analysis.20 
2.2.4 The differences in legal origins have made harmonisation difficult due to differences in 
the foundations of Member State legal systems. Both civil and common law systems are 
discrete epistemological constructs with differences that are irreducible to the effect that 
it may be nearly impossible for a civil lawyer to think like a common lawyer, and vice 
versa.21 While a civil lawyer may view the common law as overly traditional, casuistic, 
and peculiar in the interlocking of equity and law, to the common lawyer the same 
characteristics are practical, flexible, and securely rooted in national culture, as well as 
natural and productive in the separation of law and equity.22 The legal cultures of both 
systems reflect distinctive national traditions formed from a collective will to express a 
unique and complex historical and social experience of law.23 While the presence of 
civil and common law within the EU present one of the fiercest obstacles to closer 
implementation of EU law, other cultural and historical differences present boundaries 
among civil law systems that may be just as difficult to surmount as the differences 
between UK and Irish common law and the civilian systems of Continental Europe.  
2.2.5 The legal origins of a jurisdiction forms a part of the fundamental basis upon which 
legal systems evolve, however, understanding the reasons why systemic legal 
differences persist among modern Western cultures in this globalised economic world-
view cannot be explained by examining legal origins in isolation. Not every civil system 
underwent the same historical experiences and thus will have evolved on different 
trajectories that cannot be explained by narrow view of legal origins. As this treatise 
aims to fully examine the influences on the development of the legal areas under study 
in the UK and France, it must take a broader view. It is admitted that legal origins have a 
fundamental effect on the evolution of legal systems and often leads to differences in 
regulatory styles; however, it is necessary to delve deeper into the socio-cultural, 
                                                          
20 B Ahlering and S Deakin, “Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: a Case of Institutional 
Complementarity?” (2007) 41(4) L&Soc'y Rev 895, 867. 
21 P Legrand, Fragments of Law as Culture (WEJ Tjeenk Willink 1999) 11. 
22 R Zimmerman, “Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science” (1996) 
112(Oct) LQR 576, 587. 
23 Cotterrell, n11, 729. 
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political, economic and historical factors that have led to the current state of the law to 
fully understand it in context. There are too many other variables that the legal origins 
theory fails to account for, making the theory unviable for broad application without 
qualification.  
2.3 Law and Economics: Not Broadly Applicable 
2.3.1 The principles of Law and Economics might also have provided an analytical 
framework within which a balance between employment protection and corporate rescue 
could be sought. The basis of an economic approach to legal rules assumes that the 
people involved in a legal system will act rationally to maximise their own satisfaction. 
This concept evolved from a utilitarian ideal, supporting the belief that actions are right 
in proportion to their ability to promote happiness, and wrong as they cause distress.24 
The moral worth of a law is thus to be judged by its effect in promoting a surplus of 
pleasure over pain in aggregate across all citizens.25 In an economic analysis of the law, 
if two opposing sides of an issue behave rationally, they will find a balance that 
maximises the benefits/happiness of each side when an outcome is uncertain at the 
outset.26 Rational maximisation within a legal system suggests that by putting a 
conceptual price on legal rights and remedies, it will be possible to create legal rules that 
maximise effectiveness by finding the perfect balance of economic efficiency between 
competing aims.27 
2.3.2 Given the economic and competitive aspects of insolvency law and employment 
regulation,28 it might be presumed that a Law and Economics approach might be 
appropriate. However, as the movement was instigated in the United States, and mainly 
supported by theorists in that country, it may not, in fact, provide an appropriate 
explanation for the systems under study. While the UK indeed takes a more liberal 
stance in its legal system, France does not. The claim that economic considerations can 
explain the law in modern societies is an inherently comparative claim. While true that it 
                                                          
24 JS Mill, Utilitarianism (2nd edn, first published 1861, Hackett 2001) 7. 
25 RA Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory” (1979) 8(1) JLS 104. 
26 RA Posner, “Observation: The Economic Approach to Law” (1974) 53 Tex L Rev 761. 
27 Ibid, 764. 
28 Please note that any mention of insolvency law should generally be taken to include corporate rescue procedures and vice versa; 
equally mention of employment law or regulation should be taken to include labour law, and vice versa. 
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is possible to explain legal rules in such a way that can align with the emphasis on 
economic efficiency, this is largely a retrospective exercise in which Law and 
Economics legal theorists transpose a theoretical construct onto the historic rule in 
question. It does not necessarily explain the true history of a legal rule’s developmental 
process.29  
2.3.3 The connection between creditor and debtor is a competing economic relationship, as is 
the relationship between employee and employer, but there are also associated social 
issues that cannot be resolved by a singular reliance on economic efficiency. The direct 
application of values to unemployment and business failure based on their financial 
costs to society would not improve the balance between them when integrating policies 
of social justice in addition to economic efficiency, the former of which is also an 
important public policy matter for the EU. The existence of the “welfare state” in the 
UK and the socialist political system in France makes a pure economic analysis of the 
effectiveness of employment protection in corporate rescue inappropriate. Such an 
analysis would work in a market-led society, but the jurisdictions under study fall 
outside of this description. While employment and insolvency laws have intrinsic 
economic aspects, it is not enough to judge them according to economic efficiency and 
then declare them “good” or “bad” in comparison to a benchmark. This assumes that the 
law of a time or place, or of a particular nation, is an independent subject of study, with 
its own unitary framework, which can be explained without its context. There is more to 
the law than economics.  
2.4 Introducing a Comparative Legal Historical Method30 
2.4.1 Without integrating a study of the historical context of the law into the comparative 
method, it might assumed that the law of a given time and place develops in its own way 
that can be studied in isolation. Correspondingly, a pure comparative approach might 
assume that laws of each jurisdiction are discrete and coherent rather than an 
                                                          
29 J Gordley, “Comparative Law and Legal History” in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 767. 
30 The methodology in this and the following section was articulated in an early formulation for a presentation at the INSOL 
International Academics Colloquium in San Francisco in March 2015 in a paper entitled “Studies in Convergence? Post-Crisis 
Effects on Corporate Rescue and the Influence of Social Policy: The EU and the USA”, which earned the Ian Strang Founders 
Award in 2015 and is awaiting publication in the International Insolvency Review under the same title. See Annex 2 Publication 4.  
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amalgamation of legal solutions developed over time.31 Legal developments cannot be 
explained by examining a legal rule in isolation, but must account for the social and 
economic pressures operating on the law from the outside as well as the established 
ways in which the issues are dealt with internally. Even when economic and social 
conditions are similar in different countries at the time a parallel rule is promulgated, the 
differences in historical journeys to arrive at similar rules can explain why they do not 
approach new problems in the same way.32  
2.4.2 Taking a holistic approach that accounts not just for the legal rules in isolation, but with 
reference to the context within which those rules belong,33 makes it possible to see the 
law as a living, evolving subject, rather than just the law as stated in books or observed 
in action.34 A comparative historical approach situates the law within the jurisdiction it 
is found and explains the underlying aims and purposes for which a law was instituted, 
and why it functions the way that it does. 
2.4.3 Legal rules and legal texts are typically deeply rooted in the specific economic, social, 
moral, political, religious, and cultural contexts, which can often only be explained from 
a historical perspective.35 Comparing different legal system therefore requires an 
analysis of the historical contexts of the specific areas under study in order to identify 
the aims of legal rules, whether as a means of achieving social goals, as outcomes of 
distinctive legal traditions, or as an expression of a specific culture or collective 
identity.36 Where there are differences in legal rules, context, both legal and non-legal, 
becomes especially important. Differences in non-legal context can also explain the 
appearance of diverse legal problems, as well as dissimilar outcomes despite similar 
treatment.37  
 
                                                          
31 Gordley, n29, 763. 
32 Bell, n17, 788. 
33 M Graziadei, “Comparative Law, Legal History, and the Holistic Approach to Legal Cultures” (1999) 7 Z Eu P 531, 538. 
34 W Ewald, “Legal History and Comparative Law” (1999) 7 Z Eu P 553, 556. 
35 N Jansen, “Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge” in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 306. 
36 Ibid, 308. 
37 G Dannemann, “Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?” in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 414. 
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2.5 Comparative Path Dependence: A Modern Method for a Modern Problem 
2.5.1 Law has been described as the most historically oriented, backward looking, and path 
dependent of the professions, venerating tradition, precedent, custom, ancient practices 
and texts, wisdom, and an interpretative method that is inextricably linked to history. 
The characteristic gerontocracy of the profession relies upon ingrained attitudes that are 
obstacles to attempts to reorient the law to a more pragmatic, coordinated, and efficient 
direction.38 The fundamental dependence of the law on its history is evident in how 
precedent functions in common law systems and how codes drafted decades or more in 
the past continue to provide the foundation of civil law systems.39 The past exerts an 
inertial force on legal development.40 The law is simultaneously influenced by external 
non-legal factors as well as internal professional practices. Legal doctrine is thus the 
product of a complex interaction between the internal and the external.41 While the 
historical dependence of law is self-evident, its context in the wider history of a 
jurisdiction also plays an important role in how law develops. 
2.5.2 The historicity of law described above is based on the concept of path dependence, a 
theory suggesting that established traditional legal approaches to resolving legal 
problems will determine how new situations are dealt with in the present and future.42 
Path dependency has been used as a method in economics to explain how economic 
practices are embedded in a society. Economic path dependence implies that the 
destination, by and large, depends on the precise place from whence a journey began.43 
Economies vary. This is due, not just to the interplay of universal economic forces, but 
also to the way in which present decisions are shaped by the decisions and structures 
inherited from the past. These past decisions and structures provide a context within 
which present economic behaviour can be understood.44 Applied to law, path 
dependence assumes that there is not a single perfect legal system to which all systems 
                                                          
38 RA Posner, “Past-Dependency, Pragmatism and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship” (2000) 67(3) U Chi L 
Rev 573, 573. 
39 OA Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System” (2000) 86 
Iowa L Rev 601, 601.  
40 Posner, n38, 587. 
41 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (first published 1881, Gutenberg 2000) <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-
h/2449-h.htm> accessed 11 June 2015, 1-2. 
42 Bell, n17, 787-788. 
43 Posner, n38, 583. 
44 Bell, n17, 797. 
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should aspire, rather that there are many coherent sets of legal rules and institutions in a 
variety of jurisdictions that can effectively deal with the same social problems. While 
path dependence does not prevent convergence as such, it does explain the difference 
between legal systems and the routes taken to legal change.45  
2.5.3 Decisions made by legislators and judges are shaped in specific and systemic ways by 
the historical path leading up to them.46 Thus legal developments can be explained by 
reference not only to the specific characteristics of the legal system, but also by 
superimposing the social and economic pressures operating on the law from the outside 
as well as the established, perhaps culturally motivated, ways of dealing with legal 
issues within the system. Outside pressures may lead legal systems to adapt themselves 
toward a convergent centre, although radical change is an unusual phenomenon.47 While 
economic and social conditions may be similar in different countries, the historical paths 
upon which they have journeyed to arrive at the current set of conditions are not. An 
understanding of extra-legal factors connected to a country’s history will assist in 
explaining why they do not approach similar, new problems in the same way.48 This 
theory adds to the legal origins hypothesis, which is too narrow to adequately explain all 
legal differences.  
2.5.4 Path dependency demonstrates how history influences the process of legal change. It 
implies that earlier events affect the possible outcomes of subsequent events occurring.49 
There is a certain Darwinian effect here, as essentially the success of an outcome in the 
past will lead to similar choices in the future, theoretically common to differential 
reproductive success in evolutionary theory.50 This is particularly illustrative of UK 
legal development, though it does share some elements with the French, which reflects 
more of a “punctuated equilibria” of legal development. This second strand of 
evolutionary path dependence is reminiscent of the long periods of French status quo, 
punctuated by periods of explosive revolution, similar in biology to periods of rapid 
                                                          
45 Ibid, 800 
46 Hathaway, n39, 604. 
47 Bell, n17, 804. 
48 Ibid, 787-788. 
49 WH Sewell, “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology” in WH Sewell, Logics of Historicity: Social Theory and Social 
Transformation (UCP 2005).  
50 See C Darwin, On the Origin of Species (first published 1859, OUP 2008). 
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adaptation in which changes occur only in fits and starts.51 Both the UK and France 
exhibit elements of both of these strands of evolutionary path dependency, but in 
modern history the French have experienced far more explosive changes in their society 
and legal developments (consider that France has changed its Constitution no less than a 
dozen times since 1791).  
2.5.5 On the whole, “legal evolution” exhibits a combination of the two, but fundamentally, it 
is directly constrained by history.52 The legal possibilities for today and the future are 
determined by the evolutionary changes of the past, whether slow and steady or 
explosive and revolutionary.53 Given the close, if frequently adversarial, relationship 
that the UK and France have historically shared, and the fact that both have exercised 
considerable influence in the EU, they present two archetypal examples of how a state’s 
historical roots influence its approach to legal problems. 
2.6 Methodological Process: A Thematic Approach 
2.6.1 It must be acknowledged that a historical assessment such as the methodology described 
herein is an inherently interpretative process. However, by performing a deep 
investigation into the context of the rules under study, it may be possible to narrow the 
interpretation. Thus the more history examined relevant to the development of corporate 
rescue and employment protection, the closer to a “truth” the interpretation may 
realistically approach.54 As such, the Chapters of this treatise will be structured around 
relevant themes that analysis has revealed to have had a significant impact on the 
development of how employment protection is balanced with corporate rescue within 
the implementation of the ARD in the UK and France. These themes revolve around 
important historic-political events, the evolution of social policy, views of debt, and the 
relationship with Europe, all of which have shaped the aims and approaches to 
employment protection and corporate rescue. 
2.6.2 The first substantive Chapter of this thesis will explore the path to labour regulation and 
insolvency systems through a historical survey of the political, legal, economic, and 
                                                          
51 Hathaway, n39, 607. 
52 Hathaway, n39, 607. 
53 Ibid, 616. 
54 Posner, n38, 594. 
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social evolution of the UK and France. It will focus on important historical events that 
have shaped business and socially oriented legal areas, which in turn have shaped 
approaches and aims of employment regulation, insolvency law, and approaches to the 
implementation of EU Law. Although the historical events discussed in Chapter 2 may 
appear to be remote from the problem to be resolved, their impact on the political, 
social, economic, and cultural characteristics of each jurisdiction can be seen to have 
had a significant impact on legal development in the areas under study. The particular 
historical events that have been assessed as having an important influence on the paths 
toward the modern legal systems of the UK and France are the diverse impacts of 
feudalism, absolutism, and the Protestant Reformation; the impact of the Tudors; the 
Enlightenment; the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution; and the French 
Revolution. Events occurring during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are 
intertwined with the topics that will be discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
2.6.3  The third Chapter will discuss the foundations of the modern approaches to 
employment protection in the UK and France, which has been identified as growing out 
of proletarianisation, industrialisation, and the early emergence of labour regulation. It 
will deal specifically with the evolution of the proletariat comprising the working 
classes prior to the evolution of social policies aimed to protect them. The Industrial 
Revolution in England, its influences on France and the rest of Europe will be analysed, 
as will the theoretical basis for labour law. Following the emergence of the industrial 
working classes and eventual acceptance of collective bargaining, protective labour 
regulation began to emerge, out of which the Acquired Rights Directive would 
eventually evolve within the framework of the EU. In time, this Chapter will cover the 
evolution of social policy and labour law up to the point of the creation of the European 
Economic Community. 
2.6.4 The fourth Chapter will explore historical perspectives on debt, credit, and insolvency 
through an examination of the history of usury, the evolution of the corporate form, and 
the development of more complex financial markets. Views on debt had a significant 
impact on legal developments in the area of corporate law, financial instruments, and the 
ability to invest, which in turn impacted the progress of industrialisation and the 
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commercial economy. The evolution of insolvency from a punitive process to the 
development of rehabilitative aims will be explored in each jurisdiction. This Chapter 
will also discuss the relevant insolvency theories that have influenced the worldwide 
development of insolvency systems. Path dependent developments in corporate and 
financial law have had a significant impact on how the aims of insolvency systems and 
corporate rescue have been legislated.  
2.6.5 The fifth Chapter will examine EU social policy evolution and its influence on the 
Member States, particularly in the passage and reform of the ARD. Some history of the 
EU will provide context that reveals very different perspectives taken by the UK and 
France to the purposes and benefits of EU integration. It will discuss the development of 
EU social policy and the rescue culture and the eventual passage of the ARD, which 
draws the two areas of law together within the insolvency exception.55 The substantive 
provisions of the ARD relating to insolvency will be introduced and discussed in detail, 
as well as the relevant case law that has affected the development of the concept of 
acquired rights in both countries.  
2.6.6 The final substantive Chapter will examine the conflict present in the ARD between its 
social aims and the business needs for flexibility in insolvency, and offer a potential 
solution through EU level legal reform. It will draw together the paths explored in the 
first three substantive Chapters to encapsulate the influences on the evolution of 
acquired rights in corporate rescue procedures within the EU, as implemented by the UK 
and France. It will also examine criticism of the application of the ARD transfer 
provisions in corporate rescue procedures by professional organisations, through 
examples, and from survey responses received from insolvency practitioners. A 
statutory derogation will be recommended that provides an exemption from the 
application of the ARD to a selection of specifically identified corporate rescue 
procedures for a spectrum of companies based on employee numbers and turnover. 
Finally, the reception of the recommended reform will be discussed in light of the 
jurisdictional idiosyncrasies that have been revealed through the path dependent analysis 
given in the previous Chapters.  
                                                          
55 Article 5 of the ARD. 
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3 Conclusion 
3.1.1 This first Chapter has introduced the problem to be resolved: balancing corporate rescue 
and employment protection as provided for in the ARD and implemented by Member 
States. This problem is to be resolved through EU level legal reform that is intended to 
allow for a close implementation that should encourage more effective competition 
within the Common Market in relation to levels of social protection. Aligned 
implementation is to be achieved through a fundamental understanding of the 
jurisdiction-specific elements that affect the reception of law and the aims of regulation. 
Such fundamental understanding will be acquired through a comparative analysis of the 
path dependent, historical development of political, social, and economic characteristics 
that have developed from the historical experiences of each jurisdiction in those areas 
that directly impact the development of the aims of employment protection and 
corporate rescue.  
3.1.2 The next Chapter will explore the historical paths that each jurisdiction has travelled to 
arrive at their approaches to social policy and business. Important historical events that 
have shaped corporate law and social policy will be discussed. These historical events 
have guided the approach and aims of employment protection and corporate rescue and, 
over time, the approach to the implementation of EU law. Their impact on the political, 
social, economic, and cultural characteristics of each jurisdiction can be seen to have 
had a significant influence on legal development in the areas under study. Of particular 
importance are the diverse impacts of feudalism, absolutism, and the Protestant 
Reformation; the impact of the Tudor rule in England; the Enlightenment; the English 
Civil War and Glorious Revolution; and the French Revolution. The impact of these 
events has helped to build the foundations upon which modern French and British 
approaches to employment protection and corporate rescue are now based, thus having a 
concomitant impact on their intersection. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE PATH TO LABOUR REGULATION AND CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: A 
JOURNEY THROUGH EARLY FOUNDATIONAL HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 
  
“Study the past if you would define the future.” 
~ Confucius 
 
“Nescire autem quid antequam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum.”1  
~ Marcus Tullius Cicero 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Historical Events and the Approach to Legal Problems 
1.1.1 A nation’s political history inevitably affects how the modern function of political 
systems, business and economics, social policy, and regulatory style evolve over time. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the important historical events that have had a 
significant impact on the approaches to legal regulation in France and the UK and the 
paths they have travelled to arrive at their modern employment and insolvency systems. 
Employment protection regulations evolved out of the need to first control, and then 
protect, the working classes through the development of labour law. This process 
occurred in connection with industrialisation, which was highly influenced by the social, 
political, and economic characteristics unique to each legal system leading up to that 
developmental event.2  
1.1.2 The evolution of insolvency law in Britain and France, and their modern corporate 
rescue elements, can only be fully understood through their situation within the 
evolution of commercialism, the corporation, and the views that each jurisdiction has 
historically had regarding debt and credit. As such, an understanding of the social, 
political, and economic characteristics that have affected the evolution of commercial 
                                                          
1 To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child. 
2 See Chapter 3 of this Thesis for full development of these ideas.  
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law is necessary in order to fully understand its unique place and impact upon the legal 
systems of Britain and France.3  
1.1.3 There are a number of path dependent historical events that have guided the approach 
and aims of employment protection and corporate rescue in the UK and France and, 
over time, their approach to the implementation of EU law.4 The impact of diverse, 
historic occurrences on the political, social, economic, and cultural characteristics of 
each jurisdiction have had a significant impact on legal development. Of particular 
importance is the impact of feudalism, absolutism, and the Protestant and Counter 
Reformations; the Tudor rule in England; the Enlightenment; the English Civil War and 
the Glorious Revolution; and the French Revolution. The impact of these events form a 
part of the foundations upon which modern French and British approaches to social 
policy and corporate rescue are now based. These experiences have a concomitant 
impact on the intersecting balance of corporate rescue and employment protection. 
While there are a number of other important historical events that exerted influence on 
legal development, those discussed in this Chapter were chosen as major events that 
have not only influenced legal development, but also have led to the differences inherent 
in the two legal systems. 
2 The Evolution of the State and Political System 
2.1 An Introduction: Parallel Beginnings 
2.1.1 An understanding of the fundamental underpinnings of the state, its purpose, and its 
political system is an important starting point to understanding the distinctive 
characteristics that differentiate France and the UK. The French and English5 states 
evolved along parallel courses during ancient times and through the Dark Ages.6 Both 
territories were based on ancient tribal communal societies featuring warrior 
aristocracies and pagan religious classes with law based on tradition and custom. The 
                                                          
3 See Chapter 4 of this Thesis for a full development of these ideas.  
4 See Chapter 5 of this Thesis for a full discussion of the Acquired Rights Directive. 
5 Please note that England will be used in the historical context in which it belongs until such time that it is historically accurate to 
refer to the nation as Britain, Great Britain or the United Kingdom. The same applies to the use of “English” or “British” in relation 
to the people of this territory. 
6 Generally viewed as the 5th to 10th centuries, but also often referred to as the Early Middle Ages. 
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Roman Empire modernised governments and social structures7 and brought Christianity 
into Gaul and Britannia.8 Christianity eventually became a tool of authority and 
subjugation.9 European princes adopted a religious role that tied their subjects to them 
spiritually as well as politically. The influence of the Catholic Church would also place 
limitations upon state sovereignty until the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth 
century,10 despite the best efforts of some sovereigns, such as Henry II,11 to assert their 
independence from Rome.12 
2.1.2 Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire,13 the influence of ancient civilised 
culture began to fade and progress slowed. Both territories struggled through tribal 
invasions and migrations,14 although Britain largely remained a society based along 
tribal divisions. Christianity was a single common thread that eventually tied the diverse 
tribal migrants and Britons together. It served to bring unity to individual kingdoms and 
also to create what would become an English nation. Briton and tribal princes often 
derived their power to rule disparate kingdoms from their spiritual roles. Religion and 
government were intertwined, which would lead inexorably to the politicisation of the 
Church in the sixteenth century.15  
2.1.3 While the Gallo-Roman civilisation was nearly subsumed by the centuries of tribal 
migrations and invasions,16 the fundamental bases of the future French nation were also 
established between the fifth and eighth centuries. The recognisably modern French 
territory was established under Charlemagne17 as were the political and social structures 
of feudalism. It was not until the introduction of feudalism that the more distinctive 
characteristics of the French and English states begin to emerge.  
 
                                                          
7 P Ackroyd, The History of Britain Volume 1: Foundation (Pan Books 2012) 32; C Seignobos, A History of the French People (CA 
Phillips tr, first published 1933, Hesperides 2006) 37. 
8 Britannia refers to ancient Roman Britain and Gaul to the territory of modern France, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
9 P Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (first published 1974, Verso 2013) 129-133. 
10 C Seignobos, A History of the French People (CA Phillips tr, first published 1933, Hesperides 2006) 45-66; Anderson, n9 129-
133. 
11 1133-1189, reigned 1154-1189.  
12 See P Ackroyd, The History of England Volume 1: Foundation (Pan Books 2011) 130-150.  
13 476AD; N Davies, Europe: A History (Pimlico 1997) 149-212.  
14 See N Davies, Europe: A History (Pimlico 1997) 215-238.  
15 JM Kelly, A Short History of Western Legeal Theory (OUP 1992) 86 &114. 
16 Anderson, n9 112-113. 
17 Charles the Great (742-814), reigned 800-814. 
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2.2 The Development of Feudalism  
2.2.1 Feudalism was a fusion of the Roman manorial and Germanic communal modes of 
production that first evolved in France. It was a legal, military, and social system that 
introduced greater stability relative to the chaos and violence of the Dark Ages. Feudal 
social hierarchy, influenced in part by the stratification in Roman society, was created 
by Charlemagne who granted honours and benefits of land linked to official positions of 
power to his knights in return for their sworn military service. This fused the honours 
system with vassalage. Feudal positions were accompanied by immunities that would 
later become privileges associated with the ancien régime.18 
2.2.2 The French political tradition of granting honours filtered through the hierarchy of 
nobility once infeudation became hereditary, which is when feudalism truly came into 
operation.19 Grants of land subdivided noble territories and served to weaken the central 
power of the king as each subdivision would become a fresh centre of authority.20 The 
power of some hereditary fiefs would eventually rival the power of the monarchy during 
the Middle Ages. The feudal kings of France derived their ruling power from a moral 
authority gained through their traditional religious roles and ecclesiastic validation from 
the Church. The power of the king was eventually strengthened by the involvement of 
the French nobility in the Crusades and the nobles’ frequent failure to return from them 
or returning bankrupt, effectively reducing their ability to exercise as much power 
against the king.21 However, true centralisation would not occur until much later. 
2.2.3 English society had been evolving independently toward consolidated social hierarchies 
with a subordinated peasantry since the seventh century. However, the social structure in 
England prior to the importation of feudalism did not have the fusion of honours for 
sworn service present in France.22 While contemporaneous kings did exist, the country 
was effectively centralised in the tenth century. The small regional nobility did not 
                                                          
18 Anderson, n9, 139-141; The ancien régime refers to the feudal social and political structure of France prior to the French 
Revolution. 
19 Davies, n14, 298-316. 
20 Anderson, n9; and C Seignobos, A History of the French People (CA Phillips tr, first published 1933, Hesperides 2006) 80-81. 
21 C Jenkins, A Brief History of France: People, History and Culture (Constable and Robinson Limited 2011) 23-29. 
22 Anderson, n9, 158-161. 
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retain the independence nor wield the power common in France.23 Land was shared 
communally in a system based largely on German tradition until the eleventh century.24  
2.2.4 Feudalism did not fully arrive in England until it was imposed by William the 
Conqueror25 following his victory in 1066 at the Battle of Hastings, at which time all 
land was confiscated and distributed among his designated feudal lords. All vassals in 
the hierarchy were required to swear allegiance, not only to their immediate lords, but 
also to the conquering sovereign, in contrast to the decentralised feudal duties owed in 
France. Unlike France, which continued to contain pockets of privately held (“allodial”) 
land, England was placed under the strict feudal doctrine of nulle terre sans seigneur 
(no land without a lord).26 The Anglo-Norman state eventually became the most unified 
and solidified institutional system in Western Europe.27 
2.3 The Renaissance and State Sovereignty 
2.3.1 The fourteenth to sixteenth centuries were periods of absolute kings accompanied by a 
break from the ignorance and superstition of the Dark Ages, with the arrival of 
Renaissance thinking and humanist methodology.28 Innovations in religion, culture, 
economics, and statecraft of this period were heavily influenced by the influx of 
Renaissance ideas, primarily from Italy.29 Scientific discoveries implied knowledge 
beyond that of the Church, undermining the spectre of its omnipotence.30 The 
development of Protestantism fragmented the Christian European states to such an 
extent that a secular Europe eventually replaced Christendom.31 The individualist 
approach of the Protestant Reformation appealed to independent-minded princes as it 
confirmed the legitimacy and sovereignty of their rule, while maintaining the existing 
social order.32 It was the end of a religiously unified Europe and the beginning of state 
sovereignty and individualism.  
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2.3.2 There was a steady rise and expansion of centralised monarchical governments and their 
attendant bureaucracies. Humanist principles influenced both the English Tudor and the 
French Bourbon monarchs. While in England, the progressive (though often selfishly 
motivated) nature of the Tudors fundamentally changed the social, political, economic, 
and religious aspects of the country, France retained its fervent Catholic character and 
kept its social structure closely tied to the feudal structure of the previous century.33  
2.4 Catholicism and the Reformation  
2.4.1 The power of the princes of Christendom had been limited by the application of papal 
authority since the integration of Catholicism into the Roman Empire. However, the 
power of the papacy over the sovereignty of English kings had slowly been reducing 
since the fourteenth century through various statutes forbidding praemunire.34 Through 
the sixteenth century and, in particular, during the time of Henry VIII35 the reach of the 
papacy was greatly curtailed and eventually usurped following the failure to 
satisfactorily resolve Henry’s “Great Affayre.”36 Papal authority over state affairs was 
abolished, making it possible to rule with unlimited sovereignty.37Eventually the Tudors 
created a lasting version of the Church of England beyond papal control,38 resulting in 
the authority of the crown being accepted to rule over local authorities and customs. The 
power of British monarchs was further centralised39 during the reign of Elizabeth I.40 
2.4.2 Following the Renaissance, French kings pursued a political philosophy of French 
hegemony, which pushed its rulers and nobility to pursue expansionist policies. Their 
actions enshrined the notion that France embodied not just national, but universal values 
and the belief that the primary role of the state was to enforce these values. French 
society measured itself against ancient societies and desired to surpass them, to establish 
its own advanced society of grandeur, order, and harmony. It was in part this 
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fundamental desire to recapture the near legendary social advancement of ancient 
civilisations that pushed French rulers to pursue wars in Italy and Spain in order to 
create a new Holy Roman Empire in its own image.41 
2.4.3 While France also suffered through the Protestant Reformation and struggled through a 
series of Wars of Religion,42 which were in reality clever disguises for battles over a 
weakened crown,43 Catholicism retained its position as the national religion. Although 
the Edict of Nantes44 allowed the French Protestant Huguenots (Calvinists) to enjoy 
certain rights in some areas of France, Calvinism became the religion of a minority 
continually forced to defend itself against persecution.45 Following the Edict that 
effectively ended the Wars of Religion, Henri IV46 was able to restore finances and 
encourage innovation in industry and agriculture, laying down the groundwork for a 
successful Bourbon monarchy, which would usher in a century of prosperity and the 
cultural ascendancy of France in Europe.47 
2.5 The Enlightenment 
2.5.1 The innovative thinking of the Enlightenment pushed Renaissance humanism toward 
even more rationalist approaches based on human reason and intelligence. 
Enlightenment attitudes carried profound scepticism towards traditional systems of 
authority and orthodoxy.48 Given the masses of intellectual questioning that occurred 
during this period, it is not surprising that resistance to the antiquated social organisation 
of the ancien régime would find reflection in the political thought of the Enlightenment. 
The growth of more than one Christian denomination also began to temper the bigotry, 
intolerance, and fanaticism that characterised the clashes of the sixteenth century. 
Enlightened rationalism required the presence of rival beliefs to create a clash of ideas 
and eventually led to the presence of some level of tolerance within which a rational 
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dialogue could take place. Religious unity was no longer necessary to maintain order in 
a state.49  
2.5.2 Enlightenment ideals also invited innovations in statehood. The social contract model 
was used to support both absolutism and limited government, though the perception of 
man’s fundamental qualities differed. For example, Locke50 advocated limited 
government in which powers are separated between legislative and executive branches 
whose existence is justified through the consent of the governed to achieve specific ends 
desired by them,51 but also asserted that man has rights balanced with obligations that 
human morality is conditioned to keep. He also defended the private ownership of 
property and supported the extra-political weight commonly given to those possessing 
greater wealth.52  
2.5.3 The perception of human nature became accepted as being more civilised and 
disciplined, which is a reversal of the previous perceptions of human nature as being 
naturally competitive and selfish, requiring external control to temper the chaos of the 
unlimited pursuit of one’s desires to achieve the most beneficial position.53 French 
writers made their impact in exile from the more tolerant European nations. They 
criticised and encouraged the reformation of their country’s outdated regime. Others 
spoke in defence of absolutism and the divine right of kings.54 Montesquieu55 believed 
that, in man’s original condition of fear, he would eventually be encouraged to associate 
for mutual protection. Thus mankind at some time in the past made a conscious 
collective decision to create a society of humans which became the civil state. Creating 
a society out of chaos and violence would give humans the ability to assert control over 
their lives through the institutions created by them to do so.56 It was through the will of 
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humans to be governed that the state came into existence and through its requirements 
for order that its leaders achieve their limited power.  
2.5.4 Montesquieu applied Locke’s concept of separation of powers57 to French 
Enlightenment thinking, along with a separate judiciary branch. He noted that, in an 
absolutist monarchy, he who commands the execution of the law generally believes that 
he is above it.58 This was a fair reflection on the state of affairs in France at the time. 
Enforcement during the ancien régime was lax and unequal; the government would bend 
the law to its will in order to facilitate its own ends. The idea that political or legal 
institutions could be criticised was in itself revolutionary.59 At the end of the eighteenth 
century, government was no longer considered a spontaneous continuation of ancient 
communities, but had become an ideological construct separate from the dynastic power 
of the previous centuries.60  
2.5.5 Rousseau61 was also an important advocate of the social contract concept, though with 
radical differences. While his work did not necessarily form a part of the accepted 
political thinking of the time, his ideas would influence the more radicalised French 
revolutionaries, as well as justifying some of the autocratic regimes of the twentieth 
century. He suggested that far from being a bargain to exchange the submission of the 
governed for protection by the government, it was only in an equitable society that each 
individual member would give all of his rights and freedoms to the general will of the 
community. This association creates a corporate body with its own morality composed 
of a unity of equally empowered voters having a common identity. His social contract is 
not just an explanation but a justification for the existence of the state, which he 
envisages as being composed of the general will of the people. While he did not live to 
see the French Revolution, his communitarian vision is evident in its underlying 
ideological theme, reacting against the absolutism of the ancien régime.62 
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2.6 The “Enlightened” English State 
2.6.1 Until the seventeenth century, the English Parliament, while a legislative institution 
purposed with curbing royal power, was often used to achieve the personal desires of 
sovereigns by imposing their wishes upon it.63 Laws were often enacted at the insistence 
of the royal executive, which failed to recognise parliamentary independence or 
sovereignty. The English Civil War64 occurred in part due to a power conflict between 
competing camps supporting parliamentary sovereignty against the divine right of 
kings.65 The English Civil War also involved disputes about religion and the discontent 
of the masses due to levels of taxation, persecution, high prices and low wages, famine, 
plague, land enclosure, and an inequitable balance of trade.66 A brief, violent, and 
relatively unsuccessful English Commonwealth67 was created as a result of the 
Parliamentarian triumph and a written constitution was issued based on radically 
religious ideology. The Republic fell to its own ambition after a few short years and a 
differently composed constitutional monarchy was re-established.68  
2.6.2 The experience of the Civil War and the Commonwealth raised awareness of the 
potential for a more democratic society based on separation of powers, in line with the 
models promoted by Enlightenment philosophers. The presence of these enlightened 
political ideals is apparent in the resistance to the Stuart power struggles that ended in 
the Glorious Revolution.69 Disagreements about parliamentary sovereignty and the 
tendency of Stuart monarchs toward an absolutist, Catholic regime resulted in the 
crowning of the Dutch stadtholder, William of Orange,70 and Mary Stuart71 as joint, 
Protestant rulers of England,72 contingent upon their agreement to certain constitutional 
documents that subjected the power of the throne to parliamentary sovereignty.73 
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2.6.3 The English Bill of Rights74 was a progressive constitutional document that would 
provide some inspiration for the revolutionary ideals that affected all of Western Europe 
a century later. Reflected in the political writings of Locke, the Bill of Rights provides 
that the king is subject to the law and that legislation and taxation was the province of 
Parliament alone. It took away the monarch’s arbitrary powers relating to warfare and 
imprisonment. It also insisted upon the free election of members of Parliament and 
guaranteed free speech and debates within Parliament.75 The new constitutional 
arrangements shifted the balance of power away from the crown.76  
2.6.4 The purpose of the Glorious Revolution, rather than being led by disenfranchised, 
mistreated middle and peasant classes as occurred during the French Revolution, was to 
save the political and Protestant religious establishment from absolutist and radical 
proposals made by the Catholic king, James II.77 Protestant succession to the throne was 
enshrined in law and religious toleration was extended to Protestant dissidents, though 
not to Catholics. It also was here that the fundamental British constitutional value 
guaranteeing the sovereignty of Parliament was firmly established, carrying with it an 
abhorrence of absolute, despotic power. This differs significantly from the doctrine of 
the sovereignty of the people that was adopted following the French Revolution. It also 
differs fundamentally as it does not operate through a formal constitution, but through 
an unwritten constitution that includes the Bill of Rights, sundry legislation, and 
conventions.78  
2.6.5 In the eighteenth century, the role of the British monarchy within the executive branch 
of the government rapidly declined. While the Hanoverian kings appointed ministers, 
the composition of the government came to reflect the majority of Parliament, which 
over time became a constitutional convention persisting to this day. The British model 
also acted as a source of inspiration for political thinkers on the Continent, but the 
constitutional monarchy was not copied in any of the democratic republics that would 
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evolve later.79 However, Britain’s experience during the American Revolution80 would 
raise issues in the European consciousness regarding fundamental political principals as 
it challenged the foundation of European monarchies. In fact, the American Declaration 
of Independence81 enshrined the Enlightenment ideals of Locke’s contract theory, 
English legalism, Montesquieu’s thoughts on the separation of power, and Rousseau’s 
concept of the general will.82  
2.7 The “Enlightened” French State 
2.7.1 Pre-revolutionary France witnessed the development of the territorial state out of the 
feudal and dynastic lands of the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. This was 
accompanied by the expansion of central government and a de-personification of the 
sovereign as the government became more specialised, professional, and 
institutionalised.83 Central state machinery that subordinated local and religious interests 
to national interests was instituted. Public opinion was controlled by censoring the press 
and forbidding regional parlements84 from discussing state affairs.85 By the time Louis 
XIV86 took power, the regional princes of France had been reduced to submission, 
regional parlements had been tamed, and he had the advantage of an experienced body 
of officials who were well trained in the administration of the realm. The absolute 
monarchy and the power it wielded operated at times arbitrarily and in secret, 
imprisoning in the Bastille anyone who incurred the displeasure of the throne.87  
2.7.2 Louis XIV took the Christian absolute monarchy and the divine right of kings to the 
extreme.88 His desire for absolute power extended to the choice of national religion,89 
revoking the Edict of Nantes in 1685. The consistent persecution and restrictions applied 
to the Huguenots caused the flight of 200,000 into exile, impoverishing the country due 
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to the heavy loss of economically active merchants and artisans.90 By the end of his 
reign, France’s finances were in a ruinous state, weakening the monarchy significantly. 
The country was left with a debt so heavy that it could not possibly be paid. 
Unbelievers, philosophers, and sceptics had greater freedom due to the weakness of the 
king’s power and disseminated their opinions openly,91 eventually influencing the ideals 
that would inspire the leaders of the French Revolution.  
2.7.3 The Fronde92 was a revolt by the citizens of Paris, the Parisian parlement, those of the 
commercially powerful bourgeois Third Estate held aloof from the government, and the 
armies returning from Germany, against exploitative tax collection. It exemplified the 
frustration of the classes who would later lead the French Revolution. French rebels 
drew some encouragement from the success of the English Civil War in which the 
English Parliament had managed to defeat the king of England. While the Fronde was 
defeated due to the lack of a united front,93 it was a sign of things to come. 
2.8 The French Revolution 
2.8.1 The French Revolution was a fundamental turning point in French politics, law, 
economics, social policy, and culture. It was also a turning point for the nature of 
Europe and views of the purpose of the state. The influence of Enlightenment ideals 
challenged the irrational human condition and the status quo,94 which French monarchs 
worked consistently to maintain. French revolutionaries inherited the humanist belief in 
a universal abstraction of man and felt that they were acting on behalf of all humanity 
against universal tyranny. A revolution promised liberation from traditional oppression 
connected to feudal hierarchies and organised religion. It was the beginning of a French 
national identity. For Europe, it provided a lesson against the dangers of any form of 
tyranny, whether absolutist, parliamentary, or republican in nature.95  
2.8.2 The liberal bourgeois leaders of the Revolution combined elements of Enlightenment 
philosophies and vulgarised them to suit their purposes. In the liberalist ideology, man is 
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viewed as an independent actor whose behaviour is determined through the operation of 
certain general and universal natural laws. The first among these is the striving for self-
preservation and personal happiness, which if pursued by all people freely, serves the 
common interest. Despite previous dogma, human nature does not prevent the rational 
ordering of society and should therefore not be suppressed. Further, man’s natural 
pursuit of individual happiness forms the basis of the wealth of a nation by man’s drive 
to better himself through economic activity. Given the foregoing, the state should not 
suppress man’s natural liberty; rather, it should guarantee it as well as the free workings 
of the market.96 These Enlightenment ideals of reform were summed up in two of the 
three pillars of the revolution: liberty and equality.97 
2.8.3 The French Revolution was primarily a rebellion against the pillars of the ancien 
régime. Nepotism and corruption in the appointed public office holders exercising royal 
control in the provinces was ubiquitous. New institutions were established alongside 
ancient ones, leading to a confused and expensively redundant bureaucracy. Those 
engaged in public functions were recruited by the sale of offices, inducing the 
government to create more offices to increase revenues, which was done prolifically in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to pay for nearly constant warfare.98 
French finances had been poorly managed and were near bankruptcy due to defeat in 
war, frivolous spending of the royalty and an ineffective administration. The fairness of 
the system of tax collection was questioned, and numerous finance ministers tried in 
succession to apply certain taxes to the feudal elite (the clergy and nobility of the First 
and Second Estates) in order to ease the extreme burden on the peasantry of the Third 
Estate, and to finance the enormous debt accrued in the previous century, but these were 
always indignantly resisted by the parlements. Though the kings recognised the need, 
they habitually capitulated to the power of the nobility. The kings’ weakness in this 
regard strengthened the power of the parlements, which refused to register new taxes or 
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admit members from the Third Estate, and clung, tightly, to the status quo, while 
encouraging opposition to the Church and the throne.99  
2.8.4 The country was in crisis and the ruling elite were incapable of dealing with it, 
effectively blind to the setting they were creating from their own greed, which would 
precede their downfall. Due to a lack of political representation, there were no means of 
gauging public opinion. In the serf populated countryside and proletarian Paris, there 
were no means of regulating the fear and anger at consistent poverty and deprivation. 
There were no institutions present in the absolutist regime to affect reforms; as such, the 
solution generally espoused was to break down the ancient structures entirely and start 
again.100  
2.8.5 It was a combination of ignorance and indecision in the centre of government, combined 
with large scale panic among those suffering the most, as well as the unchecked 
dissemination of revolutionary propaganda101 that provided the catalyst for the 
catastrophe. The crisis reached its zenith when the bankrupt king summoned his long 
neglected états généraux102 in order to enlist their aid in resolving the crisis.103 A liberal 
minded bourgeoisie based in the elite of the Third Estate provided the impetus for this 
first stage of revolution, which was primarily an elitist bid to reform the royal 
government.104 However, the aims and means of achieving goals of the Revolution 
would change frequently and would continue to bring instability to continental Europe 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
2.8.6 The details of the events of the French Revolution are less important than their impact 
upon the French political system. In spite of the terror and violence, progress was made 
in the eventual establishment of the modern French state. The mass of the nation was 
now involved in its political future while the privileged classes were in a minority.105 
The three Estates, privilege, and the entire apparatus of serfdom was abolished, as was 
                                                          
99 Jenkins, n21, 92-93. 
100 Kelly, n15, 251. 
101 Jenkins, n21, 107. 
102 General Estates - legislative and consultative assembly of the different classes (or states) of French subjects of the ancien régime. 
103 Davies, n14, 693. 
104 Lesaffer, n29, 404. 
105 Seignobos, n45, 282; Jenkins, n21, 102. 
40 
 
indirect and arbitrary taxation and restrictions on trade, including guild requirements.106 
The separation of the executive, legislative, and judiciary was recognised107 and the 
independence of the judiciary was guaranteed. All pre-existing courts were disbanded 
and replaced by a constitutionally designed hierarchy of courts through which 
administrative and legal unification of the country was achieved and internal 
sovereignty accomplished.108  
2.8.7 France shrugged off the layered robe of bureaucracy and outdated systems and created 
new institutions and a system based on a single uniform plan applying to the whole of 
the realm.109 By 1815, the bourgeois and landowning classes had emerged as the 
dominant power in France. Feudalism had been dismantled while social order and 
contractual relations were consolidated through the Napoleonic Codes, thanks to the rise 
and fall of Bonaparte.110 The French Revolution also helped to establish democratic 
institutions such as elections, representative government, and constitutions. 111  
2.8.8 One enduring legal development was the concept of human rights, which was written 
into constitutional form in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.112 
This document encapsulated the zenith of fundamental human rights in the eighteenth 
century.113 It comprised rational, logical, and visionary statements of principle, which 
were directed toward governing the state. The constitutional protections of fundamental 
rights and liberties were derived from the belief that as the liberty and power of an 
individual were limited by the reciprocal duties to the state, and as state power is derived 
from these duties, then there must also be a limitation on the power of the state.114  
2.8.9 The French Declaration went further as it was designed to counter the abuses prevalent 
during the ancien régime by creating specific rights in counterpoint to the primary 
complaints against which the French Revolution was fought. It proclaimed men free and 
equal in their rights and identified that the fundamental aim of civil government was to 
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defend those natural and imprescriptible rights of man: liberty, property, security and 
resistance to oppression.115 By setting the tone with this document, France would 
continue to add to the list of legally protected rights while the French people would 
continue to agitate for better conditions and treatment. It was France who introduced the 
concept of droits acquis,116 which refers to the legal rule that once certain rights have 
been vested in their beneficiaries under the law, they cannot be taken away. While in the 
United Kingdom, there are rules against the passing of laws with a retroactive effect, the 
same protection of vested rights does not exist in such an inviolable form.117 
2.8.10 The violence and the political change associated with the French Revolution would 
continue for twenty five years, would be increasingly radicalised, and eventually would 
destroy itself and its leaders. However, even this is not the end of the revolutionary 
impulses of the French people as they would continue to agitate for better political 
representation, working conditions, and freedom throughout the nineteenth century. The 
stability of the French state would not be certain until after the First World War, at the 
end of the so-called “Long Nineteenth Century”.118 
2.9 The English Constitutional Monarchy and Unitary Democracy 
2.9.1 While France struggled with revolution, republic, empire, and all of the violence and 
upheaval associated with them, Britain was generally expanding and growing, becoming 
the greatest economic power of the nineteenth century. British solidarity was enhanced 
due to a series of naval victories and the constant perceived threat of invasion by 
continental neighbours. Britain’s colonial, economic, and commercial power was also 
growing. The General Enclosure Act119 had also greatly accelerated social changes. The 
Industrial Revolution was in full swing and agitation for labour reform was beginning to 
occur. The first Luddite attacks occurred in Nottingham in 1811, while Napoleon was 
still trying to broaden the horizons of his French Empire.120 
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2.9.2 Britain largely escaped the effects of the French Revolution by pre-empting similar 
problems through legislative reactions, as well as all of the international border fluidity 
that had occurred throughout Europe.121 However, while free of occupation or conquest, 
it was shaken by the revolutionary wars taking place on the Continent. Britain had 
traditionally sought to prevent Europe from being dominated by a single power, which 
could potentially threaten the sovereignty of Britain and its colonial empire. As the 
French revolutionary armies, and later Napoleon, advanced across Europe, Britain 
became an irreconcilable foe of the Revolution and the French Empire out of the need to 
preserve its own interests.122 Despite repelling foreign attacks and waging war against 
the European threat, there were moments when revolution was a real possibility in 
Britain. Nearly constant warring with France from the beginning of the Revolution in 
1789 made any internal political reforms difficult.123 However, reforms to the electoral 
system were implemented in the Reform Act of 1832,124 which reduced the power of the 
rural gentry and increased the power of the urban middle classes. 125  
2.9.3 Britain of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries encapsulated the highpoint of 
modernity. It was the home of the Industrial Revolution decades before continental 
Europe would undertake the commercial and economic changes required to encourage 
industrial progress. Through its dominance of global trade it was able to restrict the wars 
to Continental territories.126 Its form of government had been reasonably settled since 
the Bill of Rights127 set up the constitutional monarchy in 1689. While the voting 
franchise was yet to be extended fully, Britain enjoyed a stability uncommon to the rest 
of Europe.  
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3 Conclusion 
3.1 Different Histories Influencing Different Legal Approaches 
3.1.1 While Britain and France evolved along parallel lines in terms of their statehood and 
political systems from Roman times through to the Middle Ages, they began to diverge 
as early as the eleventh century. While both were feudal in nature, English feudalism 
had been imported and imposed by its Norman conquerors.128 While the French feudal 
system evolved somewhat organically as the gifts of land and privilege were 
disseminated further and further from the centre, effectively dispersing the central 
authority of the king, the Norman conquerors recognised this as a problem and created a 
system that circumvented it by requiring that vassals also swear allegiance to their 
sovereign. Thus, by as early as the eleventh century, the English monarchy was 
effectively centralised while its French counterparts continued to rely upon a moral 
authority and loyalty purchased through royal gifts.129 
3.1.2 The fifteenth century saw further differentiation. Although both regimes effectively 
consolidated power at this time, France and England diverged in the Protestant 
Reformation. In England, the creation of a non-Catholic state religion allowed it to sever 
its dependence upon Rome and become a state of unlimited sovereignty over both 
politics and religion.130 The Catholic faith was retained as the national religion in 
France, as well as a subtle intolerance for progressive philosophical or religious ideas, 
keeping the French physiocrats from influencing their own country until the French 
Revolution.131 English rationalism and individualism would, however, see it through to 
the first Industrial Revolution years ahead of similar progress in France.  
3.1.3 The dissolution of the monasteries also had a profound effect on the economy of 
England. The suppression of religions houses and sale of their property helped the 
English economy to grow and increased an enthusiasm for profit as theological attitudes 
began to change with the separation of the political and spiritual. The Reformation in 
England had a fundamental effect on attitudes toward capitalism as a focus on 
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individuality and hard work became a more accepted way of life.132 As early as the 
sixteenth century in England, capitalist behaviours can be observed as the laws of the 
market steadily replaced custom and tradition. France would never see a widespread 
acceptance of capitalism, but it would be accepting of liberalism for certain periods 
during the French Revolution.  
3.1.4 While England and France both had highly stratified class systems throughout the 
Middle Ages, France systematically destroyed its ancien régime in a series of more or 
less decisive acts of revolution.133 The class system in England endured, though its strict 
feudal character fell away as industrialisation progressed. However, there was not the 
same violent rejection of class as there was in France. Rather, the countrymen of the 
regions desired to retain traditional ways, rather than progress away from superstition 
and subservience. In a sense, the imposition of top down changes during the Tudor era 
seemed to instil a stronger loyalty to tradition in England, while the opposite was true in 
France.134  
3.1.5 Britain was able to evolve gradually toward a more liberal mind set while France 
suffered immediate and catastrophic changes during the French Revolution. The English 
Civil War influenced England’s dealings with the royal executive in the decades to 
come, culminating in the Glorious Revolution and the English Bill of Rights.135 This in 
part set the stage for the French Revolution, though without the quantity of violently 
despotic leaders and the significant death toll. By the time of the French Revolution the 
United Kingdom had already settled into a constitutional monarchy, though an electoral 
reform that extended the franchise outside of the wealthy would take nearly 150 years to 
arrive.136  
3.1.6 The French republican system and the British unitary democracy within a constitutional 
monarchy are today not so very different than their histories suggest. However, the 
events leading to their development differ such that it can be expected that approaches to 
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legal regulation are affected. The socially democratic leanings of France influence the 
interventionist methods of legal regulation while the more liberal democratic style of the 
United Kingdom tends to avoid intervention in the market if possible. France also places 
a constitutional value on the concept of human dignity and individual human rights,137 
and although the UK recognises these concepts, it is not a central foundation of its legal 
system. This has led France to present a legal bias toward the individual employee over 
businesses, while the UK tends to retain an outlook that espouses economically liberal 
ideals, preferring to leave employee rights to the vagaries of the free market. Thus, the 
diverse religious, social, economic, and political-historical experiences of Britain and 
France have had a direct effect on their approaches to social and commercial regulation.  
3.2 Transition 
3.2.1 The foregoing Chapter has explored several specific historical events that are argued as 
having a significant influence on the development of legal approaches to regulation. 
These experiences have impacted upon political views, legal systems, social 
considerations, and economic aspects of a jurisdiction and are important elements that 
affect legislative aims. The establishment of the differences between the evolution of 
these ideals in the UK and France have provided the foundation upon which the 
evolution of labour regulation and, in due course, insolvency systems can be built. 
3.2.2 The next Chapter will explore the proletarianisation of labour in both the United 
Kingdom and France and the process of industrialisation in both jurisdictions. It is 
within the framework of the Industrial Revolution that a more recognisably modern 
regulatory systems emerged. The differences in the regulatory styles of each system also 
become apparent in how each deals with the social ills occurring as a result of 
industrialisation. The evolution of labour regulation will then be traced from its genesis 
in the Industrial Revolution until the emergence of the European Union as an influence 
on British and French social policy regulation.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
PROLETARIANISATION, INDUSTRIALISATION, AND THE EMERGENCE OF LABOUR 
REGULATION IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN1 
 
“Capital is dead labour, which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, 
and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.” 
 ~ Karl Marx 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Historical Survey in Review 
1.1.1 While evolving toward modernity in terms of statehood, the law, economics, and 
society, the UK and France encountered different historical events that influenced the 
particular characteristics that define each jurisdiction. Differences in feudalism led 
France into the ancien régime practices,2 while the centralised character of English 
feudalism allowed the English state to more effectively consolidate its government in 
advance of the French state.3 England was further assisted by the separation of the 
English church from Rome, which established state sovereignty in England and 
provided a significant financial boon as a result of the dissolution of monastic houses. 
The late medieval focus on the individual nature of religion in England also encouraged 
attitudes supporting individual hard work as a means of attaining not only paradise, but 
also wealth.4 The retention of Catholicism in France, in addition to its typically 
traditionalist character, was coupled with subtle intolerance for progressive ideas, which 
would effectively slow French economic growth and delay industrial progress, albeit the 
                                                          
1 Portions of this chapter were presented in conference presentations given at the Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual 
Conference in Aberdeen and at the Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference in Nottingham in April 2014. See Annex 2 
Publication 5.  
2 See Chapter 2 section 2.2.2. 
3 Ibid, 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 
4 Ibid, 2.4.1.  
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same ideas would also inform the philosophical underpinnings of French 
revolutionaries.5 
1.1.2 Both jurisdictions underwent social and economic developments, but the means and 
character of those changes differed on a fundamental level. The catastrophic changes 
that occurred during the French Revolution led to more immediate and significant 
changes affecting the rate at which new legislation and legislative reforms took place 
over time.6 Further, the ideological basis of modern France as influenced by 
revolutionary philosophy has influenced the approach to legal regulation, putting an 
emphasis on human dignity and individual rights. The Declaration of Rights of Man and 
the Citizen7 started France on a path toward acquiring more and greater social rights. 
The French system also relies on the policy of droits acquis,8 which makes it 
particularly difficult to lessen protective regulation once it has been put in place.9 
1.1.3 In the UK, the Glorious Revolution, while not a revolution as such, amounted to 
recognition of a preference for parliamentary sovereignty over absolutism that was 
integrated into the constitutional underpinnings of the country beginning with the time 
of the English Civil War.10 Change came about slowly and gradually in the UK, 
however, which would be a lasting and fundamental characteristic of the British political 
system, differentiating it significantly from the French political system. In addition to 
the civil character of its legal system, the revolutionary character of France helped to 
justify ongoing interventionist tendencies in areas of law, economics, and society about 
which the UK would be cautious or otherwise inhibited to duplicate.11  
 
 
                                                          
5 Ibid, 2.4.3.  
6 Ibid, 2.8.7. 
7 1789. 
8 Acquired rights. 
9 Chapter 2, section 2.8.9. 
10 Ibid, 2.6.2. 
11 Ibid, 3.1. 
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1.2 An Introduction to Industrialisation and Proletarianisation12 
1.2.1 The differences in approach taken by France and the UK toward labour regulation13 
during industrialisation influenced their reactions to the social ills caused by it.14 
Industrialisation was an important turning point in French and English attitudes toward 
the working classes, business, economics, and labour regulation. These attitudes in turn 
feed into the political, legal, economic, and social policies of each jurisdiction, 
influencing the aims of regulation.  
1.2.2 Britain moved organically into an economically liberal mode of production by the early 
eighteenth century, while France struggled with revolution and autocracy until the end 
of the First World War.15 With a political structure based in liberal constitutionalism 
came the push toward capitalism, the ideals of the free market, and eventually 
industrialisation. By the time industrialisation occurred in Britain, it had already 
conquered its colonial and international markets and was largely devoid of any external 
competitive pressure. In France, industrialisation had to be forced and to some extent 
managed by the state in order to protect it against the imperialism of Britain’s free 
trade.16  
1.2.3 France’s process of industrialisation was less revolutionary, resembling a slow evolution 
of systems, processes, and ideas. As late as the 1880s, the old economic sectors 
remained the primary source of growth. Agricultural production was still a fundamental 
aspect of the economy while industry was divided into a small, concentrated, and 
dynamic modern sector, and a traditional sector that still relied on home craft work and 
the dispersion of industry in the rural areas. There was never the massive and rapid 
transfer of manpower from agriculture to the industrial centres in France, such as 
occurred in Britain a few decades after industrialisation had begun.17 
                                                          
12 This section formed part of a paper given at the INSOL International Academic Colloquium conference in Hong Kong in March 
2014 entitled “Obstacles to Cross-Border Insolvency and Employment Protection Coordination in the European Union: Examples 
from the UK and France” which then formed the basis for an article entitled “Path Dependent Obstacles to Cross-Border Insolvency: 
a Social Darwinian Perspective” 2015 3 NIBLeJ 7. See Annex 2 Publication 3. 
13 References to labour law or regulation should be taken to include employment law or regulation and vice versa.  
14 B Hepple and P O’Higgins (eds), The Making of Labour Law in Europe: a Comparative Study of nine Countries up to 1945 (first 
published 1986, Hart 2010) 5-6. 
15 Hereafter referred to as “WWI”. 
16 R Price, Labour in British Society (Routledge 1986) 16. 
17 M Despax, J Rojot and J-P Laborde, Labour Law in France (Kluwer 2011) 209-210. 
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1.2.4 Britain’s early industrialisation meant that the modern business enterprise began to 
emerge before the legal system could adjust from late-medieval or early modern forms 
of regulation. The contract of employment and companies limited by share capital had 
not yet fully developed when industrialisation was well under way. However, in France, 
private law codes were introduced decades before large scale industrialisation began and 
were therefore able to support the emergence of industrial enterprises. The differences in 
scale and speed of industrialisation had profound effects upon the legal and economic 
development of British and French societies.18  
1.2.5 For Britain, one consequence of its unbalanced pace of industrialisation juxtaposed to 
legal developments was the persistence of the quasi-penal master and servant model of 
the employment relationship, which served to institutionalise the conception of the 
enterprise as the unencumbered private property of the employer to which employees 
were subordinated. The new economic relationship of employer and employee was 
based upon the capital provided by the employer for the employee to use in order to 
perform the services for which he was being paid. The employee often became wholly 
dependent upon the industrial employer, in some cases for food, shelter, and the 
education of children, as well as for the tools and place of his trade.19 This can be 
contrasted with the French concepts of work relations, which moved quickly from penal 
sanctions to an imposed juridical equality between worker and employer that was 
embodied in legal codes. The employer’s control over employees and an employee’s 
natural position of subordination was tempered by the development of mandatory social 
legislation, the ordre public social.20 
1.2.6 Labour regulation developed following or in a disconnected parallel to industrialisation. 
It could, therefore, be surmised that the implementation of labour law was not 
constitutive of the factors of production, but reflected the economic and social structures 
of a jurisdiction.21 Thus it relates directly to the path dependency of regulatory 
approach, rather than market and social demands. The modern cultural and social values 
                                                          
18 S Deakin, P Lele and M Siems, “The Evolution of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes” (2007) 46(3-4) 
Int'l Lab Rev133, 139. 
19 Ibid, 140. 
20 Social Public Order. 
21 Hepple and O’Higgins, n14, 14-15. 
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in France have led to a liberal and social conception of labour law, giving a great role to 
the freedom of association and union activities, encouraging social dialogue, and 
fighting against every form of discrimination. It also ensures widely guaranteed incomes 
either at work or in the case of unemployment.22 British labour regulation, however, was 
instituted after labour interests had become able to wield real and damaging political 
power. Thus labour regulation was first introduced with broadly economic goals aimed 
at tempering or even replacing the power of labour interests in order to take control of 
the labour economy, and later in order to meet minimum limits set by EU law. The 
purpose of this Chapter is to explore the social, political, economic, and regulatory 
aspects of industrialisation and proletarianisation in the UK and France in order to 
understand the methods and purposes through which labour regulation was introduced. 
2 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Industrial Revolution 
2.1 Pre-Industrial Economics 
2.1.1 Prior to the Industrial Revolution, a mercantilist economic system was in place in most 
Western European nations. Mercantilism refers to the conviction that, in order to 
prosper, the state needed to manipulate every available advantage to create the best 
environment for prosperity. The mercantilist system discouraged imports through 
financial restrictions, while encouraging exports and promoting manufacturing at home. 
It concerned itself with strengthening the sources of economic power while suppressing 
competition with economic rivals with an emphasis on the government’s intervention in 
the national economy.23 During the Elizabethan era, England relied upon mercantilism 
to support its growing international trading aspirations, paving the way for the British 
global trading empire of the nineteenth century.24 In France, mercantilism reached its 
peak with Colbert,25 finance minister to Louis XIV. While Colbert encouraged industry 
and trade, created state owned factories, reorganised state finances and the court system, 
built up the navy, and founded the East and West Indies Companies, the bourgeoisie 
were generally uninterested in Colbert’s innovative investment opportunities as they 
                                                          
22 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n17, 33. 
23 L LaHaye, “Mercantilism” (Library of Economics and Liberty: The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics, 2008) 
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html> accessed 25 February 2014. 
24 N Davies, Europe: A History (Pimlico 1997) 523, 602-605. 
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preferred low risk investments or the purchase of offices.26 His innovative plans ended 
in bankruptcy.27 The attitudes of the bourgeoisie of this period are reflective of common 
risk-averse attitudes that continued through to the time of the French Revolution and 
beyond.28  
2.1.2 Mercantilism was not able to support the economic growth for which it had been 
instituted. In the early eighteenth century, a conviction grew that economic life could 
not progress further unless states ceased to apply artificial curbs and restrictions on 
trade.29 In France in particular, revolutionary notions of social welfare were being 
voiced by notable French intellectuals.30 It was theorised that national economic 
prosperity could not be assured but through the personal prosperity and liberty of all. 
The ideas of this group of Frenchmen had a formative influence on the founder of 
classical economics, Adam Smith.31  
2.2 An Economic Revolution 
2.2.1 The Industrial Revolution invited a new view of political economics and production. In 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations,32 the protectionist philosophy of mercantilism was 
shattered in favour of a free market. He introduced the concept of laissez-faire as a 
fundamental requirement for the market to function effectively, which would then 
theoretically foster social harmony. The market is personified as having an ‘invisible 
hand’ that keeps economic activity ordered and organised. State intervention in the 
affairs of business has a detrimental effect, superseding the natural order and restricting 
the natural liberty of man. The state should confine itself only to guaranteeing the proper 
functioning of the market. Smith’s view was that it is the market rather than the state 
that creates prosperity, debunking the logic of mercantilism entirely.33 
2.2.2 In Britain, for more than one hundred years prior to the publication of the Wealth of 
Nations, the state was retreating from intervention in the economy. Smith’s work gave 
                                                          
26 C Jenkins, A Brief History of France: People History and Culture (Constable and Robinson Ltd 2011) 78-79. 
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28 HAL Fisher, “The Protectionist Reaction in France” (1896) 6(23) Econ J 341. 
29 Davies, n24, 602. 
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32 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (first published 1776, Oxford World Classics 2008). 
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expression to the thoughts that had been raised through Britain’s international trading 
and colonial experiences. Setting as its guiding principle the spontaneous choices of 
ordinary men allowed individualism to succeed and British entrepreneurial spirit to 
flourish. British capitalism was strengthened by the belief that individuals were capable 
of creating laws that were as impersonal as those of the natural sciences and that, in so 
doing, such laws must also be socially beneficial.34 This outlook essentially justified the 
actions taken by industrial society to promote itself over the best interests of a 
commoditised labour force.  
2.2.3 Smith also introduced the concept of labour as a commodity into common parlance, 
stating that “the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily 
regulates the production of men...”35 This presages the concepts introduced by Malthus 
concerning population, work, and wages.36 Malthus argued that wages should never be 
raised above subsistence as the population would continue to grow in numbers as the 
means of subsistence increased. Raising the standards of mankind would mean feeding 
population growth in parallel with a commensurate decrease in the value of labour, 
leading to poverty in the working classes for lack of wage employment, due to it being 
spread out among a higher number of workers.37  
2.3 The Proletarian Plight: Social Theory 
2.3.1 Proletarianisation was a process whereby dependence upon the dictates of capitalist 
relations increased among the labouring classes. It was not solely the subordination of 
the labouring classes to a technically driven labour process, but a process occurring in 
the sphere of market relations that involved an increased exposure to the vagaries of 
market forces. Employees were less able to bargain with their employers and were more 
dependent on a single source of income, having to work on any terms they could 
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achieve.38 This may seem an unfair predicament; however, early capitalist theorists 
justified this position with cold, hard logic. 
2.3.2 Social theory during the early periods of industrialisation was partly influenced by the 
views of Malthus. Poverty was often viewed as being a necessary, if regrettable, state of 
affairs;39 an essential evil for the subsistence of the world. If everyone were rich, none 
would submit to the demands of another or to the drudgery associated with industrial 
life.40 The insecurity and the standard of life endured by the wage earning poor was 
attributed to personal defects in character rather than to any faulty social or economic 
arrangements. A common view was that the poor were the cause of their own suffering 
through vice, particularly of alcohol consumption and the costs of that habit. There was 
also a general concern for the irreligiousness and irrationality of the poor as they were 
viewed as rarely taking account of what might happen in the future.41  
2.3.3 The duty of the poor was to fulfil the role of labourer. Customary morality argued that, 
for the sake of the well-being of society and stable government, the poor should be 
provided only with adequate subsistence to fulfil their duties, as the provision of excess 
wages would lead to their own undoing through drink and debauchery.42 In essence, low 
wages were doing the poor a favour. It was also believed that the only way to impose 
temperance and industriousness upon the poor, thereby benefitting their character, 
would be to require them to work all of the time so that any spare time could only be 
spent resting. 43 These views were perpetuated in the UK during much of the early 
nineteenth century, but were never duplicated in such strong terms in France, due to the 
parallel development of human rights concepts alongside industrialisation. 
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2.4 Marxist Labour Economics 
2.4.1 Marxist political economy accepts that, from the perspective of capital, labour is indeed 
a commodity that has to be purchased at its economic cost. However, Marx viewed the 
freedom of the labour market under capitalism and the commoditisation of labour as 
resulting in the exploitation of human beings, constituting a barrier to their development, 
a view fundamentally contrary to Malthusian theory. Workers could gain little within a 
pure capitalist system; as such, in order to achieve human freedom, a transformative 
change was required. Given the need of the human being to develop himself through 
social activity, he required freedom. The need under capitalism to treat labour as a 
commodity is inconsistent with the labourer’s need for personal development, thus a 
labourer would be naturally resistant to his commoditisation.44 This is the source of 
labour’s uncertainty and volatility if treated as a commodity. The commoditisation of 
labour is one of the root causes of the non-commodity like nature of labour, in addition 
to the fact that it is inseparable from its human character.45 
2.4.2 In terms of labour regulation, both neo-classical and the Marxist political economic 
frameworks agree that within capitalist markets, labour law, if conceived with protective 
and re-distributional aims, will require a compromise to either economic efficiency or 
for the ability of employers to advance their interests. Modern labour policy has 
struggled with the conflicting needs of social welfare and economic efficiency since it 
came into its modern form following the Second World War. It has caused regulatory 
dilemmas, particularly within liberal market economies such as the UK, which have 
continued to resist the advance of protective labour regulation.46  
2.4.3 Essentially, if one were to rely purely on the movement of market forces, workers could 
never improve their position. Individual improvements risked decreasing overall 
standards for workers to maintain balance against the lowest standard. It later became 
clear that a framework of public services was also necessary if industrial society were to 
operate without social discomfort, contrary to the firm beliefs present in laissez-faire 
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economics.47 However, industrial society would have to go through dark and 
uncomfortable times before the need for some regulation was recognised. 
3 The Reality of Industrialisation 
3.1 Proto-Industrialisation 
3.1.1 There were a number of elements that had to come together to make it possible to move 
into an industrial, mechanised, and power-fuelled society. Farming, mobile labour, 
steam power, machines, mines, metallurgy, factories, towns, communications, finance, 
and demographics were all important elements that contributed to the potential for 
industrialisation throughout Europe. Farming needed to increase food production so that 
more people in cities and towns could be fed from the same land. Large scale farming 
meant that men could be released, or in some cases evicted, from the land to find other 
forms of employment. The rising availability of food contributed to rising birth rates, 
creating a pool of surplus labour and allowing a fall in wages that would serve the 
requirements of profiteering industrialists.48 
3.1.2 Commerce and industry expanded throughout Europe during the second half of the 
seventeenth century, particularly in cottage industries, which were gradually subsumed 
into larger workshops, set up by investors supplying raw materials who purchased 
manufactures from cottage workers. Workshops employed scores of day labourers, 
allowing them to enhance productivity and keep the production process tightly managed. 
Industries were built upon this workshop structure and their manufactures. However, the 
introduction of the steam engine initiated a true revolution in the already fast growing 
industries of urban centres, adding geographic flexibility that had not existed when 
manufacturing power was dependent on the power of running water. It allowed humans 
to break through their natural limitations of production, which had previously limited 
economic growth.49 Following the introduction of standardisation, specialisation, and 
mass production, large plants and factories were built that employed thousands of 
workers, displacing traditional craft workshops and cottage industries. Fashion began to 
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dictate manufacturing requirements, while mass production made it possible to tailor 
goods to consumer demand.50 
3.1.3 Industrial production and trade had become more important than agriculture and led to 
widespread urbanisation. Old towns expanded while new towns grew up around coal 
centres and harbours. Due to the importance of trade and commerce in the industrial 
economy, the demands of investors came to dictate the economic policies of the state, 
often to the detriment of landowners.51 In the industrial world, land no longer equated to 
power, thus the theories of economists of the late eighteenth century took up the concept 
of commoditisation of the elements of industry. A new and amoral view of what had 
once been value laden aspects of medieval society characterised the attitudes toward 
industrial society.  
3.1.4 In order to support industrialisation on a large scale, large quantities of capital were also 
required. Investors had to be willing to take immense risks in order to make potentially 
immense, though uncertain, gains. Such capital was only available in countries where 
pre-industrial enterprises had been able to accumulate a ready store of capital.52 Such 
capital was readily available in eighteenth century Britain. The guild system had already 
begun to break down or was no longer enforced, which made it possible for 
entrepreneurs to exercise their initiative free from the Elizabethan guild restrictions that 
had previously inhibited growth and movement within the economy and labour 
market.53  
4 The British Industrial Powerhouse 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 There are a number of characteristics peculiar to the British people, economy, and even 
geography that contributed to the ability to grow its industry on a grander scale than its 
continental neighbours. The genius of practical craftsmen coupled with underemployed 
capital, cheap labour, new techniques of mass production, and a Protestant work ethic 
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helped to push Britain to world economic leadership. 54 There were a range of new 
inventions and thousands of patents taken out in the late eighteenth century.55 The 
capital available from the building of the colonial empire, with developments in 
agriculture, and the cottage industry provided Britain with a large domestic and colonial 
consumer market. Its economy was also isolated from continental Europe during the 
Napoleonic wars, which further stimulated British industry.56 
4.2 British Industrial Economics 
4.2.1 The Industrial Revolution was an economic as well as technological affair, consisting of 
changes in the volume and distribution of resources as well as in the methods of 
resource allocation toward specific ends.57 With the emphasis on commercial and 
economic power, Britain underwent a number of economic changes preceding and 
during the Industrial Revolution. The late seventeenth century saw the growth of the 
permanent institutions of public credit in the Bank of England, the Royal Exchange, and 
the National Debt, as well as speculation associated with the colonial trade. The 
existence of the facility to invest and utilise capital as well as the willingness to take 
financial risk helped make the Industrial Revolution possible.58 
4.2.2 The Industrial Revolution forced a change in the approach to economic and commercial 
regulation. Land and labour had to be commoditised in order to support the growth of 
industry and commerce. The commoditisation of land meant that it could no longer 
provide the basis for social organisation in British society, leading to a revolution in 
social hierarchies. An individual’s labour had also provided a basis for social 
organisation as it was deeply imbued with custom and highly regulated by guilds, which 
required membership in order to learn a trade and possessed local monopolies of their 
trade products.59 Deregulating the labour and property markets effectively subordinated 
the British economy to the laws of the supply and demand.60 The new emphasis on 
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economic growth through innovation and efficiency in industry required a change of 
approach to national economics. 
4.2.3 The change in the approach to economic regulation was also a shift from a morally 
based economy to a political economy. The mercantilist moral economy was 
protectionist, not just of national interests, but also of individual interests. The 
customary requirements of protection by the nobility of its peasantry dictated that 
agrarian markets should be regulated in order for peasants to have access to what was 
needed to satisfy their needs before larger buyers could purchase products to resell at a 
profit. This welfare principle prevented a bulk purchaser from buying more cheaply than 
a small purchaser in order to satisfy the requirements of human morality. To do 
otherwise would have allowed larger purchasers to enjoy an unfair advantage over 
subsistence peasants.61 The move to a political economy ignored this perceived moral 
aspect of commerce. Without this moral element, the poorest were left to struggle to buy 
their needs for subsistence in the same competitive market as commercial agriculturists.  
4.2.4 During the 1820s, the classical economic theories of Ricardo62 began to influence the 
economic policy of the state. The labour theory of value, the relationship between wages 
and profit, and the distinction between productive and unproductive labour began to 
receive attention. These theories diverted attention from the artisanal ideology prevalent 
in the eighteenth century, which placed value on custom and habit as well as upon the 
natural passions of human nature. Modern economic theories reduced the human 
condition to numbers and sums, allowing capitalist power to subjugate the labourer and 
exercise influence over every aspect of the working man’s life. Artisanal ideology tried 
to resist the paternal reciprocity of industrial relations; however, labour and industry 
were progressively abandoned to the uncontrolled effects of mechanisation, free trade, 
and competition. Only political intervention could change labour conditions, but this 
was not permitted under the policies of laissez-faire economics.63  
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4.2.5 In order to accommodate the economic needs of industrialisation, Britain had to replace 
medieval regulation of the corporation and protectionist statutes that controlled 
production and the distribution of wealth with free market competition.64 Thus the 
Statute of Artificers,65 which had provided fines for individuals who worked outside the 
craft corporation system, was repealed in 1813-14. Guild and corporation restrictions 
had previously prevented the division of labour within a single workshop setting, 
inhibiting the potential for specialisation. The Statute was at odds with the emerging 
form of factory labour. With the repeal of this Statute, the means were made available to 
engage in more efficient and modern forms of production and employment.66  
4.2.6 While those within the corporation system rose to defend the Statute as they viewed the 
approach of industrialisation, division of labour, and the proletarianisation of British 
working classes as a threat to their relatively protected livelihood, it was recognised by 
the government as well as economists that the Statute hindered innovation in the ancient 
trades as only new trades were permitted to take advantage of modern forms of 
production. Restrictions and controls on trade were contrary to the policy of laissez-
faire. The remaining powers of city guilds to regulate trades were formally repealed by 
the Municipal Corporations Act67 of 1835.68 
4.2.7 The working classes provided diverse resistance to the transition to unrestrained market 
relations. In the 1830s, an attempt was made to create a different structure of labour and 
product markets to those of industrial capitalism through the use of cooperative 
manufacturing. Robert Owen provided a coherent analysis69 of social trends, confirming 
that the focus on competition is disruptive to decent standards of social peace. He also 
offered an analysis of economic development that integrated notions of justice and 
morality rather than the perceived amoral character of competitive capitalism. However, 
no means of achieving this cooperative society was forthcoming that would replace the 
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capitalist system with a restructured industrial and political system that could secure 
worker independence.70 While there was a continual undercurrent of socialist politics in 
Britain, there was little achievement of socialist aims within the political sphere. 
4.3 The British Labouring Classes: Proletarianisation 
4.3.1 As early as 1700 the English regions had already been effectively divided into industrial 
provinces as certain areas specialised in particular industries, owing to specific 
geographic, geological, or demographic conditions. This led to a growth of industrial 
towns according to their nature, and was aided by improved methods of transportation 
for products necessary for an increased population.71 In 1760, two thirds of British 
people were still living in the country and agriculture remained the largest occupation; 
however, Britain was growing phenomenally at this stage.72 Trade in the colonies had 
created the largest free trade area in the world, while a new consumerism saw the rapid 
increase in demand for consumer goods.73 These were now available at lower costs due 
to efficiency in production, thus creating demand for higher production levels, which the 
progress of industrialisation sought to satisfy.74  
4.3.2 The emergence of a wage dependent class preceded the growth of large scale industry,75 
as agricultural labourers were forced to rely on day labour, move into the towns to 
engage in industrial work, or in some cases, rely on the parish poor relief due to the loss 
of common lands by enclosure.76 Enclosure led to evictions and vagrancy, creating a 
pool of workers that contributed to a body of semi-employed and inefficient labour. Men 
no longer tied to the soil were now free to devote themselves to other activities that 
would raise the standard of consumption and the entrepreneurial spirit required for 
industry to take root,77 though in practice, the results were rarely so positive.  
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4.3.3 Enclosure deprived Britain of the peasants that formed the backbone of most other 
European nations. Social solidarity, primitive democracy, and a national consciousness 
that grows from a peasant based community were destroyed. The sense of Britishness 
was now projected downward from the institutions of the state. Land came into the 
hands of a small group of farmers and landowners, while British society was comprised 
of a prosperous loyalist minority and a dispossessed majority who would carry the 
resentment of their lost traditions and attachment to the soil into the heart of the British 
class system in the future.78 The loss of individualism and independence due to 
enclosure and reliance on parish systems of support made the steady fragmentation of 
skill required for specialisation and large scale manufacturing that much easier to 
accomplish. 
4.3.4 While the dissolution of ties to land and agriculture granted freedom of movement in 
principle, the application of Elizabethan Poor Laws79 were impediments. Parishes were 
often unwilling to receive outsiders because they might establish a claim to poor relief in 
the new parish. In addition, employers, who were often the largest rate payers, would 
offer work only for a period short of a full year in order to avoid the expense of an 
individual establishing himself as a parish resident. In the event an individual was not in 
a parish for the requisite period, he could be sent back to his previous parish should he 
fall on hard times and require poor relief.80  
4.3.5 The Poor Laws gave expression to a network of reciprocal obligations linked with wage 
labour, the family, and the wider social order. Service was considered a formal duty for 
those who did not have an independent means of subsistence. Service was also a means 
whereby a man and his family might gain the right to poor relief in the event of 
unemployment or sickness. The Poor Law of 1601 assumed that those in receipt of it 
had access to some land in order to supplement the funds they received from the 
settlement. This changed with the development of industrial society as people depended 
more on wages than on land to live.81 The poor law system would last into the 
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nineteenth century, tying wages to settlement, often to the detriment of the working 
classes. The poor law system of settlement was finally abolished in 1834,82 which would 
facilitate the free movement of generally unskilled workers seeking wage labour in the 
industrial centres of Britain.83   
4.3.6 The saturation of the labour market by unskilled workers as well as the introduction of 
machinery led to the deskilling of the labour supply. Specialisation and division of 
labour had further simplified industrial processes, making it easier for workers to move 
from one occupation to another,84 contributing also to the dissolution of the traditional 
household economy as women and children entered into direct competition with men. 
Wages reduced as competition rose in the labour market.85 Peasant men and women 
came to live crowded together earning their living as units of the labour force in 
factories rather than as communal groups of families and neighbours working together 
to produce from the land.86  
4.3.7 Initially, it was rare for workers to seek continuity of work as casual hiring methods 
engendered casual working habits. Essentially, workers sought work when funds were 
needed to satisfy their subsistence requirements. The preference for leisure time and the 
fact that most workers were paid by the piece led to the rapid and sometimes negligent 
or otherwise poor quality production of goods in order to gain the cash in as little time 
spent working as possible. This led to the requirements of working hours being imposed 
and standardised in contracts and eventually to the widespread use of employment 
contracts stipulating standards, hours, and wages. Eventually, workers became inured to 
the regularity of work, although the process of conditioning the labour force to stricter 
rules of working was difficult and unpleasant. However, had codes of conduct and 
working rules not been imposed during the early days of the Industrial Revolution, there 
could have been no factory system or the rise in output that led to an improvement in 
working conditions during the nineteenth century.87  
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4.3.8 Eventually, all industrial workers lived in fear of losing their jobs as there were usually 
more people than jobs available. Employees clung to employment so anxiously that their 
masters were able to exploit their desperation. Men were often required to pay hiring 
charges to use an employer’s tools and were asked to pay for repairs to the employer’s 
own equipment. In true Dickensian style, in some offices, clerks were recommended to 
bring their own coal to work to provide fuel for the furnace during cold weather. Any 
complaint was likely to lead to dismissal, which would lead to reliance upon the 
inadequate and humiliating poor law relief.88 In true Malthusian style, wages were 
generally paid to only a subsistence level based on working most of the year; however, 
workers were usually unable to work the number of days needed to meet their 
subsistence needs due to the vagaries of the market. As wage goods89 increased in price 
and wages remained fairly flat, it became more and more difficult for labourers to 
survive on their daily wage.90 Thus the plight of the industrial proletariat became 
untenable in Britain, though it would be some time before any remedy was made 
available.  
5 The French Industrial Character 
5.1 Introduction: A French Approach to Industry 
5.1.1 France maintained a small scale industrial character while rapid industrialisation was 
occurring in England. Instead of the decomposition of traditional trades, luxury and 
fashion trades remained the most common, which encouraged the continuance of small 
scale artisanal production. French exports were dominated by artefacts associated with 
these traditional trades until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.91 Wealth in 
France generally remained in real property. Large scale industry was not yet common 
and was only developed as a result of the introduction of English textile manufacturing 
machinery and new chemical processes. While power rested primarily in the 
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bourgeoisie, that class generally avoided financial risk, which limited investment 
resulting in slower industrial development,92 at least compared to Britain. 
5.1.2 France thus took a deliberate approach to industrialisation. There was first a steady 
expansion of industry in the countryside relying on small scale cottage production that 
laid the groundwork for large scale industrialisation. Peasants in the countryside relied 
upon their cottage industries during the slow agricultural seasons, which helped to 
compensate for excessive divisions of landholdings or the precarious existence of tenant 
farmers and agricultural labourers. Merchant manufacturers were content to exploit this 
ready supply of labour. This form of industrial organisation was a resilient French 
system. However, this type of proto-industrial economy would not be able to keep up 
with competitors so the transition to a more scientifically and technologically dynamic 
economy was necessary.93  
5.1.3 The quality of French industrialisation was also characterised by a form of flexible 
specialisation that aimed to develop increasingly sophisticated versions of artisan tools 
for the use of skilled labour. The new machinery still made heavy demands on the skills 
of the operative, unlike the specialisation in British industry that mainly required 
repetitive small tasks of its unskilled labour force. Skill focussed specialisation was, 
however, well suited to the craft traditions of French labour in catering to creativity and 
quality. The flexible specialisation could not, however, replace the profit making ability 
of mass production, despite the fact that it likely produced higher quality and more 
diverse goods.94 
5.1.4 France was slow to concentrate production, but an increasing sub-division of tasks 
eventually led to a de-skilling of the labour force, which reduced individual wages. In 
comparison to those who continued to work in at least semi-skilled industries, income 
distribution was increasingly unequal. Such inequality of income distribution acted as a 
drag on industrial consumption, decreasing economic growth.95 
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5.1.5 Early French industrialists relied upon foreign technology, particularly from Britain. The 
reliance on foreign technology required alignment with local craft practices and 
expectations. Skills were not immediately present in terms of management, labour, and 
technical knowledge when faced with utilising new industrial technologies. French 
industrial progress generally lagged behind British; however, this lag is due not because 
the French were less motivated, but because of different historical factors connected to 
the French quasi-commercial psyche.96 French industrialisation was undertaken with a 
different aim and focus than was British industrialisation. While the British quest for 
profit was king, there appears to have been less of a focus on making money for the sake 
of it than on fitting the inevitable approach of the industrial economy to the nature and 
culture of the French. 
5.2 Revolutionary Economics and Physiocracy: Prelude to Industrialisation 
5.2.1 The French Revolution was a fundamental turning point in French society, politics and 
economics. The physiocrats97 held a strong belief in the inevitability of human progress, 
blaming the remnants of institutional feudalism as impediments to progress.98 They 
emphasised the importance of private property rights as a precondition for the existence 
of society. Further, they deemed government as being justified only insofar as it was an 
agent for the protection of private property, adopting a laissez-faire philosophy based on 
self-sufficiency and the free market. The value of property was extended to self-
ownership, which serfdom inherently denied. Economically, it was viewed that only a 
free man could take pride in his work and thus be productive in the market.99 Serfdom 
extinguished competition and kept the lower classes in poverty, which in turn 
impoverished the realm.100 While the theoretical ideas of the physiocrats reflect some of 
the elements of the capitalist, liberal economics of the Industrial Revolution, the reality 
was that property continued to be viewed as the source of true wealth, a conception 
more closely tied to the reverence of land ownership espoused by the ancien régime.  
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5.2.2 The reality of the eighteenth century French economy was that it was stagnating in 
comparison to the British, despite the innovative voices of the physiocrats. Owing to the 
turbulent and Long Nineteenth Century101 and the instability and discontinuities in its 
development, it is difficult to assess the French economic situation. There were a 
number of obstacles to economic growth, among which were the handing over of land to 
inefficient peasant farmers; the reluctance to exploit potentially profitable inventions; 
the hesitation to expand beyond the limits of the family firm; the preference for overseas 
investments; and the habit of sheltering behind protectionist tariff barriers. The French 
were also hesitant to make capital investments due to the bursting of his “Mississippi 
Bubble” in 1720, setting French banks back by a century and contributing to the relative 
weakness of capital investment during industrialisation. The lack of long term capital 
investment placed capital intensive industries at a disadvantage relative to less risk-
averse competing countries, such as Britain.102 
5.2.3 French economic theories were inherently hostile to any remnants of feudalism. 
Engaging in commerce was itself a sign of the dissolution of the ancien régime, 
particularly for those who would have been considered of the aristocracy prior to the 
Revolution, as business was not considered an appropriate profession for the upper 
Estates.103 However, the aims of commercial endeavour were rarely capitalistic. The 
wealth of eighteenth century France was generally used to buttress existing social status 
rather than forging capitalistic fortunes. Nevertheless, those who undertook industrial 
enterprises were generally nobly born rather than of the bourgeoisie. Thus, despite the 
complete changes envisioned by the French Revolution, there was not an automatic 
transfer to capitalism. The pull of an aristocratic lifestyle was too strong once 
individuals were able to earn fortunes without the stigma of class prejudice.104 
5.3 French Working Classes: A Differently Composed Proletariat 
5.3.1 During the period of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, French society was being torn 
apart by the French Revolution and the unrest that followed it during the Long 
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Nineteenth Century. While the line between the nobility and the rest remained sharply 
drawn,105 the French Revolution had a profound effect on the makeup of French society. 
By 1815, the nobility had shrunk significantly.106 The bourgeoisie had been seriously 
strengthened, enriched by their purchases of clerical and émigré107 property. They were 
now occupying almost all public offices. They imitated the way of life that had been 
common to the privileged classes, living mainly off the incomes from their lands, which 
were cultivated by tenant farmers. They had essentially replaced the nobles as the upper, 
privileged class. Public office was still sought, although a profession at the bar or in 
medicine was often acceptable. However, instead of being based on the hereditary 
privileges of the ancien régime, the privilege of the bourgeoisie and of their families 
was based upon the hereditary rights of property, which was regarded as a natural 
human right.108 Land ownership is one of the few benefits that would also be felt by the 
lowest peasant classes, although the extent of that benefit is questionable. 
5.3.2 The end of feudalism meant not only the destruction of inequality and privilege, but also 
inefficiencies in agriculture. Due to the lack of motivation for serfs to improve 
production methods, it was impossible prior to the Revolution to increase their personal 
prosperity in this way. Once peasants were freed from serfdom, they were able to act in 
their own self-interest, which would be to improve production methods in order to 
increase personal prosperity.109 However, land-owning peasants rarely possessed an 
amount of land suitable to their needs. Despite the fact that land titles had passed from 
the nobility to the bourgeoisie, the position of tenant farmers remained precarious, 
particularly as competition grew due to an increased birth rate among the peasant 
classes. The peasants who worked the land did not have the capital to invest in modern 
farming methods and equipment. Instead, they continued to follow traditional methods. 
Those who were able to employ more modern methods introduced from England were 
industrial farmers who employed wage labourers on large areas of land.110  
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5.3.3 Those peasants who managed to gain ownership of larger plots of land following the 
Revolution were sometimes able to enrich themselves to the point that they could 
employ labourers to do the work for them, essentially becoming bourgeois themselves. 
The plight of those who performed the labour remained subsistence level, being poorly 
fed, clothed and housed. Thus the peasantry continued to bear the heaviest burdens of 
society. They provided the lingering nobility and the bourgeoisie with farm hands and 
servants, the State with military recruits, the church with parish priests, and industrialists 
with labour.111  
5.3.4 The trade guild and corporation system in France also fell during the French Revolution. 
Like in Britain, guilds and professional corporations were difficult to access unless a 
family member was already a member.112 The harsh, rule-bound social existence of civil 
society under the corporation system was the antithesis of what was sought by French 
revolutionaries.113 The coercive powers of corporate regulation were eventually replaced 
by articles in the Civil Code that passed enforcement powers to the realm of contract. 
Workers could no longer be physically constrained to complete work; rather, employers 
were limited to civil action for damages and interest. In addition, the abolition of 
corporations erased multiple obstacles to entry into the trades. All that was needed was 
sufficient capital, credit, and connections in order to be successful,114 although these 
elements were rarely easily found. 
5.3.5 The industrial proletariat in France evolved slowly. Industry was initially divided into a 
small modern sector and a traditional one based on home craft activities. Industry was 
thus populated by a mass of small peasant owners and a large number of independent 
handicraftsmen spread out among the rural areas and within the budding industrial 
centres. Like Britain, in what large scale industrial enterprises there were, workers were 
regarded merely as instruments for performing work and industrialists kept a distant 
relationship with them. Their conditions of life, food, housing and health were of no 
concern. Wages were reduced to the lowest possible level in order to decrease the cost 
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of production. Workers were recruited among the most destitute class of people in the 
poorest regions, where an increase of population had produced a surplus having no 
means of subsistence. There was no security of employment and not enough money was 
made to save for the future in working families.115 However, there was no massive 
transfer from agricultural to industrial centres that characterised industrialisation in the 
UK. There was instead a slow development of a diversified proletariat by successive 
strata of a non-homogenous population from different socioeconomic backgrounds 
constituted by successive waves of farm hands; part time peasants and migrant workers; 
women leaving home for work; and craftsmen and former self-employed 
handicraftsmen. The French proletariat was therefore composed of a diverse working 
class.116 
5.3.6 Where once a person’s occupation was a part of their social standing, their family, and 
personal identity, large scale industrial work reduced the humans providing labour to 
commoditised factors of production. Workers forged few links with their workplace. 
There were no common traditions or organisations for mutual aid. Workers associations 
were still forbidden, so the only means to improve their situation was illegal. Workers’ 
were completely dependent upon their employer who fixed their wages and working 
hours, often arbitrarily. Employers had no responsibility toward their employees if they 
fell ill or were injured as a result of the work they did.117 
 
6 The Evolution of Labour Regulation and Social Policy 
6.1 An Economic and Moral Conundrum  
6.1.1 Labour law is primarily concerned with the regulation of social power.118 It is a branch 
of the legal order of a jurisdiction that deals with the provision of human labour within a 
framework of production and service processes, organised by an employer to the benefit 
of the employee. It is an autonomous institutional phenomenon influenced by public 
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policy and translated into formal legislation.119 In economic terms, the employer holds 
the scarce commodity of capital, which is fundamental to working processes, while the 
employee is one of many individuals who are generally able to provide their labour to 
satisfy the requirements of the employer. Labour, in and of itself, is a commodity made 
available on the labour market as an essential and plentiful factor of production.120  
6.1.2 Labour should, however, be considered a fictive commodity, as it is neither produced as 
a commodity, nor is its production governed purely by an assessment of its realization 
on the markets.121 Further, it has an ineradicable social character that cannot be 
separated from its product value.122 Although labour is provided through a labour 
market and is institutionally treated as a commodity, the power of labour is derived from 
human beings who operate outside the direct discipline of the market. They also have 
the capacity to act individually and collectively to resist the economic compulsion of 
supply and demand.123 While labour is bought and sold on a daily basis on the labour 
market, it is unlike other commodities. When labour has been treated as a commodity in 
the past and sometimes still today, dysfunctional social consequences result in relation 
to the loss of market balance between employee and employer and the proverbial race to 
the bottom within the labour market.124 The commoditisation of labour is not, therefore, 
a beneficial economic perspective without certain qualifications.125 
6.1.3 There are a number of reasons why governments intervene in the labour market. Labour 
regulations aim to endow workers with some basic rights, mitigating the effects of 
labour commoditisation. They also regulate employment relationships by restricting the 
types and terms of contracts that can be associated with employment. Labour unions are 
empowered to represent workers collectively in response to the imbalance of power in 
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the employment relationship. Governments often also provide social insurance against 
unemployment, old age, disability, sickness, and death.126 These are the practical and 
physical reasons why labour regulation exists. While there is an obvious moral impetus 
for such intervention, the underlying reason why governments choose to undertake the 
costs of social legislation in favour of employees requires an examination of the 
theoretical evolution of labour law. 
6.2 The Evolution of Labour Law as a Concept: Hugo Sinzheimer 
6.2.1 The first recognised labour theorists were German scholars who participated in a series 
of studies in 1874, resulting in a new approach to labour regulation that included 
industrial workers.127 The social question that arose from these studies was concerned 
with the enfranchisement of social groups that had been marginalised due to 
industrialisation. It resulted in the notion of social rights of citizenship, and the 
government’s assumption of some responsibility for ameliorating the social position of 
industrial workers.128 Lotmar129 produced a theory of the collective agreement, forming 
the foundations for the discipline of labour law. Sinzheimer,130 the father of German 
labour law,131 built upon Lotmar’s work by giving form and content to the discipline.132  
6.2.2 Sinzheimer discussed four specific insights that became a driving force behind labour 
regulation. Firstly, it had to be acknowledged that the object of the transaction in an 
employment relationship is not a commodity, but a human being,133 a tenet that became 
one of the founding principles of the International Labour Organisation.134 Secondly, the 
personal dependence that an employee has on an employer requires balance.135 The 
subordinate relationship of the employee due to the employer’s ownership of the means 
of production became the fundamental characteristic of the industrial employment 
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relationship and would become the centre of the development of continental labour 
systems.136 Sinzheimer’s third insight was that labour law seeks to protect human 
dignity, which can be threatened by the imbalance in the employment relationship.137 
Finally, Sinzheimer suggests that labour law should not only deal with issues of fairness 
within the employment relationship, but also all those needs and risks associated with 
employment, including legal regimes dealing with job creation.138 Thus, the 
fundamental purpose of labour law is to protect employees’ material needs, their health, 
safety, and their personal dignity,139 which would eventually become a central focus of 
the regulatory framework for labour law in Europe.140  
6.2.3 France has had elements of labour protection in place since shortly after the French 
Revolution. The early twentieth century saw the introduction of labour courts, a Code du 
Travail (since 1910), and the Accords de Matignon141 in 1936, which laid the basis for 
the legal promotion of collective bargaining. The UK was a direct beneficiary of the 
teachings of Sinzheimer through his pupil, Kahn-Freund,142 who transformed the study 
of British labour law using Sinzheimer’s as well as his own unique theories on the 
subject. The modern features as developed by Sinzheimer and Kahn-Freund are that 
labour law is not only created by the state, but also by employers and labour unions; the 
separation of the contract of employment from ordinary contracts; and the subordination 
of the individual worker to the capitalist enterprise.143 Influenced by Marx’s insight that 
capitalist property constitutes domination over human beings, Sinzheimer’s labour law 
is seen as the law of dependent labour. This view results in the exclusion of the 
independent labourer and forms the essential subject matter of labour law into its 
fundamental purpose of seeking to order or control the worker’s subordination to the 
employer.144  
6.3 Kahn-Freund and British Labour Law 
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6.3.1 Unlike Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund regarded legal intervention in industrial relations as 
neither necessary nor desirable, preferring the lack of legal regulation in the British 
labour market because he perceived that it ensured the independence of trade unions 
from the state. Both he and Sinzheimer agreed that labour law existed to facilitate the 
autonomous regulation of employment relations and working life through collectivised 
labour achieved by the removal from the economic sphere of the otherwise inequitable 
functioning of private law. The views of Sinzheimer and Kahn-Freund diverged in the 
degree of autonomy to be enjoyed by collective labour. While Sinzheimer believed that 
regulation of collective interests was necessary in order to preserve the public interest 
and to ensure an equitable labour environment, Kahn-Freund was in favour of collective 
laissez-faire, allowing the free play to collective forces of society and limiting the 
intervention of the law to those marginal areas where the disparity of these forces is so 
great as to prevent the successful operation of the negotiating machinery.145 It was his 
view that the autonomous system of self-regulation in industrial relations should operate 
on a collective basis in order to achieve balanced bargaining power with 
employers.146Thus, from the very beginning, the UK was influenced by a different set of 
theoretical foundations than was continental Europe, leading to at least some of the 
differences that separate the UK from the rest of Europe today.  
7 The Employment Relationship 
7.1 The Evolution of the Employment Contract 
7.1.1 The employment relationship in the UK had long been based on a concept of master and 
servant, stretching from the Ordinance of Labourers in 1349147 into the nineteenth 
century. The master and servant model is connected to the early legal form of social 
relations, which was a statutory and hierarchical paradigm rather than contractual and 
common law. This hierarchical form can be traced from the pseudo-feudal roots of the 
British classist society and the inherent conservatism of the populace. The master and 
servant form of employment relationship relied upon a command relation with an open 
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ended duty of obedience imposed on the worker, reserving far reaching disciplinary 
powers to the employer.148 It constituted a weapon of industrial discipline, as it provided 
a convenient instrument for quick punishment or intimidation through a wide variety of 
offences of disobedience. The master and servant model was an important tool of social 
authority and was used to create social reforms intended to further subjugate the workers 
to the benefits that tied them to their employers. Effective factory production was 
achieved through a highly developed social discipline, which was achieved by the re-
creation of structures of paternal dependence and reciprocity.149 Thus, while there were 
no strict classes, the way in which the employment relationship was managed imposed a 
class-like structure of master and servant upon those working within industry. 
7.1.2 The transition to an industrial economy was also accompanied by a move to freedom of 
contract as a basis for industrial relations; however, this did not supplant the master and 
servant ideology. Although the employment relationship was established as relying upon 
the autonomous wills of both parties to the employment contract, the inherent imbalance 
in the employment relationship perpetuated a restrictive master and servant code150 and 
continued to be promoted by courts in favour of the prerogatives of the new class of 
employers.151 To that end, a number of master and servant themed acts were passed 
during the early part of the Industrial Revolution, which, among other provisions, 
established new crimes of absconding from work and refusing to enter into work under a 
contract of hiring with penalties of imprisonment for infractions.152 
7.1.3 The Master and Servant Act of 1867153 replaced imprisonment with fines as a principle 
remedy for breach of the Act and applied them specifically to all154 servants and 
labourers, who were defined as having been hired under a term of exclusive service.155 
This is the first appearance of the distinction between a contract of service and a contract 
for services, the former now signifying a fundamental factor in defining an individual as 
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an employee.156 Once the poor law requirement of settlement through hiring was 
abolished,157 the test of exclusive service was applied more flexibly without the 
requirement for a ‘servant’ to be at the employer’s disposal at all hours.158 The concept 
of mutuality of obligation also began to develop during this period. It was determined 
that it would be enough to show that the parties had undertaken mutual obligations to 
serve and to provide work, respectively,159 and for a defined period.160 
7.1.4 The Master and Servant Acts, while in effect, did not directly acknowledge any 
reciprocity in the employment relationship. They only applied to industrial and manual 
workers, while those in managerial, clerical or professional positions fell outside of the 
discipline they imposed. It was within this latter group of employees that a modern 
contract of employment based on reciprocity of obligation with limits on the employer’s 
power and control developed. The extension of these concepts to other groups of 
workers happened gradually as the influence of the master and servant model waned 
after its subversion by the provisions of the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875.161 
The legacy of the 1875 Act would remain influential, however, as it was assimilated into 
the common law of a hierarchical and disciplinary model of service within the 
employment relationship.162 The old assumptions of unmediated control were still being 
applied by the courts as they developed the law of employment.163 It was well into the 
twentieth century that contract finally replaced status, paternalism, and direct coercion 
of workers under the traditional common law of master and servant as the dominant 
legal paradigm for the employment relationship.164 
7.1.5 The contractual nature of the employment relationship was sacrosanct until it was 
recognised that the British policy of collective laissez-faire in combination with the 
inherent imbalance in the employment relationship was failing to provide adequate 
protection to the more vulnerable members of the labour force. The question arose as to 
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whether the state should guarantee a basic level of protection for the individual 
employee. To do so would lead to substantial legal intervention into the employment 
contract. However, it had become clear that the application of free contract principles to 
the employment relationship was inadequate. Despite recognition of these factors, it had 
little impact on the system of collective laissez-faire until the outbreak of the Second 
World War, when social security, workman’s compensation, and other protective 
legislation were introduced.165 
7.1.6 The traditional hierarchy of employer and employee has remained difficult to dislodge 
from the legal psyche.166 The open-ended duty of obedience enshrined in the master and 
servant laws is today characterised by an implied term in the employment contract.167 
Today’s labour courts, however, increasingly recognise the role of the express contract 
terms in placing limits on an employer’s managerial prerogative.168 While this has been 
tempered since the 1940s and given legal status following the introduction of the 
Employment Rights Act of 1996,169 as well as other more progressive employment 
oriented legislation, the master and servant basis is still evident in Britain’s regulatory 
approach to employment law.170 
7.2 The Evolution of the Contrat du Travail  
7.2.1 In eighteenth century France there was no general legal framework regulating the terms 
and conditions of the contract of employment as the corporation system provided the 
control needed at the time.171 The modern contract of employment was an invention of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, associated with the rise of the modern 
business enterprise and the beginnings of a more welfare oriented state. Wage labour 
initially took on the form of the traditional Roman law concept of the locatio conductio 
operarum172 in the post-revolutionary codes of the early nineteenth century. In placing 
labour within this concept, it was grouped with other types of contracts based on 
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exchange in the marketplace, leading to its commoditisation. Early labour codes did not 
recognise the notion of an employee’s personal subordination to the employer and his 
capital.173  
7.2.2 The early industrial labour relationship was characterised by the power of the employer 
to give orders, to issue rules contained in the livret or work book, which had binding 
force, and to retain the worker in employment until the employer considered the work 
ordered to be complete. It was not until the 1880s that the French contrat du travail was 
in common use, though its initial purpose was to satisfy the complaints of industrial 
employers that a general duty of obedience should be read into all industrial hiring. Its 
adoption was eventually promoted and systematised with a view to the development of a 
conceptual framework for collective bargaining and worker protection. Eventually, the 
concept of subordination came to rest at the core of the employment relationship in 
which the open-ended duty of obedience was traded in return for the acceptance and 
absorption by the enterprise of a number of social risks.174  
7.2.3 Today, the power of the state to regulate conditions of work is institutionalised in the 
legal system through the ordre public social, a set of minimum binding conditions 
applied as a matter of general law to the employment relationship. This concept 
recognises that there should be a formal contractual equality between employees and 
employers. In order to ensure that the employment relationship is equitable, the state has 
had to assume responsibility for establishing a form of protection for individual workers 
who, by accepting employment, are placed in a position of subordination to 
employers.175 Thus, the state assumes a role of calibration in the natural imbalance in the 
employment relationship.  
7.2.4 The code du travail176 differs from French code civil as it takes the inequality of the 
contracting parties as the point of departure, while civil law assumes bargaining 
equality. The code du travail also integrates a dimension for collective relations, while 
civil law governs individual relationships based on the assumption that, where an 
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individual employee cannot bargain on an equal footing with an employer, then trade 
unions or other collective organisations can do so. The code du travail is therefore a 
special law operating alongside the code civil, which is only referred to in those 
instances where labour law does not cover the issue in question.177 
8 Industrial Relations  
8.1 Industrial Relations in the United Kingdom 
8.1.1 The Industrial Revolution led to the institution of formally free labour as workers were 
separated from the land and labour became a factor of production.178 While the repeal of 
the corporation and guild system allowed greater access by semi-skilled workers into 
traditional trades, there was a parallel development of restrictive legislation regulating 
worker combinations.179 Although there was a growth at the end of the eighteenth 
century of friendly societies within the growing factory centres of production, agitating 
for higher wages remained illegal unless the complaint was made by appeal to the 
justices of the peace. 180  
8.1.2 While unionism was tolerated as long as it remained passive, employers would often 
petition for an act to put down combinations if a dispute threatened to disrupt 
business.181 The closeness of the French revolutionary mind-set to those of the unionist 
persuasion caused fear in the upper classes of British society and led to the passage of a 
Combination Act in 1799,182 which made any persons combining for wage increases or 
reduction of hours liable to be brought before a magistrate and sentenced to three 
months in prison. The Combination Act of 1800183 imposed lighter penalties and was 
rarely invoked. Rather, workers were indicted for conspiracy under the common law or 
for breach of some measure relating to a particular trade.184  
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8.1.3 The Combination Acts marked a new stage in the increasingly hostile relationship 
between employers and workers.185 They were used to break the resistance of a number 
of collective actions in the early nineteenth century. As the guild system fell away and 
workers were free to change jobs, a duty to work was introduced into the employment 
relationship, which, in concert with the combination laws, was used to suppress 
resistance of workers striking against the introduction of technology, for wages or for 
improved working conditions. Early craft union resistance tended to be against capitalist 
industrialisation and the introduction of capitalist forms of production that threatened 
traditional production processes. Modern trade unions emerged under conditions in 
which property rights over the processes of production and the nature of the business 
enterprise had been fundamentally reconstituted within the capitalist industrial 
system.186  
8.2 Britain’s Collective Laissez-Faire: The Rise of Labour Interest Power 
8.2.1 Britain embraced the policy of collective laissez-faire promoted by Kahn-Freund. The 
collective bargaining system, therefore, evolved independently of the law and little was 
done to regulate or even recognise the legal standing of trade unions and their 
bargains.187 Thus any mechanisms or procedures created before the middle of the 
twentieth century to benefit employees were generally implemented through the 
institutions of collective bargaining. For employees in Britain, this meant that the 
participants in industrial relations played a much more important role in the regulation 
of their own activities than they would have done in a more interventionist regime.188 
For example, in the early twentieth century, Britain viewed the duty to regulate working 
hours as belonging solely to the remit of collective bargaining and was therefore 
unwilling to ratify the ILO’s Convention on the forty eight hour work week.189 
Regulation of the employment relationship was viewed not as a matter for legislators, 
but for the social institutions of industrial relations.190  
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8.2.2 Underground unions came into the open in 1824 and put forward applications for 
advances in wages after many of the common law and statutory restrictions on trade 
union activities were lifted. While worker combinations were confirmed as being legal 
in 1825,191 combinations were prohibited unless they were for the specified purposes of 
determining wages and hours. Early collectivism was viewed as subversive and 
conspiratorial, impeding competition and regulating output, prices, wages, or the terms 
of credit, although it was also used as a tool of the free market to combat privilege and 
monopoly. As this was a time of free market capitalism, such anti-competitive activities 
were contrary to the goals of liberal economics and were thus discouraged.192 The 1825 
Act prohibited any interference with the labour supply and continued to regard other 
combinations as common law conspiracies.193 The 1825 Act specifically asserted a 
workplace hierarchy by establishing the rights of employers to manage and direct their 
business without interference.194 
8.2.3 Due to the injustices of the new Poor Law of 1834195 and the painfully slow process of 
union growth, the first truly proletarian social movement arose from the People’s 
Charter of 1838.196 The Chartists demanded annual parliaments; universal male suffrage 
and vote by secret ballot; equal electoral districts; an end to property qualifications for 
Parliament; and the introduction of salaries for parliamentary seats.197 Chartism was 
supported by traditional artisanal trades threatened by the rapid growth and efficiency of 
industrial manufactories. It encompassed an artisan critique of industrial capitalism and 
sought to capture political power in order to redress social and economic ills perceived 
as being caused by the Industrial Revolution. It was not only supported by the decaying 
artisanal trades, but also those involved in the new or expanding urban centres as it 
sought to improve working conditions overall.198  
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8.2.4 Particularly problematic was the presumed basis upon which Chartism was built. Its 
strategic presupposition of radicalism rested upon the possibility of a popular alliance 
among not only the working classes, but also small businessmen and larger employers. 
This was based on the assumption that all members of the industrial and working classes 
would be benefitted by the abandonment of capitalist industry and the assumption of a 
socialist structure of society. Given the diversity among Chartists, the movement was 
also impeded by internal political divisions, which eventually led to its failure.199 
Chartism attracted massive support but also was deeply disturbing for the ruling classes. 
While the movement survived into the later nineteenth century, the reforms sought 
would be slow to come.200 However, these early social movements also revealed the 
impact that industrialisation was having upon the populace. It was these early 
movements that altered class relations and helped to forge the English working 
classes.201 
8.2.5 The availability of a conspiracy charge for combinations outside of the topic of wages or 
hours allowed for frequent indictments against those who agitated for better working 
conditions. Even if an action did not violate the statute, the agreement to engage in 
certain activity was indictable as conspiracy. Thus combinations remained troubled by 
the ease with which the law could be turned against them. In 1875, there was finally a 
reversal of the assumptions of statute law in the Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act,202 which reversed the negative tradition of the statutes on combinations by 
permissively defining their actions as legal unless they contravened criminal law. 
Unified combination activity from that time was presumed to be legal, unless its actions 
would have been criminal if committed by a single individual.203 
8.3 Industrial Relations in France 
8.3.1 The experience of the Long Nineteenth Century left a deep mark that is still visible in 
the present labour regime in France. Early in the labour movement, there was no strict 
division of labour organisations between political and union activity. Social reformers, 
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economists, and political ideologues were all involved in the labour movement, 
rendering it fundamentally political in form.204 The labour movement took on a 
pluralistic character as trade unions in France were divided along ideological lines. 
Workers at a particular establishment could be members of different unions based on 
their political or philosophical affinity. However, trade union membership itself 
attracted only a relatively small percentage of the workforce.205  
8.3.2 The corporation system had been suppressed along with all privileges associated with it 
by the Décret d’Allarde206 and the Loi le Chapelier.207 They also decreed that every 
person should be free to exercise whatever profession, art, or skill that they wish under a 
relevant licence. The economic and political rationale for these changes were linked to 
the importance of a modern free market economy and the sanctity of the individual 
being in receipt of certain natural imprescriptible rights, two of the fundamental values 
promoted by the Revolution.208  
8.3.3 The other side of the insistence on individual and market freedom was the prohibition of 
worker combinations, which was viewed as a constraint on the free market. Such 
combinations were subject to both civil and criminal penalties.209 Despite the egalitarian 
motives of the Revolution, workers were still treated less favourably than entrepreneurs 
and industrialists as their attempts to organise were continually suppressed, while 
employer organisations were allowed to meet. This imbalance is particularly evident in 
the law that, in a dispute about wages, the word of an employer is to be taken over the 
employee in the absence of written proof. Despite the prohibition, workers still 
attempted to gather to try to improve their standard of living as it was evident that 
collective organisation would be the only way that they could achieve it.210 
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8.3.4 Although a legal prohibition on collective organisation persisted into the middle of the 
nineteenth century, a new community of working class people allowed a collective 
consciousness of solidarity to emerge that led to worker organisation through which they 
could act to obtain guarantees previously lacking. It was in the 1840s that the misery and 
debilitating working conditions of the working classes was finally recognised. As 
industrialisation increased its pace along with the misery of the workers, liberal 
capitalism was blamed by a number of socially progressive groups as well as by the 
workers themselves.211 In 1848 most European countries erupted in revolution against 
the effects of liberal capitalism and while this led to widespread chaos and was 
eventually repressed, it also brought the idea of social reforms into the political 
psyche.212  
8.3.5 The liberal capitalism worshipped by the revolutionary bourgeois would not survive the 
end of the century.213 The rise of socialism played a part in its demise, as did the attacks 
made by social Catholics who followed Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum,214 which 
condemned the degradation of the industrial working classes. Workers also began to use 
their vote and striking to improve working conditions and also to obtain changes in the 
law toward social reform. Despite the suspicion of labour held by the Second Empire,215 
it passed a Law on 25 May 1864216 that eliminated the felony of conspiracy and opened 
the way toward lawful strikes.217 
8.3.6 The Law of 1884218 finally granted a positive right to associate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining. It also gave the right to choose not to belong to a union. The right 
to associate (or not) now has the status of a fundamental right in France. The Law of 
1884 assured a considerable extension of liberties, such as freedom of association and 
freedom of the press, as well as affirming the secular nature of the French civil system. 
The individual was granted the express rights to combine with others if they believed it 
in their best interests, with the caveat that the general liberal status of the economy must 
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also be respected, which led to a number of restrictions on the means accorded to labour 
syndicates. They were restricted exclusively to the defence of their economic, 
commercial, industrial, or agricultural interests. Political or religious aims were 
prohibited and could at times lead to penal actions against certain syndicates.219  
9 Industrial Regulation in the United Kingdom 
9.1 Early Social Policy and Labour Regulation  
9.1.1 In general, the pace of the Industrial Revolution was too rapid for social legislation to 
remain connected with the position of those working in industry. Most early legislation 
was aimed at improving the health and safety of the poor, who provided the labour force 
until the mid-nineteenth century, when it was recognised that there was a need to 
regulate the conditions of work for industrial labourers. Although it was commonly 
accepted that the lives of industrial workers were deprived and impoverished, the early 
period of British industrialisation saw an increased concern for human unhappiness, 
particularly for children.220 As early as 1784, concern was pronounced for the terrible 
conditions of work in the textile industry in Lancashire.221 Concern for the health and 
well-being of industrial workers and child labourers led to the passage of Peel’s Health 
and Morals of Apprentices Act in 1802,222 which limited hours of work and prescribed 
minimum standards of hygiene and education.223 While this and Peel’s Act of 1819224 
were passed after the worst of the industrial abuses were over, they did provide the basis 
for the legislative cornerstone of modern industrial society.225 
9.2 The Factories Acts 
9.2.1 The Factories Act of 1844226 and the Factories and Workshops Act of 1878227 were 
passed to regulate the conditions of industrial employment, mainly for young children 
and women who were unable to either contract for themselves or benefit from union 
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membership.228 The Factory Acts were rarely enforced. It was not until the whole 
apparatus of government had been drastically reformed that a body of qualified public 
servants could be set to the task of reforming the squalid conditions of industrial 
centres.229 However, employers were often warned in advance and used coercion against 
workers to ensure that no complaint was made.230 
9.3 The Truck Acts 
9.3.1 In addition to poor working and living conditions, the paternalistic nature of early 
industrial businesses led to a practice of truck, a particularly pernicious form of 
employer control that refers to payment in kind rather than financial remuneration. 
During the Industrial Revolution, truck evolved to include other employer imposed 
restrictions on the freedom of the worker. Some employers would dictate where 
employees must live, how their money should be saved, and even what they should eat 
and when. In a report published in 1909, the quasi-paternal right to guide and regulate 
employees out of working hours was strenuously criticised, commenting that an 
employer should not have the right to regulate an employee’s private life just by virtue 
of the fact that he is paying him a wage.231 
9.3.2 A series of Truck Acts232 attempted to secure regular payment of agreed wages without 
arbitrary deductions or payment in kind. However, these were generally ineffective as 
deductions from wages for the rent of tools and machinery and for alleged defects in 
workmanship were used to control factory workers. Labour discipline was also imposed 
through the provision of personal and household loans, resulting in indebtedness to 
industrial employers.233 
9.4 Health and Safety Legislation 
9.4.1 In 1842 a report ordered by the Poor Law Commission presented a horrifying indictment 
of industrial living conditions and would have far-reaching effects. As factory workers 
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were often gathered in close quarters in poorly constructed tenements, life expectancy 
had been drastically reduced. The findings of this report led to a Public Health Act in 
1848,234 though this was limited in scope and effectiveness. Even the report’s findings 
did not sway some of the more strictly laissez-faire attitudes. It was averred by 
Trevelyan that:  
“…suffering and evil are natures’ admonitions; they cannot be got rid of and 
the impatient attempts of benevolence to banish them from the world by 
legislation...have always been more productive of evil than good.”235  
9.4.2 The Public Health Act of 1848 did, however, mark an important turning point in views 
of the purpose of government: state responsibility for the health of its people.236 
Eventually the Great Public Health Act was passed in 1875,237 which provided a 
complete statement of the powers and duties of local sanitary authorities, including the 
prevention of epidemics and the foundation of infirmaries. The annual death rate fell 
significantly after the passing of the 1875 Act.238  
10 Industrial Regulation in France 
10.1 Social Policy and Labour Regulation  
10.1.1 While Napoleon decreed in 1813 that no children under the age of ten should work in 
the mines, this did not stop the use of children in the textile industry once it became an 
important factor of French commerce. The first major piece of interventionist legislation 
in industrial relations with a purely social aim was the Law of 22 March 1841,239 which 
restricted child labour in factories and workshops. Of great concern was the effect that 
industrial progress was having on the corruption of morals and family disorder, 
attributed to a childhood bereft of fundamental education or religious and moral 
instruction. It was passed in response to a number of inquiries into labour conditions in 
various French industries that found deplorable living conditions and poor nutrition in 
working families. Among the most influential of these reports was one presented by Dr 
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Vuillermé in 1840,240 describing in great detail the misery that was essentially 
destroying the working classes. Child labourers were not being educated, which 
perpetuated the cycle of poverty. Dr Vuillermé’s report was a catalyst for a legal 
evolution in the area of labour protection.241  
10.1.2 Liberals in the government continued to impede the success of social legislation; 
however, there was much agitation in favour of the passage of a law of similar fashion 
to that passed in 1833242 in England in relation to child workers in the textile industry. 
At the heart of the argument against such legislation was that it would be irreconcilable 
with the principle of industrial liberty. It was feared that such regulation would be the 
beginning of a spate of intervention that would then smother industrial production in 
bureaucracy. There were also arguments supporting the role of the state to assure a 
subsistence existence for its workers, which may require intervention in industrial 
relations.243  
10.1.3 One of the strongest arguments in favour of intervention was made by those occupied 
with the defence of the country. The health of the lower class industrial workers was 
deteriorating to a state that they would not make effective soldiers should they be 
required. Eventually, the law of 1841 was passed, limiting the number of hours children 
could work at certain ages and prohibited night working in order to allow children to 
attend school.244 It did not compromise French industrial development, nor did it cause 
any problems for employers. It did, however, assist in maintaining human potential in 
order to ensure that there would be good soldiers available for recruitment as well as 
safeguarding moral and social conscience. The passage of this law also marked the birth 
of French labour law.245 It was followed by laws in 1874246 and 1892247 also dealing 
with child and female workers; a law in 1898248 dealing with health and safety and 
                                                          
240 Presented at the Academy of Moral and Political Science.  
241 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n17, 49 and Le Crom, n208, 29-35. 
242 The Factory Act 1833 (3&4 Will 4 c 103). 
243 Le Crom, n208, 29-35. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid, 36-41. 
246 Loi du 23 décembre 1874 Dite Roussel sur la Protection des Enfants en Bas Age et en Particulier des Nourrissons.  
247 Décret du 31 décembre 1892 Qui Fixe les Indemnites de Residence Due au Personnel Enseignant des Ecoles Primaires Publiques  
248 Loi du 9 avril 1898 Concernant Responsabilites dans les Accidents du Travail.  
88 
 
industrial accidents; a law in 1906249 establishing the requirement for weekly rest days 
for employees; and a law in 1919250 reducing the working day to eight hours. The 
protections continue to become greater and broader over time. 
10.1.4 Since the end of the 19th century in France, the degree of government intervention has 
been very important owing to the strength of its ideological and philosophical bases. 
Rather than the value that the British system places on freedom from government 
intervention, regulation was viewed as a means of liberating the oppressed working 
classes. Further, France did not distrust state intervention, while the UK preferred to 
retain its regulatory free area within the sphere of trade unionism.251 Rather, France 
chose the route of direct government regulation of the terms and conditions of 
employment for all employees, whether unionised or not. Early French labour 
organisations were also more politically oriented, having become accustomed to 
accomplishing their aims through political action rather than negotiation. Collective 
agreements themselves have occasionally become the subject of statute, eventually 
binding all companies, even those that did not agree to its terms.252  
11 World Wars and the Welfare State 
11.1 World War I253 and Labour Regulation in France and Britain 
11.1.1 The requirements of WWI precipitated the abandonment of the distance traditionally 
maintained between the state and industrial relations. Both Britain and France were 
forced to become highly involved in labour during this time in order to ensure that the 
war machine was suitably fuelled. The state professionalised the conciliation of 
industrial relations and displaced the essentially voluntary policy of labour mobilisation. 
Labour policies had become vulnerable to working classes’ growing awareness of their 
own political power. Legislation and policies contrary to militant striking, direct 
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confrontation, and an encouragement of arbitration were put in place in both the UK and 
in France.254 
11.1.2 Prior to WWI, the employment relationship in France was governed by basic contract 
principles and was largely unregulated, heavily influenced by the principle of an 
individual’s liberty to enter freely into service contracts.255 During WWI, it was 
necessary to bring employers and unions together through arbitration and less formal 
discussions in order to avoid an interruption in production that would have been 
detrimental to the war effort. The first widespread contact between employers and 
unions first occurred under the direction of governmental war-time policy.256  
11.1.3 In Britain, the Ministry of Labour was created in 1916, which changed the perception of 
the role of government in the labour economy. It dealt with industrial relations, 
manpower planning, and mobilisation during the war period, but then pressed for 
reformist policies such as the minimum wage once the war was concluded.257 It was also 
in 1916 that the Whitely Committee was established, recommending in its First Interim 
Report258 that there should be an establishment of a representative organisation for each 
industry with the object of regular consideration of matters affecting the progress and 
well-being of trades from the point of view of all those associated with it.259  
11.2 The Interwar Period in Britain 
11.2.1 Following the end of WWI, of pivotal importance was the defeat of the miner’s strike in 
1926, which solidified the economic strategy of the 1920s. The credibility of national 
economic policy was at stake as defeat would have meant that the direction of industrial 
and social policy was thrown into doubt. The triumph of the government helped to 
establish trade unionism as the means whereby the conditions of the working classes 
could be improved. However, following the general strike,260 the Trades Disputes Act 
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was passed in 1927261 hobbled the Labour Party’s political power by imposing restraints 
on financial contributions by way of political support from trade unions. The intention 
of the Act was to set in the law a separation of industrial and political action.262 
11.2.2 In the 1930s, industrial policy veered away from laissez-faire, despite government 
rhetoric insisting on the application of that policy. The government engaged in a number 
of ad hoc interventions in the 1920s to deal with problems of efficiency in various 
industrial sectors. It attempted to encourage rationalisation through the use of tariffs, 
which had the opposite effect as industries went toward defensive cartelisation. The 
government did little to substantially interfere with cartelisation and restrictive practices, 
however, which is contrary to a free market policy. The legacy of the industrial policy of 
the 1930s is the substantial emphasis on anti-monopoly policies during wartime and 
post-war policy discussions.263 
11.2.3 France, the Interwar Period and the Accord Matignon 
11.2.4 It was not until after WWI that the employment relationship began to change in favour 
of the employee when, in 1926, the Supreme Court of France recognised a cause of 
action in relation to unfair dismissal when based on malicious intent. From that point on, 
the French government became highly interventionist in employment relationship. 
Economic power began to shift in favour of employees.264 The election of the Front 
Populaire in 1936 was the beginning of even greater legislative intervention in the 
labour market, as well as legal recognition of collective action. The Accord Matignon 
recognised the right of the worker to join the union of his choice; promised the 
immediate negotiation of collective bargaining contracts; and established employee 
delegates tasked with representing the workforce to the management. The Accord laid 
the basis for a system of collective determination of wages and working conditions, as 
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well as improved communication between workers and employers within the firm 
itself.265 
11.2.5 The Accord Matignon was followed by the passage the Law of 1936266 that gave the 
government an active role in encouraging the negotiation of collective bargaining 
contracts. It constituted the first legal recognition of the institution of délégués de 
personnel.267 It required that all employers accept the immediate establishment of 
collective working contracts and extended the variety of collective agreements that 
could be entered and their coverage to more than just the parties to the agreement.268 
The Front Populaire government also undertook more direct regulation in working 
conditions, including the provision of vacation and limitation of working hours. It 
intervened to extend collective bargaining contracts due to fear that the negotiations for 
their renewal would lead to conflict between labour and management. Due to the risk-
averse nature and paternalistic intervention of the Front Populaire, employers and 
unions failed to learn to work together, leaving the legacy of a new system of regulation, 
rather than increased harmony or understanding in industry that could have been 
achieved through negotiation and conflict resolution. Interventionist tendencies during 
this period acted as a disincentive to unions and employers to work together at all.269  
11.3 The Legacy of World War II270 and Labour Regulation  
11.3.1 During WWII, the Vichy government271 introduced the Charte du Travail, which 
established a hierarchy of industry specific associations from the local to the national 
level. Employees and employers were compulsorily enrolled in separate associations. 
The compulsory nature of the association membership weakened the power of trade 
unions further. The hierarchy of associations also facilitated government control.272 The 
introduction of this corporatist system had been contrary to the French national character 
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since the abolition of corporations in 1791.273 The legacy of the occupation during 
WWII was a new schism within the labour movement between leaders of those 
organisations that had been created by the Charte and those who had remained 
uninvolved.274  
11.3.2 In 1946, a new Constitution was drafted that guaranteed individual and collective rights 
to workers for the first time. Social rights to organise, strike, and to social security were 
set out in addition to the political rights in existence since the French Revolution.275 
Comité d’entreprises276 were established in the Ordinance of 22 February 1945,277 
evolving from the Charte associations established during the occupation. Today, this 
appears to have been a development created by both the Resistance and the Charte 
movement. It is based on the principle that employees have the right to representation to 
an employer, limiting patrimonial absolutism in terms of both economic and social 
actions. 278  
11.3.3 A dual system was established in which the comité d’entreprises would exist alongside 
personnel delegates. The delegate’s task was to present individual and collective 
complaints to the employer in relation to wages, professional classifications, worker 
protection, and health and safety. The comité d’entreprise was limited to information 
and consultation on the plans of employers. As the trade unions have gone into decline 
in recent years, the comité d’entreprise has become the major institution that governs 
industrial relations in France. The ordinance under which it was passed is still in effect 
and the consultative role of the comité d’entreprises remains more or less unchanged.279  
11.3.4 Governmental control of many phases of economic life was common during the 
Reconstruction period. Rather than allowing the free resumption of collective bargaining 
in France, contracts had to pass governmental approval in order to prevent any conflict 
with the economic policies and controls promoted by the government of the time. Then 
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once such an agreement was affirmed, not only was it binding upon the parties who 
created the agreement, but was extended to be binding on all firms falling within the 
geographical and industrial boundaries set by the negotiations. Until 1950, the labour 
market in France was regulated by a number of governmental controls in an effort to 
improve industrial relations. However, as economic and social conditions improved, the 
conditions necessitating the controls disappeared,280 but once in place they would be 
difficult to remove.  
11.3.5 The Law of 11 February 1950281 renewed the liberty of collective negotiation in 
conjunction with the creation of a minimum wage. This was influenced by the financial 
difficulties experienced following the end of the Second World War that justified 
maintaining a narrow control over economic factors. The Law of 1950 confirmed both 
the pre-eminence of the state as well as the compromise of the collective autonomy to 
the public order of the state. The combination of the freedom to negotiate with the 
acceptance of state intervention by and large formed the foundations of the modern 
ordre public social.282 Such governmental controls are antithetical to the role of 
collectivism. The interventionist and risk adverse nature of France following the war 
helped to subvert the cause of truly free collective bargaining.  
11.4 The Golden Age of Labour Law in Britain 
11.4.1 WWII marked a turning point for labour law in Britain.283 It saw the renewed 
mobilisation of the British nation and a revival of restraints on collectivism. A vast raft 
of labour regulation was promulgated in 1940. State regulation enormously diminished 
the prerogatives and powers of employers as they were no longer able to arbitrarily 
dismiss employees and even relatively minor offences were subject to arbitration. Thus 
disciplinary issues tended to become the province of official work committees in order 
to avoid the intervention of National Services Order. Legislation also restricted strikes 
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and industrial action. Relative labour peace during the war, however, was not due to the 
efficacy of the law as there was a reluctance to invoke its full power.284 
11.4.2 The Ministry of Labour again ascended in prominence and given the primary objective 
of successfully handling labour with an improvement upon WWI labour unrest. Labour 
was a key constraint on the war effort as manpower proved to be the ultimate limit on 
the capacity to fight it. The Labour Ministry, led by Minister Bevin,285 represented itself 
as being a part of the working classes and trade unionism, which played a part in 
securing Labour’s consent to the war. Compulsion and conscription into national service 
was introduced when the labour shortage arrived in 1941. However, one striking 
observation of this period is the absence of any state regulation of wages. Voluntarism 
was the policy of the day along with the continuation of normal collective bargaining 
and arbitration286 
11.4.3 The post-war period was marked by the consolidation and final breakthrough of labour 
law as a separate legal discipline throughout Western Europe.287 Master and servant 
laws in England were supplanted and the contract of employment emerged as the 
primary instrument governing the employment relationship. It was between 1944 and 
1970 that labour law entered its golden era under the maxim that ‘labour is not a 
commodity.’288 After the WWII, labour law’s primary purpose was recognised as 
addressing the imbalance inherent in the employment relationship, exhibiting a 
fundamental redistributive goal in terms of economic power.289  
11.4.4 In Britain, the advent of the welfare state and the extension of collective bargaining led 
to employment law taking a different direction.290 While Britain was reliant upon the 
collective bargaining system into the 1950s, little was done in the legal system to ensure 
that such a system was in place. There were no legal requirements for employers to 
recognise and bargain with trade unions. In addition, collective agreements were not 
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legally enforceable as contracts. They were binding in honour only and enforceable only 
through social sanctions such as striking. While agreements between employees and 
employers had the force of contract, the terms of collective agreements did not have any 
special legal status in respect of the individual contract of employment. Even when 
terms of collective agreements were incorporated, this did not guarantee continued 
observance due to the common law emphasis on the autonomy of the parties and the 
individual contract being at the centre of its conceptual structure.291  
11.4.5 Despite the lack of legal enforceability for the terms of most collective agreements, 
collective bargaining had been recognised as the normal means of settling wages and 
working conditions since the 1870s. The development of voluntary organisations was 
viewed as the central factor in the growth of industrial relations with any legislation 
relating to it as secondary. Although the two World Wars present two periods of active 
state intervention in collective bargaining that have been viewed as temporary, they did 
lead to a readier propensity to interfere in the process. Following the WWII, the 
government recognised that the voluntary system of collective bargaining was failing to 
achieve the goals to which it attached priority. So while the rhetoric continued to 
promote voluntarism so that official unionism could be seen to offer an effective 
alternative to the militant and unofficial enterprise level workers movements, it was not 
indifferent to the gaps the system left in achieving government policy goals. Thus in the 
post-war period questions were raised about the effectiveness of voluntary collective 
bargaining and the potential role that law might play in redressing those inadequacies.292 
11.5 Labour Policy and Politics 
11.5.1 Around the turn of the twentieth century, independent labour politics began to emerge 
that reflected the dissolution of Victorian social relations. At a local level the 
paternalism of political authority was dissolved as industrial social relations were 
altered. Politics were realigning with an emphasis on labour as a new political estate. 
There was also an intellectual revival of socialism and stirrings of anti-free-trade debates 
within Conservative politics that signified the commencement of a search for new 
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policies to address the repercussions of the changing world economy. Classical 
liberalism was progressively abandoned by British political parties. WWI intervened to 
resolve the uncertainties present in the British political system, leading to the full 
destruction of the ideological integrity of liberalism. The War also raised the question of 
the position of labour within the national politics of Britain.293  
11.5.2 One result of the victory in WWII was that it closed off any questioning of the 
traditional institutional, political, and social relationships in the country. The viability of 
traditional structures was, in fact, reinforced as the British political establishment had 
not been discredited through defeat or occupation. The war essentially ratified the 
soundness of Britain, British class, and the imperial system, which though faded in 
glory, was restored following the war. WWII also served to confirm the traditional 
patterns of class relations at the point of production. Unlike France and other European 
nations, British labour had escaped the burden of fascism and had been accorded equal 
partnership in political and economic mobilisation. There was no debate or struggle 
about the nature or basis of political and social relations as there was in France. The 
political consensus had shifted to a set of progressive assumptions that reflected the 
general interests of British labour. The fact that there was no attempt to reconsider the 
basis of industrial relations did not precipitate a return to the weight of employer 
prerogatives. Rather, the balance tended toward labour and was protected by any counter 
attack by the political environment of the time. The welfare state and the commitment to 
full employment in Britain entrenched the power of labour within British society.294 
11.5.3 Labour policy has since become a tool of political power in both the UK and France. 
The course of British labour policy has been circuitous with far more violent swings in 
policy than was experienced in France. This can be explained in part through the more 
general social causes affecting each jurisdiction, but also by reference to the legal 
culture itself. The British common law system is infinitely malleable in comparison to 
the French codified system295 and can thus be easily affected by political shifts. British 
conservatism in the 1980s emphasised the need to liberate labour markets in order to 
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compete in the global economy, which led to a substantial weakening of the power of 
labour interests in favour of their replacement by regulation. As governments have 
changed between political parties, so has the strength of labour regulation, making the 
area of employment law one of the least reliable and most changeable in the UK legal 
system. Similarly, in France, as socialism gained ground in the 1980s, labour reforms 
also became increasingly protective.296   
12 Arguments, Parallels and Conclusions 
12.1 Parallels and Differences between British and French Industrialism  
12.1.1 The preceding Chapter has discussed important elements of social history that have 
influenced the evolution of labour regulation in the UK and France. Theoretically, 
labour is a part of the capitalist market and could be treated as a commodity; however, 
its inherent human quality carries with it moral implications as well as an uncertainty 
that undermines expected market behaviours.297 While both the UK and France have 
incorporated this ideology into their labour policies, there are a number of ways in 
which the jurisdictions continue to differ.  
12.1.2 The proletariat in the UK evolved out of a more or less homogenous group of lower 
class peasants, while French workers came from a diversified industrial proletariat 
issued from different socioeconomic backgrounds, resulting in a segmented, diversified 
working class.298 The French labour movement thus had to answer to diverse interests of 
a non-homogenous working class as well as the different ideologies which coexisted 
among them,299 while the British working class presented a less complex force. 
Collective bargaining became an important mechanism through which employment 
relations were managed in France, leading to the institution of enterprise level comité 
d’entreprises and the election of representatives, which placed a legal obligation upon 
the employer to inform and consult employee representative groups.300 While in Britain, 
the organisation of the workplace was voluntary, and generally still reliant on collective 
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laissez-faire, continental workplaces tended to be organised according to legal 
principles.301 
12.1.3 The loosening of trade union restrictions eventually invited a stronger position for trade 
unions in both the UK and France. However, while the function of trade union rights in 
the UK is similar to those of other continental democracies; the form that they take is 
different.302 Rather than protecting the freedom of association through the granting of 
positive rights, the UK has generally granted immunities for certain trade union 
activities which could otherwise constitute civil law liabilities,303 such as conspiracy. 
Employees remain bound by their employment contracts, regardless of the immunities 
that may exist for strike action, meaning that breaches can still occur regardless of 
employee union activity,304 demonstrating the UK’s continued adherence to the freedom 
of contract as a fundamental constitutional value.  
12.1.4 Because of Britain’s rapid pace of industrialisation, the master and servant relation 
continued to have power, even in the modern employment relationship.305 During the 
Industrial Revolution, the employee was often wholly dependent upon the industrial 
employer for even the bare necessities of life.306 In contrast, French concepts of work 
relations imposed a juridical equality between worker and employer which was 
embodied in legal codes. In France, the employer’s control over employees was 
tempered by the development of mandatory social legislation.307 The resistance to 
regulation in the area of labour law in the UK is endemic to the nature of the labour 
movement in Britain. Given the development of trade unions outside the political sphere 
and the far reaching freedom to act that they had been given through immunities, it is 
not surprising that they were not supportive of the encroachment of the law into 
industrial policy.308 Britain’s adherence to orthodox economic beliefs in the free market, 
collective laissez-faire, and the lack of political ambitions in early unionist dogma 
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meant that there was little support for any progressive labour regulation.309 This non-
interventionist stance has remained popular in British politics, though successive Labour 
governments have tempered this with more progressive legislation, particularly in view 
of Britain’s acceptance of the EU Social Chapter.310 
12.1.5 In the UK, an emphasis has remained on the importance of some form of economic 
liberalism and the free market, while France has steadily drawn away from these ideas 
toward the social democracy, which is characteristic of it today. France has manifested a 
reserve about the market economy and capitalism through its political and economic 
policies.311 Clearly, the French system has taken a view on the importance of social 
protections and this view is imposed upon any legislative act that may affect society. 
Britain, however, has continued to resist interference in the labour market where 
possible,312 despite the influence of EU social legislation. The labour systems of the UK 
and France were developing on subtly different themes throughout the industrial age, 
though they began to exhibit some similarities during the early twentieth century due to 
the effects of the two World Wars. However, that soon changed as both recovered, 
reconstructed, and entered into the golden years of the 1950s with ideas of full 
employment.313  
12.1.6 The next Chapter will explore the evolution of insolvency systems through an 
examination of historical views on debt and credit; the financial revolutions needed to 
support a modern corporate and investment culture; the development of the corporate 
culture and company law; and the evolution of insolvency and the rescue culture. 
                                                          
309 R Lowe, “Hours of Labour: Negotiating Industrial Legislation in Britain, 1919-39” (1982) 35(2) Econ Hist Rev 270. 
310 See Chapter 5 section 3.4. 
311 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n17, 33-34. 
312 See section 11.5.3. 
313 See section 11.4.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT, CREDIT, AND INSOLVENCY: AN 
EXAMINATION OF FINANCIAL EVOLUTION 
 
“Artificial wealth comprises the things which of themselves satisfy no natural 
need, for example money, which is a human contrivance.” 
~ St Thomas Aquinas 
1 Introduction 
1.1 A Review of Proletarianisation and Labour Regulation  
1.1.1 While the concept of debt and bankruptcy have formed a part of social, commercial and 
legal history for millennia, the idea that workers need some form of protection, whether 
through regulation or collectivism, is a relatively new concept having its origin in the 
era of the Industrial Revolution, ostensibly as a means to compensate for the earlier 
suppression of collective action.1 However, the fundamental aims of both labour and 
insolvency laws are closely connected to the socioeconomic and cultural characteristics 
of individual jurisdictions. The liberalism espoused by European society in the approach 
to industrialisation was built upon individual egoism and selfishness that was then 
counterbalanced and controlled through the regulation of the power relationship of 
employer and worker. It was believed that competition between all factors of production 
which, at the time, included labour, would maximise social welfare. This approach 
eventually proved to be a failure both in terms of the economy and the dehumanisation 
of workers. It is with the failure of unimpeded capitalism that the history of the state 
protection of labour began.2 
1.1.2 The previous Chapter explored the process of industrialisation and the changes that 
occurred in relation to labour as a component of the free market. A purely liberal 
economy required a mobile proletariat that could adjust naturally to labour demands 
                                                          
1 B Hepple and P O’Higgins (eds), The Making of Labour Law in Europe: a Comparative Study of nine Countries up to 1945 (first 
published 1986, Hart 2010) 112. 
2 Ibid, 75. 
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throughout the industrial centres, but completely free labour led to a “race to the 
bottom” of wages and working conditions, resulting in mere subsistence living for many 
industrial families.3 It was eventually recognised that there was a social, and indeed, 
economic need for a minimum of labour rights to satisfy various human and economic 
needs such as health, safety, and dignity, though it took some time for this recognition to 
translate into changes in industrial attitudes. Labour regulation eventually evolved in 
both jurisdictions, though with fundamentally different aims.4  
1.1.3 The labour forces in each jurisdiction were affected by jurisdictional political, social, 
and economic structures. Due to France’s more socially oriented culture, 
industrialisation occurred in parallel with the preservation of traditional trades and 
methods of production.5 The French proletariat was generally imbued with more 
political power and afforded a level of dignity that was often lacking in the UK. The 
evolution of the factory system, standardisation, and mass production in industry 
furthered the rapidity of progress and profit. It was also these developments that initiated 
the deskilling of the labour force in both jurisdictions, eventually leading to a cycle of 
poverty for industrial workers as the labour pool grew beyond the demand of the labour 
market.6 Once employed, workers were generally desperate to remain so, leading to the 
acceptance of subsistence wages or worse, in addition to inhumane working and living 
conditions.7  
1.1.4 Collectivism eventually became a tool for change in both jurisdictions, though the UK 
took a distinctly “hands off” approach, allowing free bargaining between unions and 
employers without any positive regulation in that area. The power of union interests 
eventually rose to challenge the power of the UK government, leading to restrictions on 
union power, replaced by some basic employment guarantees.8 While union 
                                                          
3 See Chapter 3 section 4.3 and 5.3. 
4 Ibid, 6.  
5 Ibid, 5.1.1. 
6 Ibid, 4.3.6 and 5.1.4. 
7 Ibid, 4.3.8. 
8 Ibid, 8.2. 
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membership has never been extensive in France, the collective power of workers 
remains a powerful force in the French labour system.9 
1.1.5 Eventually, the employment contract was developed in both jurisdictions, though in the 
UK it was viewed as a normal contract between individuals of equal bargaining power 
until much later. While penal elements were removed, it retained many of the master 
and servant elements that had long characterised that relationship.10 In France, the 
contrat du travail was created within a legal framework, specific to the employment 
relationship, within the ordre public social, which assured greater juridical equality in 
the employment relationship and alleviating the subordinate position of employees. 
1.1.6 A series of laws in both the UK and France was introduced to protect the worker in 
areas such as health and safety, working hours, and payment terms. For France in 
particular, social policy legislation aimed at providing a minimum level of worker 
protection. The introduction of such legislation in the UK generally had the aim of 
protecting the workforce from injury and increasing the efficiency of labour, while in 
France there was a greater element of social compassion and a belief in the need to 
protect human dignity that influenced the development of social legislation. The World 
Wars then saw massive changes to the nature of labour regulation in both jurisdictions, 
laying the groundwork for what would be recognisable as modern labour law. 
1.2 Connections between Labour and Corporate Insolvency 
1.2.1 Prior to large scale industrialisation, a financial revolution occurred in the Netherlands 
and England to accommodate the needs for colonial trade.11 Without the financial 
revolution, as well as the evolution of paper money, credit, debt, banking, and the 
parallel development of the joint stock company, large scale industrialisation would not 
have been possible. England’s highly developed financial sector of the middle 
eighteenth century allowed for rapid and massive industrial development. In addition, 
the modernisation of both credit and debt allowed for greater risks to be taken in 
business, which also led to a greater risk of insolvency. Thus, as modern financial 
                                                          
9 Ibid, 8.3. 
10 Ibid, 7.1.  
11 See JH Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes and Negotiability” (2003) 25(3) Intl Hist Rev 
505. 
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markets evolved, providing a forum in which to invest in growing commercial 
enterprises, so too did the need for insolvency systems that worked not only on a 
national level, but also internationally. Cross border colonial trade was a catalyst for the 
evolution of the modern global marketplace, owing to the need for a financial system 
that could deal with a variety of currencies, products, and legal systems. 
1.2.2 This Chapter will explore the historical context of the evolution of insolvency systems, 
which will include philosophical and moral aspects of debt and credit, an examination of 
business markets and the financial revolution, as well as the eventual shift from debt as a 
moral issue to a legal matter. It will also examine insolvency theory and the 
development of corporate rescue as a legal and socially influenced concept, and the 
interplay between workers and other social considerations of insolvency.  
2 Business and Financial History – Perspectives on Debt and Credit12 
2.1 Debt and Obligation: an Ancient Dichotomy 
2.1.1 Debt and credit have an extraordinarily long history lying well outside their financial 
aspects. The origin of modern debt and credit lies in a sense of human community, 
mutual obligations, and morality.13 It has been viewed as a product of humanity’s 
existential condition owed by virtue of the natural, mutual protections afforded by living 
in a society or, from a religious standpoint, the existential debt owed to a supreme 
being.14 Those living proper and moral lives were obliged to constantly repay the 
existential debts owed to one another. This evolved into a social obligation over time 
related to a reputation for honesty and charity.15 Debt requires a relationship between 
individuals who do not consider each other fundamentally different and who are 
potentially equals. The balance of debt and credit addresses this equality in the sense 
that the urge to repay a debt is also the need to reinstate the equality between the debtor 
and creditor. If one is then unable to reinstate that equality, the person who is in debt 
                                                          
12 Part of this section was used in a conference presentation at the INSOL Europe Academic Forum in Berlin in September 2015 
based on a paper entitled “The Cost of Bank Insolvencies: A Socio-Economic Rights Analysis” to be published in the conference 
proceedings by P Omar (ed) Banking and Financial Insolvencies to be published 2016. See Annex 2 Publication 6. 
13 D Graeber, Debt: the First 5000 Years (Melville 2011) 1-19. 
14 This is a primordial debt “owed by the living to the continuity and durability of the society that secures their individual existence” 
from G Ingham, The Nature of Money (Polity Press 2004) 90. 
15 Usury is defined as the exaction of interest or of any specified return beyond the principal value of a loan; see D Graeber, n13, 56-
57 and Munro, n11, 506. 
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must be at fault. Thus a debt is an exchange between individuals that has not yet been 
reciprocated.16 Given the association of creditworthiness with reputation for honesty and 
integrity, financial debt obligations became indistinguishable from moral obligations in 
the Middle Ages.17  
2.1.2 The primeval, moral quality of debt and interest was absorbed into the Abrahamic 
religions and given an immoral status associated with the sins of theft and sloth. It was 
considered slothful as there was no labour to which the profit of interest could be 
attributed. The thieving nature of lending was related to the idea that money, as a 
representation of value in goods or services, should not be required without a relevant 
exchange. Therefore, interest equated to taking money from an individual for nothing in 
return, hence theft.18 The perceived sinful or immoral character of debt influenced early 
views of credit and lenders in the religious and legal prohibitions against usury.19   
2.1.3 Lending with the intention to make profit was considered an assault on Christian charity 
and the injunction to give freely without expectation of return.20 Money is a symbolic, 
political commodity that represents an abstract unit of measurement of something given 
to another in the faith that such a debt would eventually be repaid by something of equal 
value.21 Whether in coins, shells, or the abstract of numbers on a computer screen, 
money is not in itself useful. It is only accepted because it is assumed that others will 
also do so, thereby giving it a value based upon the measure of trust one has in other 
human beings.22 It was also viewed that treating money as an end in itself defied its true 
purpose as a representation of a physical or moral obligation. Charging interest was 
unnatural as it treated mere metal as an entity capable of reproducing itself.23 Usury was 
                                                          
16 Graeber, n13, 120-121. 
17 W Hunt, The Puritan Moment: the Coming of Revolution in an English County (HUP 1983) 146. 
18 Graeber, n13, 289. 
19 Ibid, 59-66. 
20 “And if you lend to them of whom you home to receive, what thanks are there to you? For sinners also lend to sinners, for to 
receive as much. But love ye your enemies: do good, and lend, hoping for nothing thereby: and your reward shall be great, and you 
shall be the sons of the Highest; for he is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.” Luke 6:34-35, The Holy Bible, Douay Rheims 
Version revised by Bishop Richard Challoner AD 1749-1752 (James Cardinal Gibbons 1899) (Tan Books and Publishers Inc 2000) 
The New Testament, 72.  
21 AM Innes, “The Credit Theory of Money” (1914) January Banking LJ 151, 155. 
22 Graeber, n13, 46-47. 
23 Described and condemned in Aristotle’s Politics 1258b and his Nichomachean Ethics 1121b. See O Langholm, The Aristotelian 
Analysis of Usury (Universitetsforlaget 1984). 
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therefore regarded as contrary to commutative justice24 and natural law.25 Without 
shedding this negative and prohibitive perspective on borrowing and lending, modern 
systems of credit and the financial revolution would have been impossible, and 
insolvency systems therefore irrelevant.  
2.2 The Elements of Insolvency History 
2.2.1 The history of insolvency does not begin only with evolution of credit and debt, but 
importantly with the recognition that in order for financial risks to be taken by cautious 
investors, some element of reward must be made available to mitigate that risk. In order 
for this to happen, debt and bankruptcy had to move from the category of a moral wrong 
to a legal and financial condition. The negative view of debt would not change until 
some element of secularity could be applied to financial transactions; as such, the 
Reformation26 played an important part in the necessary financial paradigm shift. 
Approaches varied greatly according to religious views and acceptable methods to 
circumvent the “evils” of usury.27  
2.2.2 Apart from the important debt aspect of insolvency, the necessity for some formal 
regime would not be required until the development of an exchange economy based to 
some extent on credit and recognisable business structures. While markets, credit, and 
debt have been in existence since ancient times, the Middle Ages saw the expansion of 
regional markets and fairs that attracted merchants from all over Western Europe and 
the Mediterranean. The ever widening lens of profit-seeking entrepreneurs led to longer 
term ventures over greater distances with higher risks, leading to a need to attract 
investors to support such expensive endeavours.28 This led to the development of 
business structures that could limit liability and mitigate the risks associated with 
colonial trading.  
 
                                                          
24 Defined as justice bearing on the relations between individuals especially in respect of the equitable exchange of goods and 
fulfilment of contractual obligations: Merriam Webster Online Dictionary: <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/commutative%20justice> accessed 29 July 2014. 
25 Munro, n11, 510. 
26 See Chapter 2 Section 2.4. 
27 See Graeber, n13; Ingham, The Nature of Money (Polity Press 2004 JH Munro, n11; and G Davies, A History of Money 
(University of Wales Press 2002). 
28 ES Hunt and JM Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe 1200-1550 (CUP 1999) 23-26. 
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2.3 The Lex Mercatoria and Commercial Law 
2.3.1 As regional markets grew and began to attract merchants from all over Europe, a new 
means of exchange and rules governing merchant behaviour were required. The great 
Champagne foires29 transcended the regional to become the first truly international 
marketplaces in the thirteenth century, providing a catalyst for the evolution of the lex 
mercatoria.30 The lex mercatoria provided a set of globally agreed rules observed in all 
civilised places engaged in trading that evolved to satisfy the needs of the large regional 
fairs that attracted merchants from a variety of jurisdictions.31 It provided an expeditious 
procedure outside of the time-consuming common law procedures with lower 
transaction costs.32  
2.3.2 As there was no truly uniform system of mercantile law administered throughout 
Western Europe, the lex mercatoria derived its rules and regulations from many 
different countries owing to the unifying effect of the law of the fairs.33 By the end of 
the Middle Ages, the lex mercatoria had become the foundation of expanding commerce 
throughout the Western world.34 Today, the modern lex mercatoria is similar in every 
jurisdiction, transcending the division of the world into sovereign states, whether with 
free market or centrally planned economies, and whether those states have civil or 
common law traditions.35 
2.3.3 The lex mercatoria also evolved to satisfy the legal certainty that was needed for 
commercial transactions. Neither the Roman nor Germanic legal systems provided 
certainty or protected against the claims of an original owner against a merchant who 
had purchased stolen or lost merchandise, regardless of good faith. Ancient laws 
protected the rights of an original owner against third parties, whether they had acquired 
possession in good faith or not.36 It was eventually recognised that commercial business 
                                                          
29 Fairs or markets. 
30 The “Law Merchant”; Hunt and Murray, n26, 23-26. 
31 From G Malynes Consuetudo,Vel, Lex Mercatoria (1686) as cited in W Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law 
Merchant (CUP 1904) 1. 
32 Munro, n11, 550. 
33 W Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (CUP 1904) 2-21 and C Schmitthoff, “The Unification of the 
Law of International Trade” (1968) JBL 106. 
34 NE Hatzimihail, “The Many Lives – and Faces – of the Lex Mercatoria : History as Genealogy in International Business Law” 
(2008) 71 LCP 169, 177. 
35 Ibid, 176. 
36 W Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (CUP 1904) 93-94. 
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could not be done if title to goods was constantly under suspicion.37 Thus, the concept of 
bona fide possession came to be a part of the lex mercatoria and eventually extended to 
any purchase.38 It is also in the religious and moral overtones of good faith that the 
beginnings of a modern concept of contract can be observed.39 These elements of 
commercial and contract law are fundamental to the existence of modern business and 
therefore fundamental to the need for insolvency systems. 
2.3.4 The international foires also revealed a need for a simpler and less risky form of money. 
The larger scale trading during the Middle Ages required large transfers of physical 
coins. This was problematic due to the costs of transportation and the fluctuating 
exchange rates. Lengthy travel times could result in arriving with less value in coinage 
than when a merchant began the journey due to the common practice of currency 
debasement by impecunious sovereigns. The earliest financial institutions were designed 
to avoid these wasteful exercises by arranging paper transfers. Merchants developed a 
payment system based on lettres de foire, credit instruments that recognised the sales of 
merchandise, but specified payment at a later fair, when the total of debits and credits 
for a season could be calculated and resolved between buyers and sellers. These letters 
of credit became transferable and made the carriage of large quantities of coinage 
unnecessary, reducing the risk and expense of travel. Out of this evolved the bill of 
exchange from which the first negotiable financial instrument would develop. The use 
of paper transfers rested upon the reputation, trust, and confidence of all parties to a 
transaction that the others would honour their commitments. Merchant good faith was 
the foundation of the commercial revolution in Western Europe.40  
2.4 The Financial Revolution  
2.4.1 The foundations of the financial revolution derive from the response of thirteenth 
century municipalities and merchants to the increasingly severe obstacles erected by the 
Church and the state to inhibit lending for profit, impeding international financial 
transactions due to the lack of incentive for financial risk taking. Thirteenth century 
                                                          
37 From Sir T Scrutton, Elements of Mercantile Law (1891) 23 as cited in Mitchell, n36, 2-21. 
38 Mitchell, n36, 99. 
39 Mitchell, n36, 108-111. 
40 Hunt and Murray, n28,  29-30; 56-65. 
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Europe was caught between a commercial revolution and a vigorous campaign against 
usury for both individual and commercial investments.41 A number of illicit means were 
devised to circumvent the ban on usury. These were disguised as annuities, rentes,42 and 
other devices that cloaked loans in sales contracts stipulating a single price that included 
an uplift for interest specifying a future payment, but that would be usurious if agreed in 
terms of credit.43 As these transactions could attract a risk of prosecution and social 
stigma, participants knew that they were potentially committing both usury and fraud.44 
A defaulting debtor would also have the opportunity to claim that he had been the victim 
of extortion as there were no contractual protections for such transactions.45 It was the 
response to the restrictions on usury that provided the foundations for more complex 
modern financial instruments. 
2.4.2 Overseas discoveries and the emergence of long distance colonial trade also influenced 
developments in financial markets and business structures. In order to accommodate the 
long distances travelled and the periods of time required for them, innovations in finance 
business were needed. England and the Netherlands led this revolution, implementing 
and improving them into more efficient forms of financial instruments.46 Once the bill of 
exchange became legally negotiable, following the case of Burton v Davey,47 modern 
financial markets were able to develop with greater swiftness and certainty.48  
2.5 Debt: From Mortal Sin to Legal Condition 
2.5.1 As credit became a necessity with the expansion and internationalisation of regional 
markets, it was tied to the fundamental social value of mutual aid in order to justify its 
existence against the prohibitions on usury.49 By the sixteenth century, attitudes toward 
interest and usury began to change. The removal of the prohibition on usury was not just 
a matter of pleasing the rising commercial interests of the gentry, lawyers, and 
                                                          
41 Munro, n11, 506-507. 
42 These were contracts based on bequests of land, often to monasteries, for which the donor would receive an annual income in kind 
or in money, which was deemed as a “fruit” of the property to be paid for life to the donor and his heirs. See Munro, n11. 
43 C Wyffels, “L’Usure en Flandre au XIIIème Siècle” (1991) Revue Belge Philologie et d’Histoire 855, 859-871. 
44 JT Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury (HUP 1957) 35-36. 
45 Munro, n11, 512. 
46 EE Rich and C Wilson (eds) The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume 5: The Economic Organisation of Early 
Modern Europe (CUP 1977) 290-392.  
47 1437 – adjudicated by the Mayor of London’s Law Merchant Court in 1436: Munro, n11, 551-553. 
48 Munro, n11, 556-561. 
49 Graeber, n13, 330. 
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merchants, but also a matter of protecting the livelihood of ordinary villagers and 
farmers, who were easily exploitable by corrupt money-lenders. The protection of the 
poor from the unscrupulous trader in part explains why the ban on usury was maintained 
into the late Middle Ages, in addition to the religious and cultural implications.50  
2.5.2 The Reformation helped to hasten the breakdown of preconceptions of loans at interest. 
The process of questioning the foundations of the Church in Tudor England raised 
questions among the public that the Church failed to answer with any clarity. Following 
England’s final break with Rome, there was no longer any ecclesiastical impediment to 
the legalisation of interest. The growth of the commercial enterprise also helped to spur 
on the change in medieval attitudes toward usury as loans were more often made for 
commercial rather than charitable purposes. In 1545, an Act51 was passed that legalised 
the payment of interest, allowing payment for credit as long as the rate did not exceed 
ten percent per year.52 Though usury would fall in and out of favour for decades to 
come, depending on the religious persuasion of the Monarchs of England, culminating 
today in an almost completely free system in terms of the interest that can be charged, 
France retains its prohibitions to a certain extent. The French Revolution resulted in a 
short period where loans at interest were not limited, but today interest rates are strictly 
limited for individual loans and, though there are some exceptions available, interest 
rates remain limited in commercial loans as well.53 
2.5.3 The origin of capitalism not only heralded the gradual collapse of economic reliance 
upon traditional communities in the growing power of an impersonal market, but also 
relied on the conversion to a credit economy in which interest could become a 
fundamental factor in financial transactions. There was a gradual transformation of 
moral networks by the intrusion of impersonal market rules and the powers of the state. 
The legalisation of interest led to the evolution of signed legal bonds agreeing terms of 
loans, which in turn required the evolution of a court system that could deal with the 
                                                          
50 G Davies, A History of Money (University of Wales Press 2002) 219-222. 
51 An Act Against Usurie (37 H 8 c 9). 
52 Davies, n50, 219-222. 
53 See A Ashta and L Attuel Mendes, “French Legislation and the Development of Credit Availability for Microenterprise” (2008) 
2(2) Global J Bus Research 123, 127 and E Cafritz and O Tene, “Why French Usury Law Must Change” (2002) December IFL Rev 
32. 
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influx of commercial claims.54 While today debts and credits have taken on an 
impersonal and purely financial character within a specific legal framework, their 
derivation is in good faith, socially acceptable behaviour, and reputation that create the 
“credit” of an individual in society.55 
3 Revolutions in Economy, Finance and Politics 
3.1 The Glorious (Fiscal) Revolution 
3.1.1 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England not only changed the balance of political 
power, but it also ushered in a fiscal revolution that provided the financial foundations 
for the Industrial Revolution.56 The institution of parliamentary sovereignty gave the 
legislature a primary role in financial matters. The royal prerogative was sharply 
curtailed and subordinated to the common law. The reduction in the arbitrary powers of 
the crown also served to secure political rights, a key element in the protection against 
arbitrary violations of economic rights,57 thus progressing toward economic stability and 
financial certainty. 
3.1.2 Parliament was also constrained against taking up the Crown’s absolute power due to 
the diversity of views within the institution and the embedded economic and political 
freedoms in the law. The political independence of the courts enabled them to exercise 
unchallenged authority in large areas of economic activity, making mercantilist 
regulation like that of Colbert in France impossible. The creation of a politically 
independent judiciary also had the result of expanding the government’s ability to 
credibly bond itself under financial agreements. The ability to raise money through 
loans was strengthened through the restriction of its ability to renege on them.58 
3.1.3 The institutional changes that occurred as a result of the Glorious Revolution permitted 
the drive toward British dominance of the world. England could not have succeeded in 
the wars against France without making funds available through debt. England’s 
                                                          
54 Graeber, n13, 332-333. 
55 Ibid, 56-57; Munro, n11, 506. 
56 PGM Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study of the Development of Public Credit 1688-1756 (Macmillan 1967). 
57 DG North and BR Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitments: the Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England” (1989) 49(4) J Econ Hist 803, 815-816. 
58 Ibid, 818-819. 
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financial position gave it the edge to become the major power in the world in the 
nineteenth century while France’s economy continued to struggle due to unresolved 
institutional contradictions that eventually led to the country’s bankruptcy and the 
French Revolution.59 
3.1.4 The French government was rigid and inadaptable to the changes that were occurring 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It lacked a representative body where 
the polity’s consent to measures could be obtained in advance. As such, changes were 
made arbitrarily and at the whim of the Crown and its advisers. Had France possessed an 
effective legislative body, the legal and fiscal injustices occurring during the eighteenth 
century prior to the French Revolution would have been difficult to perpetrate and 
reform might have been introduced more effectively. The monarchy might then have 
been able to develop along similar lines to England, presenting a more competitive rival 
than it did.60 
3.1.5 The British and French empires were set on very different foundations. The French 
raised funds through plunder and taxation of the areas conquered by Napoleon, while the 
British economy relied upon debt financed by government bonds.61 While there are a 
number of reasons why this came to be, certain roots of this difference can be attributed 
to two different experiences of early investment banking. The financial revolution 
culminated in the development of the joint-stock limited liability corporation that 
protected investors from losing all of their wealth should a venture fail.62 Limited 
liability and investment in shares attracted the interest of profit hungry investors who 
would lead the world into the first stock market bubbles.  
 
                                                          
59 Ibid, 830. 
60 Dickson, n56, 14. 
61 N Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of The World (Penguin 2008) 80. 
62 T Guinnane and others, “Putting the Corporation in its Place” (2007) NBER Working Paper Series - Working Paper 13109 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w13109.pdf > accessed 16 June 2014. 
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3.2 The Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles63  
3.2.1 Both the UK and France underwent a market bubble cycle in colonial trading around 
1720. The South Sea Bubble occurred contemporaneously with France’s Mississippi 
Bubble, but was significantly smaller and caused less financial ruin. Both experiences 
did, however, have a profound effect on French and English approaches to finance and 
business.64 The differences between the Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble 
help to explain why French and English approaches to financial markets diverged at this 
time. The South Sea Company had to contend with competition from the Bank of 
England, driving up the terms they had to offer to annuitants. They also had to contend 
with political opposition within Parliament, something that was not present in absolutist 
France. They could also not establish monopolistic positions in the stock or credit 
markets as there was a rush of new companies seeking to raise capital in the same way. 
Additionally the bank notes issued by the company bank65 in England were never legal 
tender. Thus, there were not the same inflationary results as the Mississippi Bubble. 
There was no lasting systemic damage to the financial system apart from constraints on 
future joint stock company formation. Government debt conversion was not reversed 
and foreign investors did not turn away from England, unlike France.66  
3.2.2 French experiences with speculative financing beginning with the failure of John Law’s 
system in 1720 and the bankruptcies and inflation precipitated by the French Revolution 
led to a cautious approach to economic and monetary policy by the governments of the 
Long Nineteenth Century. Despite the spread of liberal economic ideas, the French 
government exercised guardianship over a considerable part of the economy. These 
controls were justified by the public’s interest in them, but while the state wished to 
encourage economic growth, it was also concerned with the potential ramifications of 
                                                          
63 See AM Davis, “An Historical Study of Law’s System” (1887) 1(3) QJ Econ 289; FH Beach and MJ Wasserman, “Some 
Neglected Monetary Theories of John Law” (1934) 24(4) Am Ec Rev 646; TE Kaiser, “Money, Despotism and Public Opinion in 
Early Eighteenth Century France: John Law and the Debate on Royal Credit” (1991) 63(1) J Mod Hist 1; EJ Hamilton, “Prices and 
Wages at Paris under John Law’s System” (1936) 51(1) QJ Econ 42; and AE Murphy, John Law: Economic Theorist and Policy 
Maker (Clarendon 1997). 
64 E Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation (Plume Books 1998) 64. 
65 The Sword Blade Company. 
66 J Hoppit, “The Myths of the South Sea Bubble” (2002) 12 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series 141; L Neal, 
The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (CUP 1990) 90-111; and Davies, n47, 263-
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such growth.67 The government played a paternalistic role in the economy, providing 
security and shelter for French businessmen. This relationship can be contrasted with the 
more predatory outlook common to business in the UK.68 However, mercantilist 
protectionism eventually became an impediment to French industrial and economic 
growth resulting in its failure as an economic model.69 
3.3 French and British Business Attitudes: Diametric Differences 
3.3.1 Though France lagged behind Britain in its pace of industrialisation, it had intentionally 
adopted a slow and methodical approach, avoiding high concentrations of labour and 
other excesses common in British industry. The French people continued to favour 
individualism and had an obstinate determination to possess land, eschewing positive 
attachments to business and industry,70 due to the businessman’s perceived inferior 
social position. The materialistic qualities of businessmen were set against the perceived 
un-materialistic values of French gentlemen; restless ambition against the prestige of 
birth; the capricious efficacy of money against the economic stability of land; diligence 
and austerity against the dignity of leisure and the pomposity associated with upper class 
living. The fundamental aims in business were generally to make enough money to be 
able to sell the business and then live in gentlemanly luxury and possibly attain a secure 
and heritable official or professional position for the next generation.71  
3.3.2 French entrepreneurs remained on the whole independent. Expansion was achieved 
through the use of company revenues rather than capital investment and, at times, 
through the wealth of relatives and friends. The family nature of most French firms also 
meant that they were of an inherently cautious nature, due to the risks of speculating 
with the family inheritance. In addition, there is an overwhelming emphasis on the 
preservation of wealth alongside the desire to create it.72 Most French companies 
remained smaller family concerns. There were only a few large joint stock companies 
with a more modern administrative structure. There was only a minority of ambitious 
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French industrialists during the nineteenth century who pursued a true industrial 
capitalism.73  
3.3.3 Most French businessmen were apathetic about new industrial techniques and few were 
willing to make the capital investments needed. There was an innate conservativeness in 
the French psyche that preferred proven techniques and had a distaste for the unknown. 
The French attachment to security in financial matters would continue to make it 
difficult to engage in large scale industrial activity.74 Capital was limited by geography, 
due to the nature of French banking. Banks also exercised restrictive and anachronistic 
control over credit. They were suspicious of borrowing and unwilling to lend unless 
against a high percentage of reserve.75  
3.3.4 New businessmen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England were 
encouraged by an individualistic self-help philosophy. There were, however, few 
individuals who had the funds or fortune to go into business on their own. The 
possibility of self-help was compromised by the economic reality that financing was 
generally only available within an elite group of businessmen among whom there was 
fundamental trust. These elite groups of businessmen collaborated extensively to reduce 
the transaction costs associated with the high level of risk and uncertainty existing at the 
time. It was therefore unlikely that individuals without an already trusted reputation 
would be able to insinuate themselves into these business networks.76 This web of credit 
became a vital feature of the business scene from the mid eighteenth century based on 
the high trust culture of English businessmen.77 This system would allow businessmen 
to reinvest profits into the business instead of tying up scarce resources in stocks 
facilitating the process of self-generated fixed investment.78 
3.3.5 British business culture was characterised by a personal capitalism revolving around 
commitment towards the family firms during the first phases of industrialisation. British 
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business firms extolled the virtues of gifted amateurs with liberal arts educations rather 
than professionally trained managers. There was also a pursuit of gentrification by the 
middle classes, which sometimes led to the fading of industrial companies, while the 
families running them found enough funds to support a quasi-aristocratic lifestyle. 
However, it was preferable to place those of a more gentlemanly character into top 
positions rather than those who had trained in business skills. Unlike France, however, 
this pursuit of gentrification existed in parallel with the idea that a business profession 
could be an end in itself, rather than a stepping stone to bourgeois leisure and the pursuit 
of functionary and governmental positions.79  
3.3.6 Large scale industrialisation was impeded by deeply rooted attitudes held by the 
government and ruling classes in France. Credit was viewed as too easily misused, 
causing bankruptcies and economic crises. There was a desire to protect savers from 
risky investments80 and an acute resistance to any risks associated with capital 
investment and debt.81 Investment decisions were influenced by a desire for revenue, for 
security, for social status and for financial inertia. Only a small minority possessed the 
knowledge or capital to make well informed investments. Most decisions were reflected 
in a broad consensus of opinion among investors. Business failures, however, were too 
common to make industrial investment attractive to those without a large amount of 
disposable income.82 However, the majority of Frenchmen preferred to depend on land 
to provide an adequate income, prestige and security for old age as well as an 
inheritance for their children. It was security that influenced most investment decisions 
rather than the potential for profit.83 
3.4 Company Law in England 
3.4.1 Towards the end of the seventeenth century, some elements of modern company 
organisation had developed in England, though there was no legal recognition or 
regulation of it. Company institutional development was impeded following the 
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experiences of the South Sea Bubble and the passage of the Bubble Act,84 which aimed 
to prevent corporate fraud by requiring the royal authorisation of all joint stock 
companies.85 However, the impact of the Bubble Act has been a matter of debate. The 
individual nature and importance of personal relationships in business of this period 
would have meant that limited liability companies would not necessarily have been 
popular.86 It has also been observed that despite the limitations imposed by the Bubble 
Act, large scale industry did develop after the 1770s.87 The restrictions on joint stock 
company formation may also have encouraged innovation with other forms of 
organisation.88 The Act may have exercised a deterrent psychological effect on company 
promotion89 and forced the average businessman to try alternative methods for financing 
their ventures. The Bubble Act was, in any event, a factor that helped to prevent the 
emergence of a form of limited liability over the 150 years that followed.90 
3.4.2 In 1825 the Bubble Act was repealed, extending the availability of joint stock company 
status. However, firms still required an Act of Parliament before limited liability could 
be granted.91 The Joint Stock Companies Act of 184492 was passed with the purpose of 
encouraging honest joint stock trading and to protect the public against the often 
fraudulent purposes of company establishment.93 The Joint Stock Companies Act made 
it possible to automatically constitute a company without permission from the Crown.94 
Companies would only then be established if they were founded on sound financial 
calculations, sound management organisation and structure, and an honest (non-
fraudulent) objective in the opinion of the Registrar of Companies.95 However, it was 
not until 185696 that limited liability was introduced, which served to provide an 
effective form of security for both investors and businessmen.97  
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3.4.3 The Companies Act of 1862,98 a consolidating act, refined the joint stock legislation, 
precipitating a flood of applications for joint stock company status. However, British 
businesses tended to adopt joint stock status while practising a private form of joint 
stock company that retained equity within the family. While securing limited liability, 
British family run operations were able to keep the company within the family, though 
this also prevented outside capital from coming into the company. There was an initial 
resistance within British company culture to separating ownership from control.99 
3.5 Company Law in France 
3.5.1 A careful legal framework was created for France’s economic development in the 
nineteenth century based in part on an earlier partial codification in an edict of 1673. 
Joint-stock companies had been outlawed during the Revolution, but were recognised by 
the drafters of the Code de Commerce of 1807 as a necessary evil for the efficient 
organisation of large business enterprises. However, the memory of Law’s infamous 
system led to the imposition of significant restrictions on the creation of joint stock 
companies.100 The incorporation instruments were viewed as requiring close regulation 
in order to inhibit abuse and corruption. Not only did the people need to be protected 
from the greed of some of the early financiers, but successive governments also wished 
to control the wealth produced through these instruments in order to promote internal 
development. The history of French corporate development is a series of compromises 
between the need for an expanded and liberal business enterprise and the fear of regular 
abuses of it.101 
3.5.2 The Code de Commerce of 1807 provided for the creation of several types of 
company.102 The société en commandite103 was a partnership between a business 
manager with unlimited liability and a financial investor, who only contributed money 
with liability limited to the amount of capital invested. It was through this institution 
that aristocratic or aspiring bourgeois could participate in business ventures without 
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stigmatising their reputation with a profession in business.104 It was also due to this 
organisation in part that full limited liability of the société anonyme105 was delayed. The 
commandite served as a substitute for free incorporation. It would not be until the 1860s 
that free incorporation would be accepted in France.106 
3.5.3 The société anonyme was a corporation in the modern sense, designed to fit the 
requirements of large scale enterprises with its total capital divided into easily 
transferable shares.107 In order to avoid abuse of this structure, it was subject to 
authorisation in accordance with a lengthy procedure dependent upon a decision by the 
Conseil d’Etat. The authorisation process required copious correspondence as the 
Conseil carefully determined whether the enterprise was useful, its promoters substantial 
citizens, and if success was probable.108 The funding of the société anonyme was also 
difficult as all capital was required to be paid before the company could be registered, 
which immobilised large quantities of capital for a long time, considering how long the 
application process generally took. The rigorous requirements were justified by 
reference to the fact that the société anonyme enjoyed the benefit of limited liability; as 
such, the creditors, public, and ordinary shareholders had to be protected.109  
3.5.4 In 1863, the restrictive procedure governing the creation of limited liability société 
anonyme was abolished and replaced with a law allowing the unauthorised creation of 
sociétés à responsabilité limitée,110 though these were limited in terms of capital. In 
1867, this restriction was removed and the authorisation procedure, which had been a 
serious obstacle to company creation, was abolished. Prior to 1867, the main form of 
business was the société en commandite, which, though it did not grant limited liability 
to all parties, provided a halfway house that encouraged some capital investment. The 
development of this instrument, while partially created in order to protect personal 
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reputations from the stigma associated with business, was a more favourable 
development than had been available under English legislation at the same time.111  
4 The Evolution of Insolvency Law 
4.1 Debt, Bankruptcy, and Imprisonment 
4.1.1 Pre-modern bankruptcy law in Western Europe was preceded by an ancient Roman law, 
manus injectio, derived from Emperor Justinian’s112 twelve tables. The debtor was 
seized by the creditor and brought before magistrates, after which the debtor had a 
period within which to make payment. If the debtor failed to do so, the creditor could 
take possession of both the person and the property.113 The debtor was subject to the 
good graces of the creditor, who could choose to put the debtor to work as a slave, sell 
the debtor into slavery, or even put him to death. The sale of the debtor’s possessions 
and of the debtor himself served to satisfy the debts owed to the collective of 
creditors.114 This precursor to modern bankruptcy procedures was softened somewhat 
during the decline of the Western Empire, when it became more common to distinguish 
between those debtors guilty of fraudulent bankruptcy and those who had found 
themselves indebted through honest unfortunate circumstances.115  
4.1.2 The term “bankruptcy” is derived from the Italian banca rotta, meaning “broken 
bench”.116 In mediaeval times, this referred to a physical breaking of the bench of the 
merchant who was unable to pay his debts in order to deny him the ability to continue 
exercising his craft.117 It later came to indicate the commercial ruin of the merchant. A 
bankrupt merchant was no longer permitted to sit in the assembly of merchants, 
essentially destroying his reputation as a merchant in the local area. The French also use 
the word “faillite” to signify insolvency, which is derived from the Latin, fallere, which 
means to fail or to fall, referring to the merchant’s fall from grace in the commercial 
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arena, resulting from being prohibited to pursue business activities. Thus the term of 
faillite has a penal character that assumes some element of wrongdoing in bankruptcy.118  
4.1.3 Individual bankruptcy in England was also penal in nature. It was viewed that non-
traders’ losses were due solely to their own extravagance or misjudgement and thus their 
own fault.119 It was viewed as an unjustifiable practice for any person apart from a trader 
to encumber himself with debt.120 Thus, imprisonment was a common penalty in 
England. Bankruptcy procedures began from a premise of guilt and fault and treated 
those engaged in it as either criminally or civilly wrong. 
4.2 Evolution of Bankruptcy Law in France 
4.2.1 French bankruptcy provisions were heavily influenced by the lex mercatoria, which had 
fashioned bankruptcy into an open ended flexible instrument to resolve a debtor’s 
estate.121 Its largely penal character is evident in the severe penalties applied under the 
edicts of François I in the Ordonnance of 1536 and the Ordonnance of 1560 of Charles 
IX.122 The latter ordinance assigned an extraordinary capital punishment to those found 
guilty of fraudulent bankruptcy. Henri III continued this severity of punishment in his 
Ordonnance de Blois in 1576, stating that fraudulent bankrupts should be publicly and 
exemplarily punished. It was viewed that severe punishments were needed in order to 
protect public morality, but also to satisfy the exigencies of the church, which had 
pronounced in 1570 that fraudulent bankrupts should be subject to excommunication 
and suffer pain of death. The capital punishments meted out to fraudulent bankrupts 
were often indiscriminately applied to simple bankrupts as well.123  
4.2.2 The Ordonnance of 1667 to some extent recognised the paralytic effects that the 
severity of punishments for bankruptcy was having on the evolution of commerce, 
industry, and modernity. As such, it abrogated the use of imprisonment for more than 
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four months for civil debts. This abrogation, however, did not apply to foreign debtors. 
Foreign merchants, often engaged in the regional fairs throughout Western Europe, were 
viewed as having the ability to easily escape their debts due to their itinerant lifestyle. 
Thus any findings against foreign merchants would tend to apply more severe 
punishments.124 
4.2.3 More modern institutions of French bankruptcy law were set out in Title XI of the 
Ordonnance sur le Commerce of 1673 under the reign of Louis XIV, which provided for 
amnesties and letters of royal pardon to alleviate the punitive nature of insolvency, as 
well as providing methods for liquidating a debtor’s estate.125 However, the rules 
remained markedly penal as bankrupts could still be exposed upon the pillory or placed 
in shackles.126 The 1673 ordinance also codified the customs and rules of the lex 
mercatoria.127 The procedures of faillite contained in the 1673 ordinance were available 
only to merchants, including the potential for discharge by royal pardon.128 The 1673 
ordinance also gave a certain modern and humane aspect to the means whereby goods 
could be seized by creditors by limiting the times when execution could be carried out 
against a debtor’s property and requiring witnesses to confirm such execution was 
performed in a dignified and respectful manner.129  
4.2.4 In order to avoid being pursued as a fraudulent bankrupt under the 1673 ordinance, 
debtors were required to provide their books, registers and other business papers that 
could show how the business had been run prior to the bankruptcy. If the records 
showed that the bankrupt had come into difficulty through no fault of his own, then the 
debtor’s good faith could be established by an assembly of his creditors. It was the duty 
of the debtor to convince his creditors that he had acted honestly and that it would be in 
their interests to enter into an agreement for collective debt repayment. It was assumed 
that a simple bankruptcy could achieve the satisfaction of all benefitting parties through 
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an amiable settlement without the intervention of the court, while fraudulent bankrupts 
were frequently punished by death.130 
4.3 Bankruptcy, Insolvency, and the French Revolution  
4.3.1 As in many political, social and economic areas prior to the French Revolution, the 
Enlightenment physiocrats also commented on the state of bankruptcy and the plight of 
the debtor. Montesquieu was moved with compassion in relation to the material ruin of 
honest French citizens. The secularity of the physiocrats assisted in the separation of 
Christian morality from the borrowing of money, allowing them to view the individual 
debtor with greater sympathy than might have been acceptable previously. Montesquieu 
believed that indebtedness gave an inherent superiority to a lender over a debtor. He 
queried why the state should augment this servitude through imprisonment or other 
subjugating penalties. He also noted that those engaged in business under contracts were 
not punished with the same severity and insisted that imprisonment was in any case 
never the appropriate course for the enforcement of debt against a citizen. Essentially, 
the liberty of an individual was a far more important consideration than the ease of 
another.131 However, the severity of punishment of fraudulent and innocent debtor alike 
would remain in place until the passage of the Napoleonic Code.132 
4.3.2 Following the French Revolution and the years of instability that followed it, 
Bonaparte133 was able to take advantage of the chaos as a justification to impose order 
through the development of his Civil Code, which by 1808 included provisions on 
insolvency. The 1808 insolvency code offered a menu of options to the parties. The 
nature of the legislation retained its former repressiveness, giving courts wide powers of 
arrest and authorising the detention of insolvent debtors.134 However, it made provision 
for unfortunate debtors presumed of good faith that allowed them to abandon all of their 
property to their creditors in order for their creditors to find a way in which the debtor’s 
                                                          
130 Ibid, 39-43. 
131 Charles de Secondât, Baron de Montesquieu, L’Esprit des Lois (first published 1748, Gutenberg 2008) 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27573/27573-h/27573-h.htm> accessed 11 August 2013, livre XII chapitre XXI; livre XX chapitre 
XV. 
132 Desurvire, n113, 44. 
133 Ruled from 1804-1814 and for 100 days in 1815. 
134 Omar and Sorensen, n125, 23. 
123 
 
debts could be paid.135 This was an obligation for debtors who wished to preserve their 
liberty as this transfer operated to discharge any liability to imprisonment. However, this 
provision was contradicted by article 1270 of the Code Napoleon that stated a debtor 
could not be acquitted of his debts even if he had given up all he possessed to meet 
them. Creditors could continue to pursue the debtor for real property. The debtor could 
also not avoid his “civil death,” resulting in the exclusion of the debtor’s civil rights and 
the prohibition from exercising a trade until all creditors had been satisfied.136 Until 
1838, most insolvencies would occur outside the civil process through an agreement 
among creditors to engage in an amiable liquidation by using extra-legal expedients. It 
was believed by many creditors that “un bon arrangement vaut mieux qu’un mauvais 
procès!”137 The reform of 1838138 would assist in improving the procedures to some 
extent.139 
4.3.3 The reform of 1838, though severe by modern standards, represented the first softening 
of French bankruptcy law, initiating a gradual disappearance of criminal liability in 
bankruptcy, except for those bankruptcies caused by fraud.140 The 1838 law reduced the 
costs of registering a bankruptcy and softened the regulation of the procedure, although 
legislators also employed more rigour in relation to the transparency of the role and 
functions of bankruptcy trustees.141 The Law of 1867142 then created the foundations for 
corporate institutions, which was followed by a humanitarian Law of 1889.143 It 
introduced the system of liquidation judicaire,144 designed to improve the situation of 
luckless, good-faith debtors. The history of modern French insolvency institutions 
begins here.145 By abolishing penal and civil sanctions, it acknowledged that the 
bankrupt was no longer regarded as guilty, but rather as misfortunate or perhaps 
incompetent.146 The modern version of French insolvency law would not be 
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recognisable until legal reform occurred in the 1960s147 when some forms of corporate 
rescue would also appear. 
4.4 The Evolution of Insolvency Law in England 
4.4.1 Bankruptcy laws in England and France through the Middle Ages were adapted in part 
from the Venditio Bonorum used in commercially minded Italian city states, under 
which a debtor’s property was equitably divided among his creditors.148 England’s An 
Acte againste suche persones as doo make Bankrupte149 adopted a species of this law, 
thus the first appearance of the pari passu principle in English law.150 Until reforms of 
the eighteenth century, however, English insolvency laws had the sole purpose of debt 
collection through the seizure of a debtor’s assets, functioning as continuation of private 
remedies with some collective aspects.151 The common law system was beneficial only 
to those individual creditors who acted promptly in collecting their accounts as no 
provision was available under the common law for securing or distributing the debtor’s 
estate for the benefit of all creditors. A turning point occurred in 1705 when Parliament 
enacted a law152 providing relief by way of discharge of bankruptcy, provided the debtor 
surrendered himself and his property to his creditors. The debtor would be discharged as 
bankrupt as long as he was seen to cooperate with his creditors.153 
4.4.2 Because insolvency rules were an exception to the common law principles of contract in 
the enforcement of debt, changes to the law were initiated through changes in statute. In 
1732, a consolidating act154 was passed that became the statutory basis for bankruptcy 
law for the rest of the eighteenth century. It provided for the appointment of an assignee 
to manage the affairs of the bankrupt estate generally chosen from among the creditors. 
As the eighteenth century progressed, the number of insolvencies increased, revealing 
weaknesses in the system illuminated by the burden placed upon it.155 
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4.4.3 The eighteenth century was a period of law reform influenced by Bentham’s156 support 
of codification and simplification of the British legal system. Bankruptcy law reform 
became an important subject during this period due to the abuse of the system in place 
and the frauds committed under it. It also left those who engaged in the process 
stigmatised and financially ruined. Early reforms made little difference to the problems 
inherent in the system until the Act of 1825157 consolidated all previous acts and 
introduced administrative concepts that would form a part of all future bankruptcy 
legislation. The 1825 Act instituted the concept of a composition of the debt agreed 
between the debtor and a majority of creditors that would allow the debtor to continue 
his business as long as he complied with the new repayment terms.158 This composition 
procedure is perhaps the first appearance of a procedure with a goal of potentially 
rescuing a business in financial difficulty, rather than just relying on its liquidation to 
satisfy debts due.  
4.4.4 Reforms were introduced in 1831 that departed significantly from the previous 
bankruptcy system and sought to address many of the issues businesses had encountered 
in the administration of bankrupt estates. It introduced a new interventionist style of 
bankruptcy that included an element of government involvement, contrary to the popular 
economic philosophy of laissez-faire. However, these reforms were promoting a refined 
laissez-faire that encouraged positive state action that was both acceptable and 
necessary in certain well-defined situations. In the case of insolvency, government 
intervention was justified due to creditors’ consistent failure to properly administer an 
insolvent estate, despite the shared common interests of all creditors. The Act of 1831159 
included the views of classical economists, a Benthamite spirit of reform and practical 
suggestions of those working within the bankruptcy system at the time.160 While these 
reforms caused some controversy among traditionalists, its promulgation was significant 
due to the introduction of “officialism.” The reforms were also in part a result of the 
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growing influence of the business community, which would only increase in the reforms 
of the 1840s.161 
4.5 Joint Stock Companies and Bankruptcy in the 1840s 
4.5.1 The origin of modern corporate insolvency law is linked to the development of the joint 
stock company in the nineteenth century.162 On the same date as the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844, a Winding Up Act163 was also passed. The object of the Winding 
Up Act was to enable a company to be made bankrupt like an individual without 
bankrupting the individual members of the company. This Act also aimed to ascertain 
the causes of business failure and discover abuses of the joint stock company form. 
However, the bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the right of action a creditor may 
have against the person or property of an individual member, thus shareholders could 
remain personally liable for the debts of the company.164 There were no options for 
compositions or arrangements that might have allowed the company to continue to 
trade, only the recourse to company funds and assets to satisfy the debts owed to 
creditors.  
4.5.2 The Act of 1844 was followed by bankruptcy acts in 1848 and 1849, passed to amend 
the procedure for the winding up of companies since winding up was becoming an 
important legal aspect of business. The Act of 1848165 transferred the winding up 
jurisdiction from the Court of Bankruptcy to the Court of Chancery, enabling company 
investors to petition for a winding up and to give the Court of Chancery a detailed 
procedure through which to carry out the winding up, particularly the enforcement of 
calls for payments from investors. The Act of 1849166 further amended the Act of 1848, 
extending its application to all partnership associations and companies consisting of not 
less than seven persons.167 
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4.5.3 The Act of 1849 introduced several reforms that favoured creditors. The simple 
principle behind these creditor friendly reforms was that, prima facie, the creditor was 
innocent, while the debtor was at fault. The Act made a debtor’s failure to comply with 
his summons an act of bankruptcy in itself. This bill also introduced a means of 
distinguishing between different types of debtors: the virtuous debtor, whose insolvency 
was attributed to unavoidable losses or misfortune; the unfortunate debtor whose 
conduct was generally satisfactory; and the speculating or fraudulent debtor.168 This 
ranking indicates a close tie to the prevailing moral perception of bankrupts and the 
Victorian values of thrift, self-help, and individual effort.169 
4.5.4 Although the 1849 Bankruptcy Act seemed to ameliorate the problems and improve the 
way the bankruptcy system functioned,170 the Acts of 1844, 1848 and 1849 produced a 
conflict of jurisdiction between the Court of Bankruptcy and the Court of Chancery, 
leading to significant confusion as petitions could be brought by various stakeholders to 
either court.171 In addition, the provision of the 1844 Act allowing creditors to pursue 
the property of each individual member of the company once the property of the 
company was exhausted not only defeated any presumption of limited liability, but also 
disrupted pari passu172 distribution.173 The introduction of true limited liability in 
1856174 resolved the problem of both conflicts of jurisdiction and the pursuit of 
individual shareholders outside of bankruptcy by allowing the Chancery Court to refer 
its winding up orders to the appropriate bankruptcy court. Limited liability was also a 
catalyst for creditors to look to the assets of a company for security when considering 
their lending habits.175 
4.5.5 Despite the rise of officialism and the codification of the bankruptcy system, formal 
bankruptcy was undesirable due to costs and delays. Creditors would instead often work 
out arrangements or schemes with the insolvent debtor to avoid bankruptcy processes, 
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leading to a private liquidation with each creditor being paid his pro rata share of the 
assets. At times, the debtor would continue to operate his business under agreed creditor 
imposed restrictions.176 
4.6 Victorian Bankruptcy Reforms: The Influence of Business 
4.6.1 The Bankruptcy Acts of 1861177 and 1869178 emphasised creditor control and minimised 
the role of the judiciary in the collection and distribution of company assets. The 
business community exercised considerable influence on the content of this Act and 
reformers believed that a system designed by those having the most at stake would be 
more likely to succeed. Officialism had fallen out of fashion, despite its effective 
operation for twenty five years. This was due in part to changes in the power structure 
within society to favour the middle class as well as the involvement of individuals from 
the non-legal or political arena in discussions about reform. The current bankruptcy 
system was viewed as a means of securing immunity for dishonest speculators and was 
in need of substantial changes.179  
4.6.2 The Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act,180 the Bankruptcy Acts181 and the 
Companies Act of 1862182 introduced and reinforced modern concepts of insolvency, 
such as the statutory regime for preferential debts, the pari passu principle, separated 
administrative from judicial functions in bankruptcy, subjecting to public examination 
persons responsible for the insolvency and associated losses to creditors and specific 
court led procedures for winding up.183 A number of acts were passed and cases heard 
that helped to develop the law of insolvency further. Some of these reforms were even 
influenced by the recognition that some species of public good was both desirable and 
could be achieved by providing a means of collective action in the liquidation and 
distribution of bankrupt estates.184 However, the quantity of bankruptcy reforms during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century resulted in layers of law that were difficult to 
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operate and prone to manipulation and would attract the attention of reformers in the 
1970s.185 It would not be until the 1980s that true corporate rescue would be introduced 
in the United Kingdom. 
5 Theoretical Aspects of Insolvency Law186 
5.1 Bankruptcy Theory: the Benefits of Collective Action 
5.1.1 Bankruptcy theory is often approached within a theoretical framework of Law and 
Economics.187 The utilitarian maximisation of “happiness” was replaced to some extent 
by the maximisation of wealth, which could perhaps be equated on a metaphorical level, 
considering the Western world’s focus on consumerism and profit-making. Though 
Bentham’s utilitarian concepts were developed during the early phases of 
industrialisation, consumerism and profit had not yet subjugated the civilised world. 
Eighteenth century middle class values were still influenced by a desire for a perceived 
aristocratic life of leisure as a goal for the ambitious pursuit of industrial profit. Today, 
however, profit alone has become an end in itself.188 
5.1.2 There have been a number of arguments in favour of the collective approach taken in 
bankruptcy and insolvency law. Many of these revolve around the idea that if creditors 
were left to pursue their contractual rights to enforce a debt, then a race to the court 
would ensue that would result in an inequitable result for the collective creditors, for the 
debtor company, and potentially for peripheral stakeholders189 who could be affected by 
an inefficient resolution of a company’s financial distress. One explanation for the 
justification of collective proceedings, against the natural exercise of market forces, is 
derived from the Rawlsian190 concept of a creditor’s bargain.191 In this bargain, it is 
assumed that creditors of a company having equal ranking in rights to debt enforcement 
would be expected to mirror a negotiated agreement among themselves had they been 
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able to do so with prior knowledge of the bankruptcy occurring in the future. While this 
idea relies on an entirely hypothetical situation in order to justify the imposed collective 
regime of insolvency law, its results may lead to a more efficient resolution.192 
5.1.3 By ensuring equitable treatment of all creditors, each with the power to participate in the 
resolution of the financial situation, an element of certainty is introduced, as the 
individual free-for-all is replaced by a certain outcome due to the identical relationship 
shared by all creditors with the debtor. This system may eliminate the strategic costs 
associated with the legal expense of racing to place individual claims and reduces the 
potential variance in recoveries, which may satisfy certain risk-averse creditors. When 
left to individual action, results will be derived only from individual self-interest and 
competition, leading to faulty decision making as a group collectively. Each creditor, 
unless assured of mutual cooperation, would have an incentive to take whatever 
advantage there may be in individual collection remedies before the other creditors are 
able to act. As a group, most creditors would not wish to take risks that would jeopardise 
the optimal recovery of what they are owed, thus there is logic in the concept of 
collective action for bankruptcy.193 
5.1.4 Collective action may also result in more optimal outcomes for the business. As 
individual remedies lead to the piecemeal dismantling of a debtor’s business, a holistic 
process is more likely to increase the aggregate pool of assets, providing greater 
advantage to both the company and the creditor groups.194 The same applies to the 
potential for reorganisation over liquidation. Without the stay on individual action, the 
optimisation of a company’s value for its sale to a third party would also not be possible. 
A reorganisation procedure can provide enough time to give all stakeholders a chance to 
assess their positions and organise their affairs. It may also make it possible to sell a 
company as a going concern, rather than as an assortment of assets.195  
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5.2 A Proceduralist Approach 
5.2.1 There are also certain areas that have been viewed as specifically outside of the purview 
of bankruptcy law, although financial distress has more far-reaching effects than just 
those within the economic sphere.196 For example, proceduralists view employment 
protection and wider community interests as residing outside the concern of insolvency 
laws and that it should not be within the ambit of insolvency law to reorder substantive 
entitlements. Rather, insolvency law has a single overriding goal: to allocate the 
common pool of assets in such a way as to maximise benefits to the creditors of an 
insolvent estate.197 The creditor wealth maximisation approach avoids the first come 
first served dilemma by imposing a single joint action on the creditors such that they act 
as a single entity. This approach maintains pre-insolvency entitlements, despite any 
inherent imbalance between the creditors subject to the bargain.198 The proceduralist 
philosophy is justified on the supposition that if creditors were free to choose their own 
mechanism of enforcement in insolvency, they would inevitably agree on a collectivist 
arrangement.199 
5.2.2 The creditor wealth maximisation view is not internally consistent, however, as it is 
justified only by presupposing what it has set out to prove. Assumptions are made about 
the creditors and there is no explanation as to why the parties would inevitably agree on 
a collectivist regime.200 Further, the goal of simple creditor wealth maximisation does 
not take into account the legitimate interests of other stakeholders, such as employees 
and the community. The proceduralist would argue that it is not the fundamental 
function of insolvency law to do so. It treats the problem of corporate insolvency as 
isolated only to those parties contractually connected to the business benefitting from a 
sale of assets for the creditors. This fails to treat business failure as an economic and 
social problem,201 overlooking the fact that certain problems confronting claimants 
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outside of the common pool of creditors arise specifically because of a company’s 
insolvency.202 
5.3 Broad Based Contractarianism  
5.3.1 Broad based contractarianism is a philosophy based on the tradition of the social 
contract that evolved in part from the theory of “justice as fairness,” according to the 
philosophy of Rawls.203 The contractarian approach similarly promotes wealth 
maximisation, though it is presumed that together a broader set of stakeholders will 
agree to rules relating to insolvent entitlements, while ignorant of real contractual 
entitlements or the actual status of the company at the time. This agreement would 
include representatives of all stakeholders, rather than restricting it to creditors with 
contractual entitlements.204  
5.3.2 The contractarian vision accommodates a variety of stakeholder interests,205 but also 
makes assumptions about human behaviour with no evidence to support those 
assumptions. In short, both the proceduralist and the contractarian theories rely on the 
presence of a “veil of ignorance”, which is not a realistic metaphor for the true 
relationship that exists between stakeholders of an insolvent company. Creditors are not 
naturally likely to cooperate and stakeholder relationships are far from equitable; it is far 
more likely that they will act with their individual best interests in mind, regardless of 
how a self-interested approach might affect the level of distributions to the entire 
collective of stakeholders.206 
5.4 The Traditionalist Approach 
5.4.1 The economic approach to bankruptcy law has been challenged as being unrealistic 
according to the needs of the modern business and its associated stakeholders. The goal 
of creditor wealth maximisation has been viewed as flawed, as it does not take into 
account certain values that have helped to give bankruptcy law its shape. In particular, 
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the economic approach does not account for the potential to discharge any part of the 
debt owed, as this goes against any natural bonds of financial agreements. Rather, 
bankruptcy law has been said to exist, not in a vacuum, but as a response to certain 
conditions of human life. It goes beyond the simple mechanism of debt collection to 
implicate certain moral, political, personal, social, and economic values.207 
5.4.2 The purpose of modern insolvency law is generally accepted as existing to replace the 
chaotic creditors’ free for all pursuit of the enforcement of debt obligations with a 
statutory regime suspending creditor rights and remedies, while procedures are initiated 
to provide for the orderly collection and realisation of assets and their distribution 
among creditors in accordance with a scheme of distribution.208 It has been convincingly 
argued that other interests should be considered in insolvency, in addition to the 
creditors, and that an emphasis purely on wealth maximisation is an oversimplification 
of the broader effects of insolvency.209 It has often been debated whether it is necessary 
to strike a balance between stakeholder interests as well as social, political, and policy 
considerations that may have an impact on the economic and legal goals of insolvency 
law.210  
5.4.3 Neither the broad based contractarian nor the proceduralist approach relying on the veil 
of ignorance can explain the current preferences given to corporate rescue over 
liquidation, which has become an important aim of insolvency globally. The 
traditionalist approach allows for this. Traditionalists reject the notion that insolvency 
law exists only to serve creditors’ financial interests. Rather, traditionalists promote a 
stakeholder oriented approach, giving weight to the concerns of all stakeholders, even 
those outside of contractual relationships of the business. It recognises a wider purpose 
for insolvency procedures, considering employment protection, the interests of the 
community, and equitable treatment of creditors as legitimate goals of insolvency 
law.211  
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5.4.4 A traditionalist view of insolvency allows for some redistribution of value, so that high 
priority creditors are required to give way to some extent to other creditors. This vision 
also permits an emphasis on the survival of a business instead of only promoting wealth 
maximisation principles or contractual entitlements.212 The influence of other 
stakeholder interests is evident in the diverse approaches to insolvency. It is this 
traditionalist approach that the UK and France have espoused in insolvency law, 
although France has continued to take the redistribution of rights to a higher level. 
While insolvency laws throughout the world have a similar function, the fundamental 
aims of insolvency regimes can differ. These aims can be oriented around a light touch 
regulation to support a liberal economy, the preservation of businesses, the protection of 
employment, or other aims that are generally influenced by the cultures within which 
insolvency regimes are situated. Social policy has had a particular influence on the 
development of corporate rescue mechanisms that aim to preserve or rehabilitate a 
business. The reality is that European insolvency laws inevitably consider broader socio-
political issues in a traditional framework than the pure forms of the Rawlsian creditor’s 
bargaining position would have them consider.  
6 French Corporate Rescue: A Fundamental Value  
6.1 The Evolution of the Rescue Culture in France 
6.1.1 It has been said that liberalism teaches that bankruptcy is the method whereby the 
economic cycle is sanitised.213 However, so-called liberal governments have regularly 
taken decisions opposed to this idea. There are certain social and economic imperatives 
that have led to a consensus that legislation in this area is necessary. Indeed corporate 
rescue legislation arose out of the need to artificially prevent the demise of enterprises 
that would otherwise be moribund.214  
6.1.2 The Law of 1955215 accentuated the distinction between the civil and penal forms of the 
bankruptcy procedure.216 For those bankrupts who were found to have acted 
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inappropriately, it was no longer possible to enter into a concordat with creditors, a 
procedure that had been regularly abused as a means of blackmailing creditors into 
agreeing to lose only a portion of what they were owed in an informal arrangement or 
otherwise to engage in a judicial procedure in which they would likely recover none of 
it.217 The procedure of règlement judiciaire218 was introduced, which was a substitute 
for judicial liquidation, providing for two alternative results. Firstly, the procedure could 
result in the reestablishment of the debtor’s business and the partial or total payment of 
his creditors through a composition that involved the collection and realisation of the 
debtor’s assets, followed by the dissolution of the company. The second procedure, 
faillite, was used in the event that the corporate insolvency was the fault of the business 
manager. Under this procedure, the debtor’s assets would be sequestered and the 
company forced into liquidation in order to drive the culpable businessman out of 
business. Unfortunately, the results of these procedures were not always fair, as some 
businesses were unnecessarily dissolved, while others were allowed to linger on with 
detrimental social and economic consequences before finally collapsing.219 
6.1.3 The modern concept of corporate rescue in France arrived with the Law of 1967.220 This 
law broke with traditional approaches to bankruptcy legislation in which the head of the 
enterprise was identified with the enterprise itself. The law distinguished the patrimony 
of the company from the physical personality of its directors. Thus the idea that an 
enterprise could be disengaged from the men who ran it became a part of the bankruptcy 
code. In addition, the failure of a judicial settlement would no longer necessarily lead to 
the inevitable bankruptcy of the company and its grave consequences for the company 
and its stakeholders. Rather, there was now a procedure available in which a transfer of 
business assets could be made, making it possible to continue the activities of the 
enterprise.221 
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6.1.4 The Law of 1967 provided for either a règlement judiciaire or a liquidation judiciaire.222 
The former was chosen if the result of the process was likely to be a composition 
agreement with creditors, while the debtor continued to trade, “rescuing” the business 
from liquidation. The latter was chosen if there was little likelihood of survival and 
resulted in the liquidation of the debtor’s assets. The Court would choose from these 
options based on their view of the viability of the business. The law of redressement223 
was introduced later in 1967 and was aimed at businesses whose insolvency would be 
damaging to the economy and were, while insolvent, not irretrievable. It included a 
moratorium, a mechanism for the settlement of debts, and repayment. The reforms of 
1967 were, however, designed to meet the requirements of a relatively prosperous 
France. The general outcomes were poor, saving few businesses from collapse and 
causing detriment to creditors, employees, and shareholders alike. While many attempts 
at reform were made, a new law on insolvency was only passed in 1985 and whose basic 
structure would remain untouched for almost a decade.224   
6.2 Business Rescue in the 1980s 
6.2.1 Both England and France saw changes to their insolvency systems in the mid-1980s that 
shifted the focus from liquidation to the rescue or rehabilitation of companies. A more 
social approach to insolvency had developed among European nations that left scope 
for, and indeed justified, rescue activities according to the individual values contained 
within the corporate rescue principles of each jurisdiction.225 In France, the reforms of 
the 1980s had as one of their fundamental objectives the protection of employment.  
6.2.2 The Law of 1985226 was passed with the objective of protecting employment at the risk 
of sacrificing creditors’ rights. It envisaged three possible outcomes: (1) a plan for 
continuing the business; (2) a plan for its sale; or (3) winding up with court 
supervision.227 It was mandatory, at least ideologically, to attempt the first of these 
outcomes before resorting to the second and third in order to provide the greatest chance 
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for employees. The law reduced creditors’ rights in favour of focusing on saving the 
business and the jobs associated with it. This approach was later viewed as too biased in 
favour of labour and unsuited to allowing the French economy to evolve in the highly 
competitive global market.228 Further, the results achieved under this legislation were 
mediocre, owing in large part to creditors’ lack of interest in prevention or rescue 
procedures.229 However, the focus on employment protection and business rescue has 
not been lost in subsequent reforms to the French insolvency code.  
6.2.3 In the 1990s, France was witness to a number of high profile cases in the business world 
centring chiefly on the misuse of corporate assets. Due to the close-knit nature of the 
business community, there was an absence of transparency and objective checks on the 
exercise of the power in French companies. This was viewed as particularly acute in 
insolvency proceedings where the failure of companies also had political, economic and 
social implications.230 France therefore underwent another set of reforms to its 
insolvency system in 1994.231 The purpose of this reform was the reinforcement of those 
measures available during the pre-insolvency stage, to redress some of the rights of 
creditors during insolvency proceedings, and to ensure greater equity in the plans 
resulting in the sale of a business. The 1994 reforms were aimed at creating balance 
between the interests of the company and its creditors.232 However, business corruption 
would not stop with this reform. A number of technical and administrative changes were 
made during the 1990s, but the most significant reforms would not take place until 2005, 
following a number of episodes of corruption and scandal in the French business 
community.233 
6.3 Insolvency Reform in the Twenty First Century 
6.3.1 In addition to increasing transparency and integrity of the French insolvency system, the 
balance between the rights of employees and creditors has been a consideration in 
                                                          
228 JR Silkenat and CD Schmerler, The Law of International Insolvencies and Debt Restructurings (Oceana Publications 2006) 143. 
229 I Didier, “Creditors Rights in France after the Reforms of 26 July 2005 – Part I” (2007) 4(4) ICR 178, 178. 
230 P Omar, “Reforms to the Framework of Insolvency Law and Practice in France: 1996-2006” in KG Broc and R Parry (eds), 
Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (Kluwer 2004) 114. 
231 LOI no 94-475 du 10 juin 1994 relative à la prévention et au traitement des difficultés des entreprises. 
232 Omar and Sorensen, n125, 28. 
233 Omar, n230, 115-116. 
138 
 
attempts to reform the insolvency code,234 leading to the Law of 2005.235 In the period 
leading up to the promulgation of this law, it was observed that the previous insolvency 
code had in many instances failed to keep a company from falling into a terminal 
financial condition. Other pressures for reform included the coming into force of the EC 
Insolvency Regulation236 and a view that the French insolvency regime was too debtor-
friendly, particularly when this view is coupled with the perennial French concern for 
employee job security.237  
6.3.2 The Law of 2005 was designed to improve the balance between employee and creditor 
rights by enhancing the protection of creditors generally. It takes creditors’ interests into 
account and involves them directly in the restructuring plans for the company in 
financial distress through mediation or other remedial procedures. The spirit of the 
reforms were therefore cooperative in nature, encouraging company directors and 
company creditors to find a mutually beneficial solution to the financial problems of the 
company without resorting to previously confrontational procedures that frequently led 
to the failure of the company as a whole.238 The hope for rehabilitation became a driving 
force within the insolvency system in France, in part to protect the economy from the 
effects of business failures but also to protect those employed by failing companies, 
preserving jobs.239 
6.3.3 The Law of 2005 includes an entirely new procedure, the sauvegarde,240 which is 
available to debtor companies before the formal cessation de paiements241 situation 
occurs. It was designed as an anticipatory debtor-in-possession rescue procedure where 
the business could benefit from a moratorium while conceiving of and proposing a plan 
to creditors with a view to restructuring the business.242 This Law was reformed by 
ordinance in 2008,243 partly as a result of the poor utilisation of the sauvegarde 
procedure. In large part, the 2008 ordinance addresses perceived inefficiencies in this 
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procedure with the aim of encouraging recourse to upstream rescue by clarifying the 
criterion for access to the procedure, the functioning of creditors’ committees and their 
role in the procedure. It also aims at enhancing the operation of other insolvency 
procedures such as conciliation and judicial liquidation.244  
6.3.4 A further decree in March 2014 made additional modifications to the sauvegarde 
procedure aimed at facilitating the anticipation of worsening financial difficulties, 
enhancing process efficiency in relation to the roles of creditors, debtor, and 
shareholders, and to more realistically treat those situations that are irrecoverable in 
relation to the rights of creditors and debtor. It also aims to improve the procedural rules 
in relation to security, simplicity and efficacy.245 In addition, the Loi Macron,246 passed 
in late 2015, is likely to have a number of interesting effects on French social policy and 
insolvency as its aim is generally to create more business friendly policies in line with 
the post-financial crisis need to liberalise the French economy.247 
7 Corporate Rescue in the United Kingdom 
7.1 The Evolution of the Rescue Culture  
7.1.1 In the 1970s, a Darwinian approach to corporate rescue was espoused in the UK, 
whereby the promotion of a market driven economy acknowledged that a certain level 
of corporate failure is inevitable and necessary for the proper functioning of a free 
market economy.248 Thus, the UK was slower in its adoption of the rescue culture. At a 
time when France was focussing on rescue and rehabilitation, in the UK the focus of 
insolvency legislation remained to a certain degree maximising returns to creditors by 
replacing the chaotic pursuit of individual claims with a statutory regime suspending 
creditors’ rights and providing a mechanism for the orderly collection and realisation of 
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assets and their distribution.249 However, changes in the market, social policy, and the 
economic climate eroded this paradigm of British insolvency law,250 resulting in the 
initiation of massive reforms culminating in the Insolvency Act of 1986.251  
7.1.2 The prospective entry of the UK into the European Community252 in the 1970s also 
demanded that the UK should be capable of negotiating with other Member States under 
a coordinated insolvency convention. The committee assigned to deal with the EC 
insolvency convention was a precursor to the committee convened in the 1980s to 
consider UK insolvency law reforms. The process of assessing the compatibility of an 
EC insolvency convention with the UK approach to insolvency law had the effect of 
focussing the attention of lawmakers on the need for reform, which resulted in the 
Insolvency Act of 1976.253 Its provisions were useful, but not fundamental in reforming 
the UK system.254 
7.1.3 The lack of fundamental reforms and the recognition that this may be necessary led to 
the appointment by the Secretary of State for Trade of the Insolvency Law Review 
Committee, chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, in 1977.255 The Cork Committee was tasked 
with reviewing the law of insolvency, considering required reforms, examining the 
potential for formulating a comprehensive insolvency system, suggesting possible less 
formal procedures, and making any other relevant recommendations. A report of the 
Cork Committee256 was published in 1982 containing detailed and critical examination 
of all the existing procedures as well as a number of recommendations aimed at 
procedures that catered for rescue and rehabilitation of companies in distress.257 It 
stressed that a comprehensive review of insolvency was required not only for the 
purposes of negotiating with other Member States, but also due to the poor state of the 
law,258 which “has been tinkered with, patched and extended by false analogies so that 
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today it is replete with anomalies, inconsistencies and deficiencies.” Further, the law 
was viewed as no longer fulfilling its obligation to the demands of fairness and justice in 
a modern society.259  
7.2 Business Rescue in the 1980s 
7.2.1 One result of the Cork Report was a new definition of the aims of a good modern 
insolvency system, which should aim to:-  
“...recognise that the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private 
interests of the insolvent and his creditors, but that other groups in society 
are vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome, and to ensure that 
these public interests are recognised and safeguarded.”260  
7.2.2 This was an entirely new approach and perception of the aims of insolvency law in the 
UK, including a truly social message that was recommended to be incorporated in the 
imminent reforms. The Cork Report also recognised and formulated the concept of a 
rescue culture, stating that the failure of commercial enterprises has wide repercussions 
for a variety of stakeholders, including but not limited to creditors, shareholders, 
employees, suppliers, and others who would be adversely affected by business failure. A 
legitimate aim of insolvency laws should be to have concern for the livelihood and well-
being of those dependent upon an enterprise.261 In the view of Cork Committee, the 
rescue culture would manifest itself in policies directed at the more benevolent treatment 
of insolvent legal entities as well as the more draconian treatment of the unscrupulous 
abusers of the system. It would also mean the steady removal of the stigmatising effect 
of bankruptcy.262 Though beneficent in their view of what the future should hold for 
insolvency, the Cork Committee’s more socially oriented recommendations would not 
find immediate implementation. 
7.2.3 The publication and consideration of the Cork Report by parliamentary legislators 
resulted in the passage of a new IA1986, preceded briefly by an Insolvency Act 1985.263 
The IA1986 put into practice many of the suggestions published in the Cork Report. 
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Cork’s philosophy was, among other things, in favour of increasing the emphasis on 
rehabilitation of the company,264 as such, he recommended an administration procedure 
aimed at corporate rescue which would also ameliorate the plight of the unsecured 
creditor, who generally received nothing in previous procedures. Administration was 
introduced as a court based procedure designed specifically for corporate rescue rather 
than asset realisation, focussed on the interests of unsecured creditors.265 Cork qualified 
the rehabilitative approach, saying that the “corporate rescue mechanisms are not 
intended to maintain inefficient firms that are not economically viable.”266 Essentially, 
insolvency law should not undertake to rescue all companies, but only those which 
possess an inherent viability.267 While Cork’s broad policy was aimed at the 
rehabilitation of the company, the IA1986 did not go as far as he perceived was 
necessary to achieve this end.268  
7.3 Insolvency Reform and the Enterprise Act 2002269  
7.3.1 Since the turn of the millennium, fundamental changes have occurred in the legislative 
and commercial approaches to insolvency, moving from responding to corporate crises 
in a reactive manner to actively managing financial risk to avoid failure.270 Legislators, 
creditors, and corporate personalities have become serious about corporate rescue, 
seeking to intervene at earlier stages of corporate distress. As such, there has been a 
movement away from simple debt collection towards monitoring corporate risk and 
taking pre-emptive action.271 The Labour government272 was moved to foster a rescue 
culture due to the perception that powerful secured creditors were all too willing to put a 
company into administrative receivership, a process which can be hostile to enterprises 
and to the interests of unsecured stakeholders.273  
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7.3.2 The passage of the EA introduced significant changes, implementing a number of 
reforms designed to assist troubled companies and foster the growth of the rescue 
culture.274 In British terms, the rescue culture refers to the idea that insolvency 
legislation should adopt a positive and protective role rather than a corrective and 
punitive role. Interpretation of socioeconomic statutes should be deliberately inclined 
towards giving a positive and socially profitable meaning, rather than a negative and 
socially destructive one.275 The EA was aimed at the furtherance of the rescue culture, 
encouraging companies to consider insolvency risks in advance of a final financial 
crisis.276 
7.3.3 During its journey through the House of Commons, it was noted that the bill should 
strengthen the foundations of the enterprise economy by establishing an insolvency 
regime that would encourage entrepreneurs to try again. The reforms also addressed the 
fear of business failure which had been a significant barrier to entrepreneurialism, and 
also prevent companies from failing unnecessarily. The goal was to make the UK a 
better place to do business by lifting barriers and creating a culture of encouragement for 
entrepreneurs.277 
7.3.4 The Insolvency Service Review Group in 2000278 recommended that the law should be 
changed to remove the rights of the floating charge holder to veto the making of an 
administration order. A moratorium would apply to debenture holders, rendering it 
impossible for a floating charge holder to stop an administration procedure by 
instructing a receiver. Administrative receivership was effectively abolished,279 while 
the administration procedure was completely rewritten,280 replacing the previous 
procedure with a new schedule B1 that introduced a specific priority of objectives.281 
The administration procedure was also streamlined to make it easier and less expensive 
to use and also to give unsecured creditors more rights. 
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7.3.5 An administrator was now required to perform his duties according to three hierarchical 
objectives: (1) to rescue the company as a going concern; (2) to achieve a better result 
for creditors in a winding up; or, (3) if the first two are not reasonably practicable, to 
realise property for the benefit of secured or preferential creditors.282 The 
administrator’s duties are then subject to the caveat that his actions do not unnecessarily 
harm the interests of the creditors of the company as a whole.283 This new approach to 
administration pushes business rescue firmly to the fore of the objectives to be achieved. 
As such, the approach to insolvency law has moved away from a selective Darwinian 
approach, settling on pure rescue as the default model for desired insolvency 
outcomes.284 However, while the existence of rehabilitative procedures and their priority 
in usage is uncontested, some insolvency practitioners have informally expressed their 
disillusionment with them in practice. In the experience of one anonymous practitioner, 
what actually happens in the prioritising of outcomes in administration procedures is not 
necessarily what one would expect from the letter of the law or the findings in cases. 
7.3.6 The changes made to insolvency law in the last ten years demonstrate that the policy of 
business rescue is now being given precedence over traditional creditor wealth 
maximisation and debt recovery.285 Rescue strategies supported by the current 
legislation are based upon a utilitarian approach, predicated on the premise that the 
interests of the few are outweighed by the needs of the many. The interests represented 
now also include the wider community, as well as social and political objectives of full 
employment. These interests can often be better served though the rescue of a business 
than asset realisations followed by pari passu distributions of what remains after secured 
creditors and liquidators are paid their share.286 
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8 The Aims of Insolvency and Social Policy287 
8.1 The Social Influences on Aims of Insolvency and Corporate Rescue 
8.1.1 Prior to the introduction of the concept of corporate rescue in the United Kingdom, the 
purpose of insolvency was based primarily on a collective regime aimed at achieving the 
best possible outcome for creditors.288 These aims were tempered by some element of 
social consideration first by the introduction of administration in the IA1986 and then in 
the EA with the introduction of procedures aimed at rescuing a business as a priority. In 
addition to concern for unsecured creditors, employees enjoy a degree of preference in 
the distributions of insolvency: an imposition upon the economic purity of insolvency 
procedures.289  
8.1.2 Although insolvency law has traditionally aimed to satisfy more economic interests, 
issues of fairness have now been accepted as necessary considerations in the UK 
insolvency system. Among these considerations are the ranking of wages as preferential 
debts, access to social security for repayment of arrears, rules dealing with continuity of 
employment, and laws stipulating the mandatory transfer of contracts on the transfer of a 
business as a going concern.290 The last of these protections is derived from EU law, but 
has been in existence elsewhere on continental Europe for decades. In particular, social 
policy issues, such as the application of acquired rights, are fundamental factors that 
influence the regulatory style in France.  
8.1.3 In France, the aims of insolvency have encompassed social policy matters since the 
development of a modern insolvency regime in 1967.291 The emphasis on social policy 
has encouraged a move to the maintenance of businesses over liquidation. In the 1980s, 
the harmful effects of unemployment caused by business failures in recessionary times 
were an influence on the creation of a corporate rescue policy heavily biased toward the 
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protection of employment and the rehabilitation of the business.292 The French system 
exhibits redistribution tendencies that are recognisable as characteristics endemic to its 
version of social democracy. Creditors’ rights have been made secondary to the 
preservation of the business in difficulty and the jobs dependent upon it.293  
8.2 Employees in Insolvency: Issues of Job Security and Social Policy 
8.2.1 Employees are one of the most vulnerable stakeholders whose lives can be 
fundamentally affected by the insolvency of their employer. They are often the lost 
voice in bankruptcy proceedings, having little influence or bargaining power outside of 
collectivism. However, it must be queried whether there is a justification for giving 
special treatment to employees above those of trade creditors. One argument is that 
employees have not generally assumed the risk that their employer may fail to pay them 
and are typically left with no recourse. Trade creditors, however, can factor payment 
defaults into pricing and interest rates on lending and also have access to the financial 
and economic data of the debtor, making it easier for them to manage their risks. The 
effects an employer’s insolvency can have on an employee’s life and future are thus 
significant and can also have other far-reaching societal effects. Thus, employee 
entitlements in insolvency deserve some kind of attention in government policies in 
order to manage the larger impacts that ignoring this area may cause.294 However, the 
social policies that influence how employment entitlements in insolvency systems are 
approached differ significantly between the UK and France. 
8.2.2 The French concept of personal dignity is a strong influence on how it deals with 
employment rights, among many other fundamental values. The dignity of the 
individual is an overarching value to which all legislation must bow. In the UK, history 
has shown a resistance to compromising the operation of free market to the rights of 
individuals. While this has changed over the last half century, much of these changes are 
due to factors that have little to do with social rights to full employment or individual 
dignity. For example, the first health and safety legislation was implemented with a 
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view to protecting an employer’s investment in functioning and healthy employees 
without whom their businesses could not operate. Other protections did not emerge until 
the 1960s, as the view prior to that time was that collective bargaining should be capable 
of dealing with any issues that labour may have in relation to the employment 
relationship. The Redundancy Payments Act 1965295 was the first major piece of 
legislation that provided protections for employees subject to the effects of the financial 
distress of their employer, although it only guaranteed payment rather than any 
security.296 Further, unfair dismissal legislation was initially implemented in reaction to 
the disassembling of union power in the 1980s in order to provide something to replace 
the protections that unions had previously provided for their constituency.  
8.2.3 While employees are still generally considered unsecured creditors of the employer with 
the usual rights of a normal contracting party,297 their position is now protected in 
relation to up to four months wages occurring prior to the insolvency, ranking as a 
preferential debt subject to a maximum amount of £800, an amount set in 1986298 and, 
to date, unchanged. Employee claims beyond the preferred portion rank equally to that 
of other unsecured creditors. An employee also has the right to claim some amounts due 
from the Secretary of State, which is paid out of the National Insurance Fund.299 In the 
event the business continues, an insolvency practitioner steps into the role of the 
employer and must deal with the adopted employment contracts appropriately. Where 
the business is sold, provisions apply that will transfer employment contracts to the 
purchaser.300 It is this latter provision that particularly conflicts with the equality of 
creditors’ rights in insolvency procedures. 
8.2.4 France’s insolvency system provides numerous procedures that allow for arrangements 
to be made to allow a business to continue with the primary aim of preserving 
employment.301 Employees in France are also afforded a priority above other 
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stakeholders subject to business rescue processes.302 The Law of 1967 guaranteed 
employment debts occurring as a result of a judicial settlement or liquidation. 
Employees were also able to invoke other special privileges, including participatory 
rights in the insolvency process.303 The Law of 1985 did not change the rights afforded 
to employees, but made it a legislative priority to resuscitate a business in financial 
distress in order to artificially preserve employment and to safeguard the economic 
potential of the enterprise.304  
8.2.5 While the most recent reforms have softened the draconian treatment of creditors 
relative to employees, apart from heavier consultation obligations issued from the most 
recent decree, the social objectives of protecting employment continue to affect the way 
in which courts deal with specific insolvency cases. In general, there is an emphasis on 
employment preservation in the French system. At times, there are compromises made 
between the social objectives and financial objectives in cases of business sold as going 
concerns.305 This can result in choices that favour employees but result in reduced funds 
available in distributions to creditors. Thus, the social objectives of employment 
protection and their costs reduce the value of a business being sold; thereby reducing the 
distributions available to creditors, but this is generally acceptable due to the French 
emphasis on workers’ rights.  
8.2.6 In addition, France has placed an importance on the acquired rights of employees since 
legislation was put in place in 1928.306 The law required that where there was a change 
in the juridical situation of an employer, such as the transfer of a business, all 
employment contracts would continue between the new employer and employees of that 
enterprise.307 In contrast, the first UK legislation conferring continuity of employment 
on a business transfer308 would apply only if the employees were voluntarily retained by 
the purchasing firm. There was no concept of automatic transfer as this would conflict 
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with the fundamental freedom of contract.309  UK law has taken a liberal attitude toward 
creditors’ rights, self-help and the use of contractual remedies, but has also seen a steady 
erosion of workers’ rights since the 1970s.310 It would not be until the UK accepted the 
Social Chapter of the EU treaty that it would be required to amend this stance.  
9 Conclusion:  
9.1.1 While the focus of a large part of eighteenth and nineteenth century British culture and 
society was on the perceived progress of industrialisation, the majority of French society 
retained conservative values of land, leisure and the security of knowledge and tradition. 
This is not to say that progress for the sake of progress served Britain better, as the 
resulting labour poverty can tell, but the fact remains that French and British views of 
industrialisation as a form of progress differed on a fundamental level. Their values 
affected their respective views of “progress” leading to the British embracement of 
change, a characteristic that had occurred with frequency in relation to both government 
and religion. Though the French Revolution precipitated catastrophic change, the 
tenacity of the monarchy and the steadfastness of ancien régime values demonstrate that 
far from changeable, France tended to try to establish and retain equilibrium. This is 
evident throughout most of French history apart from the short period of the Reign of 
Terror, which caused and seemed to revel in chaos. The memory of this upheaval in 
combination with the propensity to attach to security and tradition had a profound 
influence on French resistance to British “progress”. 
9.1.2 There are a number of differences between the UK and France in relation to how the 
elements of industrialisation, commerce, and big business evolved. Prohibitions on 
usury and the moral resistance to reliance on credit as a business mechanism lasted far 
longer in France. Further, France continues to retain resistance to unbridled debt as 
allowable levels of interest remain restricted. France was also more severely affected by 
the results of the Mississippi Bubble as the French economy was linked to the future of 
the company. Once it failed, the effects on the French economy were catastrophic, 
leaving a lasting memory and influencing resistance to speculation and financial risk, 
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and further entrenching French attachment to security and tradition. Britain’s more 
adventurous financial spirit led to a colonial and eventually corporate empire that would 
overshadow French growth for centuries.  
9.1.3 Insolvency laws developed with fundamentally different aims, the French taking pity on 
the unfortunate debtor while the UK retained a punitive approach, favouring the 
creditors owed by bad businessmen. France’s debtor friendly approach encompassed a 
concern for other stakeholders who would be affected by business failures, in particular 
employees. This approach led to a natural affinity for rehabilitating or rescuing 
businesses, sometimes at the expense of creditor entitlements. While the UK has also 
undertaken corporate rescue as an additional aim for insolvency procedures, its approach 
remains more focussed on resolving creditor debts, though the social aspects of 
insolvency have become a consideration in recent years. Membership of the European 
Union has had a significant influence on changes to the UK approach to insolvency, 
particularly in relation to the social elements that had previously been left to other areas 
of the law. It is the influence of the EU on the legal systems of the UK and France as 
well as how the focus on employment protection, influenced in part at least by EU law, 
began to conflict with insolvency that will be explored in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
ACQUIRED RIGHTS AND THE INSOLVENCY EXCEPTION: EU SOCIAL POLICY 
EVOLUTION AND INFLUENCE 
“Someday, following the example of the United States of America, 
there will be a…United States of Europe.” 
~ George Washington 
“Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no 
further, but cooperation, which is the thing we must strive for today, 
begins where competition leaves off.” 
~ Franklin D. Roosevelt 
1 Introduction 
1.1 A Review of the Historical Context of Insolvency Systems 
1.1.1 Bankruptcy laws have existed since ancient times, though their sometimes punitive 
nature has long been influenced by moral perspectives on debt.1 Prohibitions on usury 
were relaxed in England largely as a result of the Reformation, during which England 
gained a new and more dubious perspective on Catholic rules and dogma, including 
views on lending with interest.2 Thus, it was in England where the criminal and immoral 
aspects of debt first began to give ground to more commercially viable approaches to 
lending.3 These changes in attitude on finance and debt led to a more stable, but also 
flexible framework that preceded English commercial dominance in the world.4  
1.1.2 Seventeenth century France, however, remained rigid and inadaptable to change as 
capricious absolute monarchs contributed to unstable social and economic conditions 
that eventually provided the catalyst for the French Revolution.5 Despite the liberalism 
promised during the French Revolution, the French generally remained attached to fiscal 
security and were inherently risk-averse,6 while English businessmen were self-reliant, 
but also willing to cooperate to accomplish commercial goals, such as colonial 
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commerce.7 French attitudes toward credit remained geared towards distrust and 
distaste, while Britain’s colonial and industrial empires were eventually built upon the 
foundations of credit and debt. 
1.1.3 Despite the differences in attitude toward business risk in the UK and France, both 
developed modern corporate structures, including limited liability and separate corporate 
personality, in the mid-nineteenth century.8 Utilisation of these corporate forms varied, 
however, in no small part due to the significant restrictions placed on the creation of 
joint stock companies in France, which led to a variety of compromised corporate 
forms.9 There were also a number of restrictions present in the British company law 
system influenced by resistance to separating company ownership from control.10  
1.1.4 As the corporate form evolved in complexity, eventually benefitting from a separate 
legal personality that protected investors behind a corporate veil, so too did the need for 
effective insolvency law. Britain underwent numerous bankruptcy reforms during the 
Victorian age, though reforms generally retained the creditor friendly approach that has 
historically characterised the British insolvency system.11 Nineteenth century French 
insolvency law was no friendlier towards debtors; however, many insolvencies were 
resolved outside of the civil process in order to avoid draconian results, a characteristic 
that is reflective of the modern emphasis on collective arrangements. 
1.1.5 Corporate rescue became an important aspect of insolvency systems for both the UK 
and France following the Second World War.12 France was the first to recognise that the 
penal nature of bankruptcy laws was not necessarily good for business. Regular reforms 
followed in addition to procedures aimed at encouraging the safeguarding of companies 
in order to protect employment and bolster the economy.13 It was not until the 1980s that 
the UK would follow France on a path toward a rescue culture with any significant 
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reforms to their insolvency system.14 Changes were heavily influenced by the UK’s 
prospective entry into the European Community,15 rather than any fundamental change 
in the UK perspective on insolvency, although the acceptance and continued prevalence 
of the Cork Report16 recommendations demonstrate the UK’s eventual, if begrudging, 
embrace of the rescue culture.17  
1.1.6 While the state of the British and French insolvency systems are not so very different 
today, the historic influence of European Union18 policy and practices on domestic law 
is also evident. The same can be said for legislation in the area of social policy, 
particularly for the UK, though it is in this area that most of the modern controversy 
relating to UK membership in the EU resides. In addition, the UK and France have had 
significant influence on how policy has been implemented during the life of the EU. The 
purpose of this Chapter is to examine the influence of EU law and policy in the area of 
employment protection within the context of corporate rescue.  
2 The Historical Context of the European Union  
2.1 The Great War and Social Change 
2.1.1 The First World War19 was a catastrophic turning point in European politics, economics, 
and intellectual priorities. After the highpoint of the Age of Reason, the wealth and 
comforts made available by industrialisation, and one hundred years of relative peace, 
WWI brutally ended any hopes for an enlightened and peaceful Europe.20 However, the 
war also provided a catalyst for the state machinery of “war socialism” as socialists and 
trade union leaders joined the government and rallied around the cause of patriotism. 
Thanks to wartime solidarity, employees, governments, and unions were willing to 
collaborate in order to provide the best results for war effort.21 The inroads in this new 
area of social policy would be the seed that would eventually grow into the pan-
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European system in existence today. In addition, WWI provided a catalyst for European 
cooperation, though this would be decades in the making. 
2.2 A “Carthaginian Peace” 
2.2.1 While the EC did not fully come into existence until several years after the end of 
WWII, the impetus for its creation can be found in the widely held desire not to repeat 
the mistakes made at the end of WWI, which were viewed as having led to the 
instability of the German economy that precipitated the rise of the Nazi party and the 
outbreak of WWII. The Treaty of Versailles22 contained the terms for peace, which were 
principally agreed to by the Germans on the understanding that it would be based on 
President Wilson’s magnanimous Fourteen Points.23 However, only the victors were 
represented during the negotiations and the Fourteen Points were poorly supported, 
which resulted in what the Germans viewed as a dictated peace, very different from the 
terms agreed in the armistice. It included reparation costs and schedules of repayment 
that were impossible to meet and hobbled German industry and military in an attempt to 
render its existence distinctly harmless and subordinate.24  
2.2.2 Among the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference was Keynes, who at the time was 
working for the British Treasury. Keynes rather prophetically outlined the potential 
economic outcomes of the Peace Treaty as it was agreed, and was also intensely critical 
of the Council of Four25 and what he viewed as their guiding principles for a negotiated 
peace, all of which were significantly influenced by the perceived needs and wants of 
the political requirements of the jurisdictions they represented.26 The meeting of these 
minds is a microcosm of the cultural and political differences existing among European 
and world powers at the time, differences that have not disappeared with the passage of 
time. There was little sense of solidarity, as the Americans expected that the French and 
British had imperialist designs, while the British suspected the French of Napoleonic 
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tendencies, and European nations, not unrealistically, suspected America’s 
commitment.27  
2.2.3 The cynicism, stubbornness, and vengeful outlook led to an inability to negotiate 
without significant bias, resulting in a “Carthaginian Peace,”28 which did not augur well 
for peaceful stability in Europe. Thus, during the interwar period, Europe failed to 
escape the shadow of WWI.29 Social upheaval, mass unemployment, and political 
violence, caused in no small part by the effect of the Treaty terms, ultimately lead to the 
rise of the Nazi party, which paradoxically fused the radical socialists of the far left, 
who fed on mass unemployment and the dire effects of hyperinflation, and the radical 
nationalists on the far right, who fed on the humiliation of war guilt and resistance to 
reparations.30 
2.2.4 The economic impact of the Treaty of Versailles not only negatively affected the 
German economy, but was felt throughout Europe. It was Keynes’ view that: 
“You cannot restore Central Europe to 1870 without setting up such strains 
in the European structure and letting loose such human and spiritual forces 
as, pushing beyond frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and 
your “guarantees”, but your institutions and the existing order of your 
Society.”31  
2.2.5 The depression of the 1930s supports Keynes’ controversial hypothesis. There were no 
provisions in the Treaty for economic rehabilitation in Europe; no means of reconciling 
wartime enemies; nothing to stabilise the new European states; nor did it promote any 
kind of economic solidarity or restoration of the finances of those countries hardest hit. 
It was an Old World treaty that failed to account for New World requirements.32 
 
                                                          
27 Davies, n23, 927 and Lesaffer, n20, 498-499. 
28 The imposition of a brutal “peace” by completely crushing the enemy, derived from the peace imposed on Carthage by Rome after 
the second Punic War.  
29 Davies, n23, 928 & 938. 
30 Ibid, 942. 
31 Keynes, n26, 15. 
32 Ibid, 91. 
156 
 
2.3 The International Labour Organisation33 
2.3.1 Notwithstanding its defects, the Treaty of Versailles contributed to the development of 
an international framework for the promotion of workers’ rights by providing for the 
establishment of the ILO.34 Its purpose was to establish internationally recognised 
labour standards concerning employment and working conditions through the 
mechanism of coordinated collective bargaining.35 While members of the ILO are 
obliged to observe the basic principles of its constitution, to submit conventions to the 
competent authority and to make reports to the International Labour Office, national 
sovereignty is fully respected. Rather than making any enforceable enactments, the ILO 
merely declared methods and principles that were to be deemed of special and urgent 
importance.36  
2.3.2 Not surprisingly, the establishment of the ILO precipitated a wave of labour legislation 
in 1919, the annus mirabilis of labour law.37 The ILO adopted 67 conventions and 66 
recommendations in the subsequent twenty years. It became the creator of social policy, 
publishing its work in an International Labour Code. While the flurry of legislation 
slowed during the Great Depression, it picked up again during and after WWII.38 
Despite the fact that the ILO lacked any means of enforcement, an important step had 
been taken through which the fundamental rights of workers had become the new 
foundation of labour law.39  
2.3.3 The ILO conference in 1944 resulted in the Declaration of Philadelphia,40 in which a 
constitution was created in place of the previous methods and principles. While 
affirming the original principles, the ILO Constitution also emphasised that labour is not 
a commodity; that freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained 
progress; and that poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere. The 
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organisation as a whole viewed social justice as inseparable from the objective of lasting 
peace, but also that social justice should be a distinct objective in its own right. Social 
rights and human rights were inextricably linked in the ILO Constitution. In addition, 
social objectives were seen by the organisation as being paramount aims of economic 
development. The preamble to the Constitution also recognised that unequal labour 
conditions between member nations would be an obstacle to the improvement of 
conditions overall,41 ostensibly due to the unequal economic competition that such 
diverse conditions would create.42 
2.4 Birth of the European Union out of the Ashes of War 
2.4.1 A “European movement” has been in existence since the seventeenth century, but 
individual national ambitions have often stood in the way of any true federalism. The 
devastating aftermath of WWII and the loss of imperial territories and hopes thereof 
were necessary before European cooperation and peace could be agreed throughout the 
Continent.43 Thus, in the aftermath of WWII came a process of economic, social, and 
political integration throughout Europe. This was motivated by a desire to avoid further 
warfare between western European countries as well as forming a coordinated front 
against the perceived Soviet threat. Though predominantly economic in form, European 
integration was prompted by these geopolitical objectives.44 
2.4.2 There was an opportunity following WWII for the UK and the United States to take the 
lead in the formation of European institutions. Churchill45 was personally involved in 
the initial discussions, which boded well for official British support. He was quite vocal 
in support of cooperation and appealed for a “United States of Europe” in order to 
subvert the proliferation of atomic weapons into the hands of divisive governments. He 
encouraged reconciliation and indeed a partnership between Germany and France, and 
believed that the future of Europe depended on the “resolve of millions to do right 
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instead of wrong”, a moral rather than economic argument for unification.46 He even 
chaired the Summit of The Hague in 1948, called to ponder the problems of European 
disunity, which also further revealed the inner contradictions among various pro-
European movements.47  
2.4.3 It was recognised during the debates, however, that a principle of supranationality would 
need to be a formational element of any community institutions. Member States would 
have to surrender part of their sovereignty in the interests of common institutions. 
However, France enjoyed a dominant position in Europe at the time, which made other 
nations reluctant to release sovereignty for fear of French dominance. This was 
mitigated by transferring the monopoly of initiative to a third party, the European 
Commission, whose independence was assured. This, along with the rotating presidency 
of the Council of Ministers, guaranteed that Member States would enjoy equality within 
the EC. These institutions made it impossible for a single state to occupy a hegemonic 
position.48 
2.4.4 There were also economic arguments in favour of union. The post-war economic boom 
motivated the idea of European unification further, given the potential prosperity a 
unified Europe might achieve over competition between individual nations.49 However, 
it became apparent that the ruling Labour Party in Britain had no desire to become 
involved in a pan-European community. Thus, it fell to the French to explore this option 
fully, which they did through four successive French presidencies, eventually finding 
success in Schumann’s presidency during which a plan50 was conceived that would 
result in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community51 in 1951.52  
2.4.5 The Schumann Plan was based on a premise of Franco-German reconciliation and 
included far-reaching economic, military, and political institutions. It was designed to 
prevent the reappearance of a separate military industrial base in each member 
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country.53 The Treaty of Paris,54 under which each signatory agreed to abide by common 
regulations governing the manufacture, competition and, in times of crisis, the price and 
production of coal and steel, was signed by France, West Germany, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. Britain did not participate.55  
2.4.6 While the ECSC had lofty ambitions for European unification, it was limited to 
economic integration as a result of the Messina Conference of 1955,56 during which a 
report was produced that jointly and unanimously proposed the drafting of a treaty to 
establish a common market and an atomic community.57 The Treaty of Rome,58 signed 
in 1957, created the European Economic Community,59 which extended the Common 
Market to all commercial and economic sectors of the six signatories, and created the 
EURATOM.60 The ECSC, EEC and EURATOM together formed the EC.61 The aim of 
the Common Market was, inter alia, to eliminate barriers to free competition and to 
encourage the mobility of capital, labour, and business.62 The EEC became a free trade 
zone with significant integration of economic and monetary policy, and a supranational 
character that differentiated it from other regional organisations.63 
2.4.7 Britain remained hesitant to fully engage in European integration. Due in part to the fact 
that Britain had not suffered to the extent that continental Europe had during WWII, 
they continued to prefer sovereignty and self-sufficiency. In addition, they still retained 
much of the Commonwealth, which joining the Common Market would complicate in 
terms of commercial preferences. Britain also continued to place a greater value on its 
relationship with America and its place in the United Nations. They did, however, apply 
in both 1961 and 1967 to join the EC, but their applications were vetoed by De Gaulle.64 
The French were reluctant to accept British membership as it was feared that they would 
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try to continue to prefer its Commonwealth trade connections and its close relationship 
with America, which were thought would obstruct French efforts to create a European 
defence community free from trans-Atlantic dominance.65 It was not until 1970 that, 
following De Gaulle’s departure from office, the British application was accepted, 
leading to admission in 1973.66 This began the process of UK integration into the EC, a 
conflicted path that has led to controversy and resistance from the inception of 
membership. Several treaties have followed the Treaty of Rome as well as numerous 
enlargements, but the details of these are not relevant to this Thesis. However, a number 
of EU social policy directives have affected business interests, particularly the Acquired 
Rights Directive.67  
3 In the Beginning, was there Social Policy? 
3.1 EU Social Policy 
3.1.1 Social policy at national level has generally been viewed as serving a role of helping to 
attain social justice or cohesion, often referred to as a “market-correcting” role. It 
involves the use of political power to supersede, supplement, or modify the operations 
of an economic system in order to achieve results that an economy could not naturally 
achieve if left unregulated.68 Traditionally, the employment environments of the world 
have been viewed as being strictly national jurisdictional matters, as employment policy 
has been determined by national political, economic and social environments, and the 
history particular to individual countries.69  
3.1.2 The EC early recognised that social policy was an important aspect of its structure, 
though it was founded on the premise of creating a common economic market. Thus, it 
first approached social policy as having a “market-making” role to ensure only that 
competition was not distorted and to prevent social dumping and other anti-competitive 
activities by seeking to harmonise labour costs throughout the EC.70 Its jurisdiction on 
social protection was limited to employment related matters insofar as they affected the 
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functioning of the Common Market, excluding social policy issues such as pensions, 
unemployment, housing, family, the disabled, and the young. This market-making 
policy was only concerned with the civil right to enter contracts and not with industrial 
and social rights, so was not really a social policy at all.71 However, social policy has 
developed and become more inclusive over time. It is now possible to trace the 
evolution of EU social policy in four distinct phases since the creation of the EC. 
3.2 Social Policy Phase I: 1957-1973 
3.2.1 Social policy in a pan-European context was first officially discussed in the Ohlin 
Report,72 a document created by a group of experts set up by the ILO to examine 
whether or not the proposed European economic integration should also have a social 
dimension.73 While unfair competition due to differentials in labour standards was a 
significant fear of economic integration, the Ohlin Report argued that such differences 
broadly reflected differences in productivity.74 It was believed that any distortions in 
competition would be corrected by the market,75 relying on accepted neo-liberal doctrine 
of the day. The experts were strongly of the view that an active interventionist social 
policy was not a necessary element of the proposed economic arrangement in Europe.76 
However, it was argued, particularly by France that, in its absence, the efforts of some 
countries to improve social conditions might be frustrated due to the competition of 
countries with lower wages or poorer working conditions. While the experts recognised 
this argument, they felt that its importance should not be exaggerated; taking the view 
that there was no economic reason why the establishment of a free market should lead to 
a “race to the bottom” of labour standards.77  
3.2.2 The Spaak Report,78 commissioned just prior to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, 
broadly agreed with the findings of the Ohlin Report. While the report argued for 
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transnational harmonisation in some areas of social policy, such as equal pay, it rejected 
a general harmonisation of social policy in the EC.79 Rather, both the Ohlin and Spaak 
Reports argued that, once market barriers fell, a natural coordination of social policies 
would occur, whether at parliamentary or at the level of collective labour, favouring the 
latter over social legislation due to its perceived greater effectiveness. The improvement 
of living and working standards were summarily returned to the remit of collective 
labour organisations.80 As a result, the primary focus of the Treaty of Rome was 
economic.81  
3.2.3 The Treaty limited action in the social policy field to ensuring the elimination of gross 
distortions in competition, a market-making role, while setting out a mere customs union 
with a broader unwritten objective of developing common economic policies and an 
eventual convergence of national economies.82 This was encouraged by Articles 117-
128, obliging Member States to work towards harmonisation of their social systems, 
while making continuous improvements to living standards. The Commission only had 
power to promote close cooperation between Member States in the social field and not 
to propose legislation.83 The European Court of Justice84 would, however, extend the 
remit of EC social policy to include a market-correcting role, recognising that along 
with preventing distortions in competition and social dumping, the Treaty also aimed to 
promote social progress.85 This gave EC social policy a new influence within the Treaty 
framework.86 However, it would not be until the 1970s that social policy would find 
significant influence in EC legislation.  
3.3 Social Policy Phase II: 1973-1983 
3.3.1 By the 1970s, the social dimension of the EC had begun to grow in importance, 
recognising that a philosophy of economic growth based on neo-liberal ideology was not 
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capable of addressing the social problems consequential to economic integration.87 The 
EC had begun to adopt a market-correcting role in its approach to social policy, going so 
far as to state that “vigorous action in the social sphere is to them just as important as 
achieving economic and monetary union.”88 The Social Action Programme89 of 1974 
introduced a number of measures, creating the perception that a comprehensive market-
correcting social policy at Community level had arrived.90 Social policy became a 
dichotomy, combining market-led employment regulation with some recognition of its 
market-correcting function.91 While it could be that these market-correcting elements 
were unintended consequences of legislation aimed at eliminating distortions in 
competition, their social relevance is evident.  
3.3.2 The French approach to Europe in the 1980s shifted from a platform for foreign policy 
manoeuvring, to a means of achieving domestic policy goals hidden behind the mask of 
EC integration. The French began to adapt their domestic politics and institutions to the 
aims of European integration, while intentionally engineering the EC itself to further 
French interests. These endeavours can be seen in constitutional revisions in the 
Maastricht Treaty92 and in the economic and monetary policies designed to direct the 
French economy toward a convergence with the criteria needed to join the Common 
Market. The French were also instrumental in shaping the EC in such a way as to imbue 
social policy with a higher profile within it. This eventually resulted in the Employment 
Title in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997,93 though it would be consistently impeded by 
UK obstinacy. 94 
3.3.3 Social policy initiatives faded into the background in the 1980s, due in no small part to 
the UK’s continued resistance to the encroachment of EC social policy into its 
sovereignty. The ruling UK Conservative party was in favour of labour market 
deregulation to ensure maximum labour market flexibility and maintained a minimalist 
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stance toward Europe. Anything that went beyond market integration towards collective 
interventionism or convergence was persistently rejected. EC social legislation fell far 
outside the minimalist approach.95  
3.3.4 The UK position was not assisted by the fact that there are significant differences 
between the UK labour system and those on the Continent. In particular, there was no 
legal basis to support the adoption of the European Charter of Fundamental Human 
Rights,96 such as an entrenched Bill of Rights. There was also no institutionalised 
system of worker representation and no requirement for employers to recognise or to 
bargain with labour unions.97 Essentially, the UK system was and perhaps still is so 
different from the labour and employment regimes in continental Europe that the way in 
which Directives were drafted did not fit with the mechanisms of UK law.98 
3.4 Social Policy Phase III: 1983-1997 
3.4.1 Inroads into social policy were continued in the Maastricht Treaty that included a new 
social chapter, though in a separate protocol to satisfy UK demands.99 This Social Policy 
Agreement was limited to implementation of the 1989 Social Charter on the basis of the 
“acquis communautaire”. This protocol afforded the Community an enlarged 
competence to legislate in the area of social policy and increased those areas to which 
qualified majority voting would apply to include health and safety, though unanimity 
would still be required for areas of social security and the social protection of 
workers.100 It was thought that the absence of the UK veto would allow the EC to 
introduce significant social reforms in the area of social policy, but the UK dissociation 
with the EC in this fundamental area meant that such an exemption could become a 
routinely applied device for individual dissenting countries to achieve their self-
interested ends. Social policy might then become further fragmented with different laws 
applying to different jurisdictions with the resulting differences in law between Member 
                                                          
95 Brewster and Teague, n35, 120. 
96 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2 October 2000. 
97 B Hepple, “Social Rights in the European Economic Community: a British Perspective” (1989) 11 Comp Lab LJ 425, 435-437. 
98 See J Bell, “Path Dependence and Legal Development” (2012) 87 Tul L Rev 787.  
99 Fairhurst, n65, 11; Barnard, n70,17; and J Kenner, “Employment and Macroeconomics in the EC Treaty: A Legal and Political 
Symbiosis?” (2000) 7(4) MJ 375, 377. 
100 Streeck, n71, 46. 
165 
 
States.101 Essentially, the UK opt-out emasculated the EC competence and legitimacy to 
produce laws in this area. Social policy was once again relegated to an ineffectual 
compromise.102 
3.4.2 The EC focussed on social policy only insofar as it was concerned with cross-border 
mobility and market making103 until the UK veto lost its power with the introduction of 
qualified majority voting in the area of health and safety. This change provided a means 
of circumventing the unanimity required for some social policy legislation by qualifying 
many new Directives as having a health and safety dimension.104 The Community Social 
Charter was introduced in 1989, and was signed by all Member States except Britain. 
Due to Britain’s resistance, the Charter was adopted merely as a proclamation of 
fundamental social rights and had no independent legal effect. The Social Charter 
Action Programme105 resulted in several important pieces of social legislation, though 
these were woefully short of the propositions recommended in the White Paper for 
Completing the Internal Market.106 The resulting Directives amounted to an eclectic 
body of employment law, adding specificity rather than general rules that could serve as 
a means of harmonising social policy throughout the EC.107  
3.4.3 The existence of a “two track social Europe” was relatively short lived, as the UK 
Labour Party came to power in 1997 with the promise of social justice and inclusion. In 
addition to a number of labour reforms, the government also chose to accept the Social 
Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and would take the necessary steps to bind itself under 
it.108 The Treaty of Amsterdam then incorporated the provisions of the Social Chapter 
directly in 1997 in the Employment Title, which set a high level of employment as a 
central objective of the EU. In 1999, employment policy moved to the forefront of the 
                                                          
101 Ibid. 
102 CA Ball, “The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the 
European Community’s Legal Order” (1996) 37 Harv Int'l LJ 307, 331. 
103 Barnard, n70, 41. 
104 Ibid, 12. 
105 Communication (89) 568 from the Commission concerning its Action Programme relating to the Implementation of the 
Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers (29 November 1989). 
106 Communication (85) 310 on Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 
28-29 June 1985). 
107 Barnard, n70, 13-15. 
108 Fairhurst, n65, 16. 
166 
 
agenda in the EU,109 admitting through its inclusion that there were increased 
interdependencies between economic policy of the EU and national social policies. If 
national markets were closed and independent, social policy could remain a domestic 
concern. However, once the European Monetary Union was created with a common 
currency, social policy in one country became relevant to other states as it can affect the 
integrity of the currency and the competitiveness of the larger trans-national market.110 
3.5 Social Policy Phase IV: 1997-Present 
3.5.1 The current phase of EU social policy is characterised by a softer approach to 
convergence and a distancing from harmonisation, though the turn of the millennium 
began with a declaration that was clearly beyond the market-making underpinning of the 
original Treaties. The aims of the Lisbon Strategy111 were for the EU to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs, and greater social cohesion.112 
These aims appear to be irreconcilable with the market-making social policy objective, 
embracing a market-correcting approach that encompassed traditional social policy 
values of redistribution and social justice.113 The Lisbon Strategy also introduced the 
Open Method of Coordination114 as a means of spreading best practice and achieving 
greater convergence by helping Member States to develop their own policies in line with 
EU goals.115 However, OMC requires a significant degree of cooperation, which was 
defeated by the isolating effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
3.5.2 The financial crisis revealed that the targets prescribed by the ambitious Lisbon Strategy 
were extravagant and unachievable, as it wiped out any gains made in economic growth 
and job creation. The methods of implementing the strategy were a failure as there was a 
fundamental lack of commitment from many Member States to the Strategy, which was 
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often seen as merely a bureaucratic exercise with little effect on their governments or 
legal systems. The EU2020 Strategy116 was introduced in 2010 with priorities of smart, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth, aims that are far less ambitious than the Lisbon 
Strategy of the previous decade.117 While OMC remains an important method of 
achieving Treaty aims, a special appeal has also been made to companies’ sense of 
corporate social responsibility to promote best practices in line with the Strategy from 
within. It is thus expected that companies voluntarily commit to social policies that go 
beyond common regulatory and conventional requirements in order to raise the 
standards of social development.118  
4 The Birth of the Acquired Rights Directive119 
4.1 The Original ARD120 
4.1.1 Business insolvency and restructuring have been of fundamental concern in the 
emergence of an EU employment law since the creation of the ECSC.121 It was 
recognised then that the establishment of a common market could have adverse effects 
on employees. Following the SAP of 1972, a number of Directives were passed aimed at 
assisting the process of restructuring in order to facilitate the emergence of more 
efficient undertakings, while addressing the social consequences of the process.122  
4.1.2 Among the measures arising from the SAP was the ARD 1977, the purpose of which 
was to enable workers to maintain the rights acquired in their employment relationship 
prior to the business transfer and to transfer those rights to the new employer. The ARD 
1977 was born partly out of a growing concern about the absence of a “social face” to 
the Common Market123 as well as the fact that the prevailing frameworks in both 
Germany and France already provided for the protection of employment related 
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acquired rights and were consequently in a potentially disadvantageous competitive 
position to those Member States lacking similar protection.124 It was justified by 
reference to the rapid increase in the concentration of undertakings due to numerous 
business mergers in the decade preceding the SAP, resulting in the “Europeanisation” of 
industry in the EC.125 It was recognised that such industrial concentrations would have 
significant consequences on the social situation of workers employed by the undertaking 
concerned as Member State employment protection regimes did not always take 
adequate account of workers’ interests in such situations.126  
4.1.3 Following recommendations from the European Parliament127 and the Economic and 
Social Committee,128 the Council enacted the ARD 1977, though it was less generous 
than the provisions advocated by the EP. However, while the ESC was favourable of the 
Commission’s draft with a few minor changes, it also stressed that it should not hamper 
corporate restructuring and profitability, but admitted that the adverse effects of 
restructuring were generally borne by workers alone.129 Thus, the ARD 1977 was 
drafted in part to facilitate restructuring businesses with a view to making enterprises 
more efficient and competitive, while encouraging a degree of industrial democracy, and 
providing some social protection.130 In addition to the transfer of the employment 
relationship to the new employer, it also provided for the protection of workers against 
dismissal, and included information and consultation obligations for both new and old 
employers.131 
4.1.4 The premise of the ARD 1977 was to provide necessary protection for employees in the 
event of a change of employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights were 
safeguarded.132 It operated to transfer employment contracts to the buyer of a business 
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undertaking or part of a business undertaking,133 effectively granting employees a 
property right in their job.134 Rights and obligations arising under employment contracts 
transferred to the buyer and both buyer and seller remained jointly and severally liable 
in respect of those obligations arising prior to the transfer. Member States were given 
latitude in relation to any duty to notify a buyer of the rights and obligations connected 
with the transferring contracts. The terms of collective agreements also transferred, 
though Member States were given the option to limit the period for observing those 
terms and conditions. Pension rights were excepted from the operation of the ARD 1977 
and would not transfer unless a Member State provided otherwise.135  
4.1.5 The ARD 1977 was surrounded by controversy that reflected the larger struggle within 
the EC between proponents of a strong centralised European government with expansive 
jurisdiction over social and economic policy, and those with a more modest vision of 
European unity.136 The EP recognised that differences in Member State policies on 
business transfers were a hindrance to harmony in the Common Market because 
Member States with more protective legislation and associated increased labour costs 
were at a competitive disadvantage.137 However, the ambiguous provisions of the ARD 
1977 led to many ECJ cases the results of which provide definitions, explanations, and 
criterion under which the ARD 1977 would apply.138 The operation of the ARD 1977 in 
insolvency situations was a frequent subject of EU jurisprudential interpretation. 
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5 EU Jurisprudence and the Evolving Insolvency Exception 
5.1 Abels139 
5.1.1 The ARD 1977 did not expressly exclude business transfers during insolvency from its 
scope.140 This lacuna in the ARD 1977 was first confronted by the ECJ in Abels, a Dutch 
referral, in which the applicability of the ARD 1977 transfer provisions to a business 
sale during a non-liquidation insolvency procedure was in question.141 The ECJ took a 
purposive approach, looking at the aims of insolvency, the objectives of the rescue 
culture, and the purpose of the ARD 1977. The ECJ stated that the purpose of the ARD 
1977 was to ensure that the restructuring of undertakings would not adversely affect the 
employees. Taking this view, the ECJ was initially unsure if the application of the ARD 
1977 to insolvency situations would be favourable or prejudicial to employees. While 
employees of an insolvent employer are probably at the highest risk, extending the ARD 
1977 to insolvent transfers could have the effect of dissuading purchasers from 
acquiring an undertaking on terms favourable to creditors. In such a case, liquidation 
may be the outcome, which would result in a greater loss of jobs, contrary to the purpose 
of the ARD 1977.142 Thus its application in such situations could actually undermine the 
Directive’s objective of promoting job security.143 
5.1.2 The ECJ concluded that the ARD 1977 did not require Member States to extend the 
transfer requirements to those taking place in the context of insolvency proceedings 
instituted with a view to the liquidation of the company, essentially creating an 
exception for insolvent liquidations. Another reason for relaxing the rules was attributed 
to the special nature of insolvency laws, designed to weigh up the competing interests 
involved. It was accepted that insolvency rules could derogate at least in part from social 
policy.144 It was felt that, had the drafters of the ARD 1977 meant for it to apply to 
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insolvency situations, an express provision in the legislation would have been included 
to that effect.145 
5.1.3 The surséance van betaling procedure in Abels was deemed to fall outside of the 
definition of liquidation proceedings as it aimed to safeguard assets of the insolvent 
undertaking and, where possible, to continue the business of the undertaking by means 
of a collective suspension of debt payments, with a view to agreeing a composition plan 
that would enable the business to continue trading in the future.146 Following Abels, it 
was thought that all business transfers occurring through insolvency proceedings would 
be removed from the scope of the ARD 1977. However, subsequent decisions 
demonstrated otherwise.147 
5.2 D’Urso148 
5.2.1 D’Urso also questioned whether a specific insolvency procedure, in this instance the 
Italian “special administration procedure,” would attract the application of the ARD 
1977. The ECJ determined that the decisive test to establish applicability should be the 
purpose of the procedure. It went on to clarify, much to the chagrin of insolvency 
practitioners, that, while the ARD 1977 would not apply to those procedures instituted 
with a view to the liquidation of a company, it would apply if the purpose of the 
procedure was to continue trading and safeguard assets. Further, the application of the 
insolvency exception was not strictly dependent upon the exercise of judicial or 
administrative authority, but on the purpose of the insolvency procedure in question. In 
this judgment, the ECJ not only confirmed its previous approach in Abels, but took a 
step toward extending the scope of the ARD 1977 in corporate rescue procedures.149 
5.3 Spano150 
5.3.1 The question posed by the Italian court in Spano was whether a provision of the Italian 
Civil Code applying to undertakings declared by the Ministerial Committee for the 
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Coordination of Industrial Policy to be in critical difficulty attracted the application of 
the ARD 1977. This declaration was contingent on the submission of a recovery plan. In 
the ECJ’s view, as the purpose of the declaration was to enable the undertaking to try to 
recover from its financial difficulties, continue the business, and to preserve jobs, then 
failing to protect the rights of employees by not transferring their contracts to a 
purchaser of the undertaking would defeat the purpose of the ARD 1977. Again, the 
determining factor was the purpose of the procedure in question.151 
5.4 Déthier152and Eurpiéces 153 
5.4.1 The Belgium court referred a question to the ECJ in Déthier regarding a law outlining 
the winding up procedure following the dissolution of a commercial company. The 
procedure was designed to allow a company to continue trading until it could conclude 
its transactions. It was, however, precluded from engaging in any new business. 
Furthermore, a company was not required to be technically insolvent to use the 
procedure. Companies under this procedure were merely marking time until dissolution 
could be completed. The Advocate General in this case was of the opinion that the 
purpose of the procedure was not enough to determine the applicability of the ARD. 
Rather, the fact that the company continued to trade at all, regardless of the reason it 
continued to trade, in this case for the purpose of liquidation, must be the determining 
factor. That the purpose of the procedure was liquidation or the fact that it was 
continuing to trade with a view to the liquidation of the company was not enough to 
justify the loss of rights that its employees would suffer should the business be sold 
without ARD 1977 protection.154  
5.4.2 The ECJ followed the opinion of the Advocate General, concluding that, in deciding the 
applicability of the ARD 1977, and where the purpose of a procedure is not immediately 
clear, account should be taken of the form of the procedure. The court then examined 
the characteristic features of the procedure in question and determined that the objective 
of the Belgian winding up procedure was to realise assets for the benefit of the company 
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and its creditors, but that the company was not required to be in financial distress for the 
procedure to apply. Liquidation in this case was being used outside of an insolvency 
procedure. There was no justification for depriving employees of their acquired rights 
as, despite the fact that liquidation was to be the end result, there was little doubt that the 
undertaking would continue trading upon its transfer. 155 
5.4.3 Eurpiéces was another Belgian case that closely followed the facts in Déthier. The query 
related to circumstances in a voluntary liquidation where a company had transferred all 
or part of its assets to another company. The court found that this procedure had even 
less in common with an insolvency procedure and that the transfer provisions of the 
ARD 1977 would definitely apply.156 A similar approach was taken in Sophie 
Redmond157 and Merckx,158 in which procedures were undertaken outside of insolvency 
or were otherwise comparable to insolvency, but were not in fact insolvency procedures. 
5.5 The Approach of the ECJ 
5.5.1 The definitions “clarified” in the above judgments left much to be desired. The approach 
in Abels has been described as ultimately unsatisfactory and even incoherent.159 The 
ECJ drew a distinction between insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings that was 
based on a false premise. It failed to recognise that the reason why many companies 
engage in pre-insolvency procedures is that they may be able to sell of part of their 
undertaking with the result of preserving jobs within what is retained, which is precisely 
the reason why the insolvency exception was introduced.160 The application of acquired 
rights in procedures that are taken with a view to recovering the business risks deterring 
potential purchasers from acquiring an undertaking, potentially resulting in a total loss 
of business integrity and job security. The ARD 1977 was aimed to balance the 
protection of employees with commercial realism, but the above jurisprudence has 
shown a bias in the ECJ in favour of employee protectionism. As such, the original 
                                                          
155 Ibid, 44. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Case C29/91 Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartol [1992] ECR 3189.  
158 Joined Cases C171/94 and C172/94 Albert Merckx and Patrick Neuhuys v Ford Motors Company Belgium SA [1996] ECR I-
1253. 
159 P Davies, “Acquired Rights, Creditors’ Rights, Freedom of Contract and Industrial Democracy” (1989) 9 YEL 21, 45. 
160 Barnard, n70, 620-621. 
174 
 
purpose of the ARD 1977, designed in part to facilitate business transfers, acts to 
prevent these by creating a financially disadvantageous climate for a potential purchaser.  
5.6 Reforms to the Acquired Rights Directive 
5.6.1 In 1994, the Commission proposed amending the ARD 1977 due to its perceived 
inadequacies, ambiguities, and uncertainties as demonstrated by the ECJ’s strong law-
making role in determining how the Directive should apply.161 The predominant concern 
for the amendment of the ARD 1977 was to better articulate the basic individual rights 
created by it within certain commercial transactions that proved to be troublesome,162 
including the codification of the insolvency exception.163 During the UK’s presidency of 
the Council during the first half of 1998, the Labour government at the time proposed to 
take the opportunity to seek to make further progress and bring the negotiations on 
reforming the ARD 1977 to a conclusion.164 The UK had a particular national interest, 
as it intended to overhaul its TUPE Regulations165 and a revised supranational text 
would provide the ideal platform. The UK presidency was a perfect opportunity to 
ensure that the two pieces of legislation would closely correspond.166  
5.6.2 The 1998 Directive,167 consolidated in the Acquired Rights Directive168 in 2001, 
expressly excluded transfers of insolvent entities, unless otherwise provided for by 
Member States, as articulated in Article 4a. It incorporated the ECJ’s case law 
distinguishing between the liquidation of insolvent companies and other insolvency 
procedures.169 Compared to the ARD 1977, these were substantial derogation options 
that allowed Member States to opt into an exception to the application of the ARD in 
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insolvency situations of the first kind unless Member States elected otherwise.170 At the 
time of its drafting, there were still differences remaining in the Member States 
regarding the extent to which employees are protected. It was recognised throughout the 
EU that such differences should be reduced to level the competitive playing field among 
the Member States.171  
6 Implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive 
6.1 Problems of Divergent Implementation of Directives 
6.1.1 Prior to the introduction of the ARD 1977, European law was divided on how to deal 
with employment contracts upon the transfer of a business. In the UK, employment 
contracts were subject to the normal rules of contract, considered personal to the 
employer and employee and non-transferable.172 France has required the transfer of 
employment rights on the transfer of a business undertaking since passing a law to this 
effect in 1928.173 The provision was introduced following the requests of employers 
who wished to ensure that business transfers not only meant the transfer of assets, but 
also the transfer of a skilled and experienced labour force that knew how to operate 
them. France has been particularly innovative on this point and the ARD has typically 
favoured the French position.174  
6.1.2 The implementation of the various versions of the ARD has had diverse effects 
throughout the EU, principally due to the results of the limitations set on the competence 
of the EU to legislate in the area of social policy. The legislative form of Directives that 
social policy generally takes is a fundamental factor in the differences in 
implementation. Member States have a wider margin of discretion as to how the results 
of directives are achieved,175 which has led to a variety of implementations. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union176 has therefore had to take a broad approach to 
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decisions regarding whether individuals could rely on Directive provisions in national 
courts, even though Member States retain flexibility of implementation.177 
6.1.3 A further obstacle to convergence in social policy is the fact that directives are limited to 
vertical direct effect,178 or under some circumstances, indirect effect.179 Thus, while 
private individuals cannot generally rely on the provisions of a directive to, for example, 
sue their employer for non-compliance; they can sue the state for failing to interpret 
national law consistently with the requirements of a directive. However, the principle of 
indirect effect has been manipulated by the UK through the denial that indirect effect 
could be applied to national legislation preceding the directive and by arguing that 
indirect effect cannot be used to distort the meaning of national legislation. Following 
the CJEU’s decision in Marleasing,180 the first of these arguments has been dropped, but 
the latter has been further expanded in Webb v EMO Cargo,181 insofar as it was stated 
that UK courts would only interpret domestic legislation consistently with EU law if 
such interpretation would not distort the meaning of domestic legislation.182 Thus, the 
mode of legislation itself allows for a wide scope of interpretation in the implementation 
process, which has contributed significantly to the differences in transposition effects. 
7 Acquired Rights in France 
7.1 History 
7.1.1 Before the introduction of the French transfer of undertakings provisions, employment 
contracts affected by a business transfer would not be transferable to a new employer, as 
they were considered personal in nature, essentially a freedom of contract position.183 
This position was heavily influenced by concepts of personal liberty. However, in 1926, 
the employment relationship in France began to change in favour of the employee.184 
The concept of acquired or maintained rights was borne out of this legislative shift. It 
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was legally recognised in 1928 that the broad application of the contractual freedom 
principle in employment relationships was dangerous for employees who risked losing 
their job security in the event of any business transfer. The law was designed to ensure 
the job security of employees, who at the time of the original law were often family 
members, when a company changed hands. It was therefore prescribed that employment 
contracts should be preserved in the event of a transfer of undertaking.185 This became 
an element of public policy leading to the compulsory nature of the transfer for the 
transferor, transferee, and employees.186 
7.1.2 In the 1934 Groupy187 case, the new text on the transfer of undertakings was interpreted 
widely, insofar as it was judged to be applicable even to successive service providers of 
public services associated with city lighting. It was considered that taking up a service 
of this nature using identical means would be sufficient for the application of the 
transfer of undertakings law. The result of this case meant that a business would not 
require a legal contractual relationship between successive operators in order for the law 
to apply. The text of this law did not change until the 1980s. It was later included in 
Article L.122-12 of the Code of 1973.188 Today, the transfer provisions in the French 
Code du Travail must be interpreted according to the provisions of the Acquired Rights 
Directive,189 though this has caused few problems considering the close alignment 
already subsisting between the ARD and the French provision. 
7.1.3 In the 1980s, the Court of Cassation recognised that applying the law on transfers of 
undertakings to what was essentially a service provision change was problematic. Even 
the Commission denounced the blanket application of Article L.122-12 to service 
provision changes as contrary to free competition because it distorted the means of 
access to a market in the course of renewal. In addition, a company taking on contracts 
of employment in such a situation might be completely unaware of the number of 
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employees or the terms of their employment. In a 1985 case, it was found that a change 
in cleaning service provider in Nimes would not draw the application of the transfer 
provisions with the Court of Cassation, stating that a change in the juridical situation of 
an employer defined in the law cannot simply be indicated by a loss of a service 
contract. In short, the simple change of the recipient of a service would not be enough 
for the application of the transfer provisions. The fact that the same activity continues 
with another employer would not cause the transfer of contracts unless that activity 
constituted an autonomous economic entity.190  
7.1.4 In 1986, the court further narrowed the scope of the transfer provisions in a case brought 
to an employment tribunal by employees against two companies, one of which had lost a 
work contract on the railway to the other. The employees of the former company 
claimed that their employment contracts should have transferred to the company now 
hired to do the work. However, the court found that the change in juridical position of an 
employer that would attract the application of the transfer provisions implies that there 
is some legal connection between successive employers, which in that case meant that 
over one hundred contracts of employment would not transfer to the new service 
provider.191 While this made economic sense, the decision caused genuine consternation 
among trade unions and workers as it introduced a great instability in employment 
during a period in which restructuring was common.192 
7.1.5 The ECJ then undertook the issue of legal connection in a case that has become known 
as Daddy’s Dance Hall.193 It was found that it was not necessary for there to be a 
juridical link between two successive employers in a case where the transfer of 
employment contracts was implicated. This influenced the Court of Cassation to 
abandon its unpopular stance and return to more protective solutions, though not to the 
broad extent of the previous approach to the law. It incorporated the approach of the 
ECJ by stating that, while a legal connection was not necessary to establish the 
application of the transfer provisions, a mere loss of service contract would not be 
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adequate. It would be necessary also to show that there was a transfer of an entity that 
has preserved its identity and the activity of which is pursued or resumed.194 Today the 
transfer provisions are contained in Article L.1224-1 of the Labour Code. 
7.2 The Operation of French Acquired Rights 
7.2.1 The French position is fairly straightforward compared to the UK position. All 
employment contracts transfer in the event that there has been a transfer of an 
autonomous economic entity that retains its identity, regardless of any extenuating 
circumstances, including insolvency. The notion of “autonomous economic entity” 
implicating the transfer of employment contracts extends to an organised grouping of 
individuals functioning as a unit that exercises an economic activity pursuing an 
identifiable objective. Thus, the existence of an economic entity is independent of any 
corporate rules of organisation, function, or management tied to corporate entities. 
Essentially, a distinct activity associated with a company can constitute an autonomous 
economic entity.195 While these provisions appear to be broad and present a potential 
obstacle to the freedom of enterprise, they also coincide with French policy and 
constitutional principles regarding the right to work.  
7.2.2 Given the frequency with which companies are reconstructed in the modern corporate 
world, France has recognised the need to maintain some stability for employees in 
addition to the flexibility of business enterprises. In a decision by the Constitutional 
Court in January 2000,196 the importance of social cohesion was emphasised. It was 
stated that, according to Article 34 of the Constitution of 1946, the legislature is required 
to determine fundamental principles of labour law, to assure that the economic and 
social principles listed in the Preamble of the Constitution are put in place, while 
ensuring that these principles are reconciled with constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. 
In complying with the constitutional requirement to ensure that everyone has the right to 
obtain employment, it is also possible to limit freedom of enterprise, but only insofar as 
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the result is not disproportionate to the objective pursued.197 In consideration of the 
French approach to employment protection and the rights of labour, the explicit 
recognition that this may sometimes interfere with freedom of enterprise is not 
surprising. However, such limitations ensure that employees benefit from a high level of 
protection in times of economic turmoil, which includes extensive information and 
consultation requirements as well as the specific protection of employment contracts 
with their terms and conditions. 
7.2.3 While dismissals by reason of the transfer itself are considered ineffective, dismissals 
for economic reasons can still be made if they satisfy all of the requirements contained 
in the labour code. Various insolvency procedures provide for such dismissals if 
required. These can occur with the authorisation of the juge-commissaire during the 
period of observation during a redressement judiciaire procedure. An administrator will 
be obliged to consult the works council or employee representatives198 and must inform 
the competent administrative authority.199 A plan conceived during the process of 
redressement may also provide for justified economic dismissals, but these carry with 
them requirements for compensation and attempts to find alternative employment for 
those employees whose jobs are under threat. Plans that envisage economic dismissals 
can also not be approved by the court until a works council or employee representatives 
have been consulted and the administrative authority informed. The same applies to 
economic dismissals envisaged prior to or following a business transfer or during 
sauvegarde procedures. Economic dismissals are of particular importance in a 
sauvegarde procedure given that its aim is the reorganisation of a company, as such, 
economic dismissals will often be one result of the changes required to increase 
competitiveness.200  
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8 Acquired Rights in the UK 
8.1 History 
8.1.1 Prior to the adoption of the ARD 1977 and its implementation in the UK, the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities considered the new Directive 
and reported that existing British legislation afforded adequate and comprehensive 
protection for employees, without the need for new requirements applicable on the 
transfer of a business. Further, the EC proposals were of little value given that the 
legislation on mass redundancies was deemed sufficient. However, the ARD 1977 was 
to go far beyond the procedural aspects of collective redundancies as it conferred 
substantive individual rights on workers. While the position in Britain provided some 
limited statutory rights in the event of a change of employer, there was no blanket 
protection of employment continuity or contractual transfer.201 
8.1.2 The position of employment contracts upon the transfer of a business relied upon rules 
of contract. Employment contracts were personal in nature and could not be transferred 
to a new employer that was not already a party to that contract.202 Individuals have a 
negative freedom not to consent to a change in employer, as the requirement of 
automatic transfer would be against the principle that a man cannot be compelled to 
serve a master.203 Thus, a purchaser of a business could not generally expect to receive a 
trained workforce, nor could employees be assured of any job security in such 
situations.204 The first UK legislation conferring continuity of employment on a business 
transfer205 would apply only if the employees were voluntarily retained by the 
purchasing firm. There was no concept of automatic transfer, as this would conflict with 
the fundamental freedom of contract206 as well as with fundamental human rights 
against forced labour.207 The ARD 1977 and its implementation changed the common 
law position in the UK, essentially subverting fundamental rules of contract law.208 The 
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implementation of the ARD 1977 would mean the end of the legal fiction of the 
personal, non-transferable nature of an employment contract, replaced by the principle 
of an automatic transfer, which essentially reflects the reality of modern working life.209 
8.2 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981210  
8.2.1 With its labour friendly stance, the UK Labour government of 1974 to 1978 agreed to 
the ARD 1977, but it failed to implement the Directive before the election in 1979 when 
the Conservatives came into power under Thatcher.211 The ARD 1977 was unwanted by 
the Conservative regime, thus it is unsurprising that the Commission had to threaten 
taking action to motivate them to implement TUPE 1981, but the lack of enthusiasm 
affected the form of the Regulations.212  
8.2.2 TUPE 1981 came into force in May 1982, more than three years after the expiry date of 
the two-year implementation period.213 Little was made to integrate the ARD 1977; it 
was simply placed on top of existing UK law,214 which caused a number of problems. 
As EU law is generally modelled in the style of Continental legal practice, many of the 
clauses of TUPE 1981 were unclear and obscure, making them difficult for UK courts to 
interpret. In addition, the form that the implementation took had its own problems. Most 
EU law up to that time had been implemented through Acts of Parliament, but as 
Regulations, TUPE 1981 did not amend existing legislation as would have been the case 
with an Act.215 While it would seem that the devices used in implementing the Directive 
should limit its impact in Britain, it also created legal confusion that caused chaos for 
industrial tribunals interpreting the status of the law in that area. The legislation instead 
undermined the coherence of worker protection in transfers of undertakings. Little 
would be done to ameliorate this during the Conservative governance of the 1980s.216 
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8.2.3 The introduction of ARD 1977 provisions would also have significant impact on the 
process of privatization that was to occur under the Thatcher administration.217 It had 
been believed that the transfer of state-owned enterprises from public ownership to 
private control would not attract the application of the ARD 1977. However, in 
Commission v UK,218 it was found, among other things, that employees in non-
commercial undertakings would also be protected by the Directive, endangering the 
privatisation initiative.219 As such, an effective implementation of the ARD 1977 would 
have significant impact due to the costs that would accompany the mandatory transfer of 
employment contracts. Despite rote copying, TUPE 1981 had failed to comply with the 
Directive in application. For the Conservative government in power at the time of the 
Directive’s initial implementation and well into the discussion of its reforms, the ARD 
1977 was a classic example of how EU social policy prevented the utilisation of 
competitive forces to eliminate government failure. Rather, it helped to preserve pockets 
of inefficiency, while inducing distortive creative compliance behaviour among the 
Member States.220  
8.3 Reviewing and Reforming TUPE221 
8.3.1 At a House of Lords review in 1996, the Business Services Association pointed out that 
the ARD 1977 had:  
“resulted in substantial and unforeseen compensation and business costs, 
significant legal costs, and [...] the diversion of a significant proportion of 
management time to TUPE related issues.”222 
It also concluded that the primary need for any revision of the law was clarity.223 
Although the ARD was consolidated and updated in 2001, it was not until 2006 that the 
UK followed suit. A number of changes were made prior to the passage of the new 
regulations. In 1999, the UK government created a special legislative power to extend 
TUPE beyond normal TUPE situations. In 2000, it used a Cabinet Office Statement of 
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Practice as a dictate to declare that all transfers from the central government would be 
subject to TUPE 1981 controls even when it would not normally be indicated, for 
example in an internal transfer with no change in an employer’s identity. When 
contracting out, administrative codes required that all contractors respect the existing 
terms and conditions of transferred staff and to pay any who join no less favourably, 
thus attempting to avoid a two tier workforce.224 TUPE 1981 was expanded significantly 
in the years preceding the passage of TUPE 2006. It is unsurprising that it has caused 
controversy as a regulation that inhibits a flexible labour market in the UK and, in 
particular, successful corporate rescue. 
8.3.2 Prior to the passage of TUPE 2006, a government consultation document  stated that the 
purpose of the legislation would be to assist in managing change resulting from the 
reorganisation or restructuring of businesses and public sector modernisation by 
encouraging partnership and a cooperative approach to such changes. While TUPE 2006 
may have streamlined some processes, given the amount of problems encountered by 
employers and the generally litigious feel to the operation of TUPE 2006 between 
employer and employee, they have not promoted as much cooperation as might have 
been anticipated.   
8.3.3 TUPE 2006 repealed and replaced TUPE 1981 and made a number of substantial 
changes to the law on business transfers. It includes service provision changes as being 
subject to TUPE, a position already supported in CJEU case law, and clarified the effect 
of acquired rights in relation to transfer related dismissals and changes to employee 
terms and conditions. TUPE 2006 introduced information obligations for the seller in 
relation to employee liabilities. Importantly it allows for greater flexibility in cases 
where a transferor is insolvent, ostensibly to bring the TUPE 2006 provisions in line 
with the UK government’s policy of encouraging the rescue culture.   
8.3.4 In November 2011, the UK government called for evidence on the effectiveness of 
TUPE 2006 as concerns had been raised that it was overly bureaucratic and 
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ineffective.225 The response to the consultation was published by the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills in 2013 and contained some controversial suggestions 
for change; however, few of these changes have a bearing on the application of TUPE in 
corporate rescue situations. The changes envisaged were intended to realign the wording 
of the Regulations to make it closer to the wording of the Directive and to avoid going 
further than required.226 The new Regulations227 have, however, aligned Regulations 4 
and 7 with the ARD in so far as contractual variations and dismissals are only 
legislatively prohibited if the sole or principal reason for them is the transfer, but no 
longer will reasons connected with the transfer fall within this prohibition.228  
9 The Insolvency Exception 
9.1 The Provision in the ARD 
9.1.1 The ARD contains the option to exclude its application in certain cases of insolvency, 
codifying much of the case law that issued from the ECJ during the currency of the 
ARD 1977. The ARD allowed its application to be disapplied to transfers in the context 
of liquidation proceedings. It would, however, continue to apply in non-liquidation 
proceedings, though the ARD also contained some relaxation on the requirements that 
would apply upon a transfer. However, the distinction between procedures focuses on 
the ultimate fate of the transferor, rather than on the position of employees and the 
transferee when viable businesses are sold. It has been argued that this distinction is 
inconsistent with the primary aims of employment protection contained in the Directive 
and that it provides an incentive for insolvency practitioners to adopt a terminal rather 
than rehabilitative approach. The Trade Unions Congress pointed out that it would not 
always be clear at the outset of a procedure whether it might lead to rehabilitation or 
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liquidation, thus the distinction within the insolvency exception is based on unstable 
grounds.229  
9.1.2 The insolvency exception states that:  
“Unless Member States provide otherwise, Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to any 
transfer of an undertaking business or part of an undertaking or business where the 
transferor is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency 
proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets 
of the transferor and are under the supervision of a competent public authority 
(which may be an insolvency practitioner authorised by a competent public 
authority)”230 
9.1.3 The insolvency exception allows Member States to derogate from the provisions of the 
ARD in certain, though ambiguously defined, circumstances. This ambiguity has led to 
several cases in which the provision had to be interpreted by the Court in order to clarify 
its application in various insolvency procedures that were not purely liquidation 
oriented. The same controversy is not present in the French system given that there is a 
blanket application of the transfer provisions, regardless of the financial circumstances 
of the action. 
9.2 TUPE231 and Insolvency: UK Jurisprudence 
9.2.1 Generally, the allocation of employee liabilities arising from the application of TUPE in 
a business transfer can be a matter of agreement between the buyer and seller of a 
business undertaking through the use of warranties and indemnities in the purchase 
agreement. However, in business transfers occurring out of insolvency it is of much 
greater concern to employees to ensure that their contractual rights and obligations have 
transferred to the buyer of the business. The buyer is more likely to be solvent and will 
thus be in a stronger position to ensure that the contractual obligations owed to the 
transferring employees can be met in full.232 As such, the question as to whether 
contracts will transfer in the various insolvency procedures available in the British 
system has been important to determine. 
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9.2.2 The insolvency exception was adopted in TUPE 2006.233 The exception was drafted to 
support and to promote a business rescue philosophy. TUPE Regulation 8 operates to 
exclude the application of the rules on the transfer of contracts of employment and the 
prohibition on dismissal by reason of a transfer. This exception is available in the event 
that the transfer in question is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous 
insolvency proceedings that have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the 
assets of the transferor.234 Given that TUPE 2006 failed to clarify which specific 
insolvency proceedings would be exempt from its application, it has been the duty of the 
courts to determine the applicable tests.  
9.2.3 The decision in Abels did not assist the UK with the incongruity of its insolvency 
definitions. In particular, as administration has three options, the last being liquidation 
when the first two have been exhausted, it would seem that administration can be 
instituted with a view to the liquidation of the business. However, the hierarchy of 
purposes in administration implies that priority should be given to rescuing the 
company. This lack of clarity resulted in litigation in the UK to provide a test for 
business transfers out of insolvency. The lacuna on definitive insolvent situations where 
transfers will attract the application of TUPE is difficult to comprehend as insolvency 
procedures often result in business transfers and thus indicate its operation.235 The 
insolvency profession has criticized both the lack of presence of any provision for 
insolvency situations as well as the CJEU’s approach to terminal and non-terminal 
insolvencies.236 
9.3 Oakland vs Wellswood237 
9.3.1 Oakland is the first in a series of UK cases that have extended the reach of acquired 
rights in corporate rescue. In Oakland the Employment Appeal Tribunal238 found that 
administration proceedings, in particular pre-pack administrations instituted with a view 
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to liquidating the company, would benefit from the insolvency exception in TUPE.239 
Employees subject to a pre-pack administration would therefore not automatically 
transfer to the buyer of the business package. The company was deemed as being in a 
form of terminal insolvency and therefore subject to relevant bankruptcy proceedings as 
required for the insolvency exception to apply.240  
9.3.2 The administrators in Oakland had declared that rescuing the company, Wellswood 
Yorkshire Limited, as a going concern would be impossible and instead concentrated 
their efforts on achieving a better outcome for creditors by commencing negotiations on 
the terms of a pre-pack. An onward sale could then be structured before entering formal 
insolvency so that the business could be more easily continued by the buyer. As the 
business could not be rescued as a whole, it was decided to sell it off in parts as separate 
undertakings.241 This action was taken to swell the assets of the company to improve 
distributions to creditors upon its liquidation.242  
9.3.3 An employee who had continued to work for the business following the business 
transfer claimed unfair dismissal against his new employer less than a year following the 
sale on the basis that TUPE had applied to the transaction. It was found that TUPE did 
not apply and the employee therefore did not have sufficient continuity of employment 
to claim unfair dismissal.243 Rather, the insolvency exception was found to apply 
because the company was subject to relevant insolvency proceedings when the transfer 
was affected so his contract was deemed terminated with the original employer while 
being rehired anew by the purchasing employer. The EAT justified its position by 
concluding that its construction of the Regulations accorded with the policy of 
encouraging the rescue culture whereby a purchaser of a business out of insolvency is 
not deterred by TUPE liabilities.244  
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9.3.4 The EAT judge commented that as Parliament had declined to specify which particular 
insolvency proceedings should be characterised as being instituted with a view to the 
liquidation of a company’s assets, there was no test against which to measure the instant 
case. As such, he found that it was a question of fact for the tribunal. The facts in this 
case lead the judge to rule that as the administrators had immediately recognised the 
impossibility of rescuing the business as a going concern and took immediate steps to 
sell its assets, it was clear that the administrators believed that the liquidation of the 
company would result in the optimum returns for creditors.245 In addition, this 
construction accorded with the concept of the rescue culture as the insolvency exception 
had effectively protected the buyer of the company, giving it an opportunity to try to 
restructure it without the financial risks occasioned by TUPE. Jobs were preserved and 
creditors benefitted from what administrators had deemed as the best available option.246  
9.3.5 The case set before the Court of Appeal247 avoided discussion of whether the insolvency 
exception would apply in a pre-pack situation, finding for the claimant on the basis of 
rules on continuity of employment contained in the Employment Rights Act 1996.248 
The CA expressed regret that the question of the applicability the insolvency exception 
was not set before it. Obiter, Moses LJ said that there were strong grounds for believing 
that both the first and second tier tribunals were incorrect in their interpretation of the 
insolvency exception.249 
9.3.6 Despite the obiter comments of Moses LJ, the result of Oakland gave some hope to 
insolvency practitioners that the potential impact of TUPE would no longer place jobs at 
risk or suppress the value of the assets of a company when an administrator is seeking a 
buyer for a part of the business.250 The case determined that it was possible to 
distinguish between two types of administration: one with the purpose of rescuing the 
business as a going concern and one where the intent is to cease trading completely and 
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liquidate.251 ECJ jurisprudence also seemed to support this idea insofar as a business is 
not preserved as a whole, but broken up and sold in different parts, essentially a 
liquidation of assets, even where those individual parts might be regarded as 
undertakings under the ARD.252 The decision in Oakland was, however, contrary to the 
guidance issued by the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform at 
the time, which stated expressly that the insolvency exception should not apply to 
administration. The EAT referred to the guidance, but derived no assistance from it. 
Rather, the conclusion of the tribunal accorded with the policy of the rescue culture 
whereby a purchaser should not be inhibited by the effects of TUPE.253 
9.4 OTG v Barke254 
9.4.1 The primary issue in OTG was to answer the question that was left out of the CA 
judgment in Oakland. The facts are similar. An employee brought a claim for unfair 
dismissal following a termination occurring around the time of a pre-pack transfer. The 
appeals gave the EAT the opportunity to clarify whether the administration procedure255 
constituted “insolvency proceedings instituted with a view to the liquidation of the 
assets of the transferor” within the meaning of Regulation 8(7) of TUPE. Two 
approaches were suggested: an absolute approach contending that the insolvency 
exception could never apply to administrations, or a fact based approach depending on 
the intentions of the administrator.256  
9.4.2 It was argued that an absolute approach catered to the true form of administration 
procedures, the default purpose of which is to rescue the company as a going concern. 
Only if this primary purpose is unattainable should the second two options be 
considered, both of which lead to liquidation. The fact that the results of these options 
that appear later in the hierarchy of choices allow for liquidation does not defeat the 
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character of the procedure when it is instituted, that of rescuing the business if at all 
possible.257 
9.4.3 Alternatively, it was countered that the fact that there was a hierarchy of purposes in 
administration did not defeat the argument that a fact based approach should be taken 
when deciding cases of this type. The purpose of every administration is not to rescue 
the business. At times it is immediately recognised that rescue will not be possible, as in 
Oakland, and that the best option for stakeholders will be either selling the assets for 
distribution or the immediate liquidation of the company. The proponent for this 
argument used pre-packs as an example, submitting that in these cases administrations 
are undertaken in circumstances where there is never a real prospect or intention of 
rescuing the company as a going concern.258 
9.4.4 In OTG a pre-pack was instituted in order for the business undertaking of the company 
being sold to continue trading. It was decided that it was irrelevant that at some later 
date the company might be subject to liquidation.259 Rather, the second tier tribunal 
determined that in any business sale by a company in administration, employees would 
automatically transfer to the buyer of that business, preferring an absolute approach.260 
The view of the EAT was that due to its very nature, administration proceedings can 
never be instituted with a view to liquidation.261 The EAT described five distinct reasons 
why they believed this was the appropriate finding:  
1. “The distinction made within the provisions of the insolvency 
exception is more likely intended to depend on the legal character 
of the procedure rather than the object of the individuals operating 
it;  
 
2. The TUPE insolvency exception is specifically concerned with the 
object of the proceedings at the time that they are instituted. As the 
obligation placed on administrators under Schedule B1 is, at the 
point of appointment, to consider first the primary objective to 
rescue the business as a going concern, then the institution of 
proceedings must always be with this consideration in mind;  
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3. There is also no requirement for an administrator to declare his 
intentions upon the initiation of proceedings; 
 
4. The fact based approach increases the likelihood of disputes as to 
who is liable for a transferor’s obligations, which will increase the 
costs of proceedings, result in delay and create uncertainty; and 
 
5. The purpose of the Directive is to protect employees in the event of 
their employer’s insolvency. An absolute approach goes further to 
reach this end than would the more flexible fact based approach.”262 
9.4.5 Underhill J goes on to explain his disagreement with Judge Clarke’s assessment in 
Oakland. Judge Clarke had argued for a fact based approach, saying that the approach 
accords with the policy underlying the insolvency exception in both the ARD and its 
implementation in TUPE. It promotes a rescue culture under which potential purchasers 
should not be deterred from purchasing an undertaking out of insolvency as a result of 
transferring employee liabilities. Underhill J agreed with taking a purposive approach, 
but believed that it should be applied to the fundamental purpose of the Directive as a 
whole: to safeguard the rights of workers. While in insolvency related transfers there is 
an undeniable tension between the rights of employees and the aims of the rescue 
culture, and while it is true that the loss of some employee rights may in effect protect 
the business as a whole and its associated jobs, the Directive proceeds on the premise 
that employment should be protected in these business transfers instituted not with a 
view to the liquidation of the assets of the company. As such, distinctions were made 
between terminal and non-terminal insolvencies. Despite the need for balance as 
recognised in previous CJEU and UK jurisprudence, Underhill J found that the purpose 
of the Directive is biased toward the rights of employees and does not allow them to be 
trumped except in very specific circumstances.263 
9.5 Key2Law264  
9.5.1 In Key2Law, the ET followed the reasoning in Oakland, asserting that the application of 
the insolvency exception in an administration would be a question of fact for the tribunal 
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and that due to the fact that the proceedings in this case were not instituted with a view 
to liquidation, the insolvency exception would not apply. While the ET Judge came to a 
final conclusion that the EAT agreed with, his reasoning was disputed. The EAT 
followed the reasoning set out in OTG for an absolute approach, finding that 
administrations in their nature are not instituted with a view to liquidation.265 
9.5.2 It was argued on appeal that it was right to take a fact based approach, despite the 
hierarchical structure of the administration procedure. It was unrealistic to regard 
rescuing a company as a going concern as reflecting a primary objective in 
administration. In practice, there are cases where there is no prospect for such a rescue, 
as such the sole objective of an administration in such circumstances would result in the 
realisation of assets in the best interests of creditors.266 While this case was not a pre-
pack situation, the order was made for the purpose of disposing of the undertaking to a 
third party for consideration, which would enable a distribution to creditors. It was 
argued that the administration order was therefore made with a view to liquidation and 
therefore fell within the intendment of the insolvency exception.267 
9.5.3 The CA disagreed, finding that in principle it was unsatisfactory to depend on evidence 
leading up to the making of an order as key in determining whether or not an 
administration procedure should be considered as having been taken with a view to 
liquidation. The fact based argument produces uncertainty regarding the objective to be 
achieved by any administrative appointment, which is to firstly try to find a means of 
rescuing the company. The CA also regarded it as wrong to identify the purpose of an 
administrative appointment by reference to the objectives of their pre-appointment 
considerations. It must look to the purpose of the procedure triggered by the making of 
the order, rather than the intention of the people involved in the making of it. To this 
end, the purpose of an administration is clearly set out in Schedule B1 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 and its headline purpose is to try to rescue the business, only resorting to the 
liquidation of assets if that primary purpose proves impossible to achieve.268 In all cases, 
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it is this first objective with which all administrators must formally engage in before 
resorting to any others.269 The CA therefore solidified the approach to TUPE and 
administrations, firmly applying an absolute approach as it has the merit of achieving 
legal certainty: all involved will know where they stand upon the appointment of an 
administrator.270 
9.6 Operation of TUPE in Corporate Rescue 
9.6.1 Given that the status of the law is currently such that TUPE will apply in most if not all 
corporate rescue situations, it is relevant to consider how it operates. There is some 
relaxation in the Regulations for those procedures that fall short of the exception but that 
are nonetheless still insolvency situations, thus ostensibly promoting the rescue culture 
despite the application of TUPE.271 Similar to other transfers, in the event that pre or 
post-transfer dismissals are required for economic, technical, or organisational reasons 
entailing changes in the workforce,272 such dismissals will usually be permissible, 
whereas those dismissals that are conceived of by reason of the transfer will be 
considered automatically unfair. However, any liability incurred for ETO dismissals if 
improperly done will then pass to the transferee, but those dismissals done legally will 
remain with the transferor.273  
9.6.2 While the effect of TUPE usually means that any contractual changes conceived of by a 
transferee related to the transfer are prohibited, those changes arising in relation to a 
transfer occurring out of a relevant insolvency proceeding will not be caught by this 
prohibition. Permitted variations are allowed if those variations are by reason of the 
transfer or for a reason connected with the transfer that is not an ETO reason and is 
designed to safeguard employment by ensuring the survival of the undertaking subject to 
the relevant transfer.274 A relevant insolvency proceeding is defined as an insolvency 
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proceedings that has been opened not with a view to liquidation.275 This would therefore 
cover most corporate rescue procedures commenced under the UK insolvency system. 
9.6.3 Nonetheless, not all liabilities transfer with the employment contracts. Those liabilities 
covered by the UK National Insurance Fund under the statutory provisions of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 do not pass to the transferee.276 Employees retain their 
claims against the Fund while any excess will transfer to the purchaser. Such claims 
include statutory redundancy pay, arrears of pay for up to eight weeks, amounts due for 
failure to give the minimum notice period, holiday pay, and basic compensatory awards 
for unfair dismissals.277  
9.6.4 While the foregoing exceptions for insolvency are helpful, they do not ameliorate the 
significant impact that transferring employment contracts will often have. Chapter 6 will 
explore the criticism that has been levelled against the ARD and TUPE. The costs of 
employee liabilities have been seen to reduce the value of a going concern to the point 
of making a purchase unviable. While the ability to change contractual terms and 
conditions; increased flexibility for employee dismissal; and the availability of the 
guarantee fund for employment costs, the overall effect of TUPE in corporate rescue has 
been viewed as fundamentally negative in the UK. The same is true in France, although 
the political status of employment rights makes criticism generally fruitless and change 
extraordinarily difficult. As such, a new approach may be called for that attempts to 
balance the needs of job security and the integrity of the rescue culture. 
10 Analysis and Conclusion  
10.1 Social Policy, European Unification, and the ARD 
10.1.1 The implementation of the ARD in the UK and in France differs fundamentally due to 
two very different approaches and perspectives on the need to protect employees over 
the interests of business. These approaches are heavily path dependent as evidenced in 
the examination of how both countries viewed their place and exercised their influence 
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in the early days of the EC and on its approach to issues of social policy. Social policy 
in Europe has had a long and varied development and has been heavily influenced by 
the two great wars in the first half of the twentieth century. The personalities involved in 
the peace negotiations at Versailles were singular microcosms of their particular 
jurisdictions, with the French highly concerned for specific French interests, an 
individualist perspective illustrative of the French cynicism toward any lasting change 
or, indeed, peace following the war. The British, while exhibiting some passing interest 
in international cooperation, were also more concerned with maintaining their distance 
from Continental problems.278 While the outcome of the treaty contributed to the causes 
of the WWII, the treaty also created the ILO, which would provide a further impetus for 
social policy in Europe, though each individual state would create their own jurisdiction 
specific regimes of labour and employment protection.279 This jurisdiction specific 
approach would be reflected in the EU approach to social policy in the 1950s. 
10.1.2 As WWI provided the catalyst for war socialism, most continental countries continued it 
to some degree during the interwar period, while the UK reversed direction, preferring a 
liberal economy during peace time, though this was not without some serious social 
consequences in terms of unrest.280 The development of a unifying process following 
WWII was supported by the UK and the US, though the UK has taken an outsiders 
stance from the very beginning of European integration processes, with Churchill 
recommending a “united states of Europe,” of which the UK would not, admittedly, be a 
part.281 The lack of interest of the UK and the US for a European unification process 
meant that the French would take the lead, which would have significant impact on the 
form that unification would take, as well as its approach to social policy, though the 
latter would be tempered by the more liberal stance of the German government.282  
10.1.3 Since the first steps toward some type of European collective were taken in the ECSC, it 
has been recognised that the creation of a combined market would have far reaching 
effects on individual citizens, particularly due to the effects of market integration on 
                                                          
278 See above, section 2.2. 
279 Ibid, 2.3. 
280 Ibid, 2.4.1. 
281 Ibid, 2.4.2. 
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European business. This led to specific provisions in the ECSC that allowed for 
financing activities aimed at mitigating the consequences of restructuring on workers 
affected by the integration of the coal and steel industrial markets.283 While this 
approach would not be fully utilised in the Treaty of Rome, which took a distinctly 
market-making stance to social policy in the Community,284 some of the first social 
policy directives occurring in the wake of the SAP would be passed specifically to deal 
with employees affected by the insolvency of their employers in the Collective 
Redundancies Directive,285 the Employers in Insolvency Directive286 and the Acquired 
Rights Directive.287 However, British liberalism and protection of its sovereignty would 
provide constant obstacles to any advances toward a market-correcting role for social 
policy in Europe, though this role would be specifically recognised by the Attorney 
General in his opinion in the Defrenne No. 1 case. The fact that the Attorney General 
was French only supports the perception that France has always had a more 
redistributive social policy in mind for Europe, ostensibly to protect itself against the 
anti-competitive nature of differentials in social costs between Member States.288 
10.1.4 While the adoption of the Social Chapter by the UK would mean an end to any 
significant obstacles that the UK could continue to present, its implementation strategies 
in terms of social policy directives has lacked enthusiasm and, at times, legal 
effectiveness.289 While France was actually the impetus for the creation of a law that 
would deal with employees’ acquired rights,290 the ARD was one of the many EU 
directives that caused problems for the UK legal system. The UK’s failure to implement 
it initially led to threats of a lawsuit by the European Commission. Then its inadequate 
implementation and failure initially to apply it in cases of privatisation led to a CJEU 
decision requiring its application.291 Thus, the UK has struggled to comply with the 
requirements of EU social policy, due not only to its economically liberal stance and 
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desire to maintain its sovereign power, but also to the differences between Continental 
civil systems and the British common law approach, the former upon which much EU 
law is based.292  
10.1.5 The ARD has caused problems on a European level as well, in no small part due to its 
original failure to deal with circumstances of insolvency. A number of cases considered 
how the Directive should apply in corporate rescue situations, which were eventually 
resolved with the distinction between those procedures entered with a view to 
liquidation or those that are not so initiated. This distinction has meant that any 
procedure entered with a view to continue trading, even in those situations that may 
eventually lead to liquidation, any business transfers occurring would not be exempt 
from the operation of acquired rights.293 The UK has also had a number of cases dealing 
with this problem, resulting in the application of TUPE to all insolvency procedures that 
allow the business to continue trading.294 This has caused controversy at both an EU as 
well as a national level, however, the current Directive and its implementation 
throughout the EU mean that this problem cannot be solved without significant reforms 
in the provisions relating to the insolvency exception.295  
10.1.6 The following Chapter will analyse the path dependency of the position in relation to the 
ARD in the UK and France, explore the controversy caused by the application of 
transfer provisions during corporate rescue including the opinion and experience of 
insolvency practitioners, and present a recommended solution that will allow Member 
States to essentially opt out of the transfer provisions in certain circumstances of 
corporate rescue where to do otherwise would mean the failure of the company. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION: PATH DEPENDENT INFLUENCES ON THE 
EVOLUTION OF ACQUIRED RIGHTS IN CORPORATE RESCUE IN THE UK AND 
FRANCE  
“Of all the differences between men and the lower animals, the moral sense 
or conscience is by far the most important...it is the most noble of all the 
attributes of man.” 
~ Charles Darwin 
“The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”  
~ Martin Luther King 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Evolution of a United Europe  
1.1.1 The previous Chapter explored the evolution of the European Union1 from its roots in 
the conflict of colonial competitiveness during a time when conservatism, nationalism, 
and imperialism dominated national psyches, aided by fervent national activists who 
sought to recruit people by plundering history, religion, folklore, and racial theories to 
demonstrate a nation’s ancient and aboriginal struggle for its rights and its lands.2 The 
passions of nationalism fuelled the conflicts that arose in the first half of the twentieth 
century.3 It was these conflicts that began Europe on a path towards a confederal 
unification that would eventually become the present EU.4 Despite the negative effects 
of the Treaty of Versailles in its heavy reparations that would play a large part in the 
recommencement of hostilities in 1939,5 it also provided for the first international 
efforts toward social policy in the creation of the ILO.6  
                                                          
1 Hereafter referred to as the “EU”. 
2 N Davies, Europe: A History (Pimlico 1997) 881-896. 
3 See Chapter 5 section 2.  
4 Ibid, 2.4.  
5 Ibid, 2.2.  
6 Ibid, 2.3, see chapter 5 n33. 
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1.1.2 The end of the Second World War7 saw the first real impulse to create a European 
community, though this was mainly to ensure that power in Europe could remain 
balanced by not allowing the German industrial machine to regain supremacy.8 The 
ECSC9 created a sectorial market community in the coal and steel industries. Though 
limited in scope, it provided a framework that could be applied to the common 
economic community created by the Treaty of Rome.10 While, initially, Britain was not 
willing to part with its sovereignty in order to join the European Community,11 it was 
eventually prevailed upon to do so, though Britain’s presence has been a frequent 
obstacle to a fuller European integration.12 
1.1.3 European social policy initially had a market-making role to ensure that competition 
would not be distorted within the Common Market.13 However, the current phase of 
European social policy has come to embrace a market-correcting role, as the aims of the 
EU are not only to create and maintain a common economic market, but also to 
encourage social cohesion and fuller employment.14 However, the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 has been the cause of a paradigm shift in European social and economic 
integration, due to Member State introspection precipitated by the economic upheaval.15 
While the current preferred methods of implementing policy is through soft law 
mechanisms,16 the subject of this treatise, the Acquired Rights Directive,17 is a relic of 
an earlier phase of European social policy.18  
1.1.4 The ARD, borne out of the Social Action Programme in the 1970s and amended in 
2001, aims to protect employees affected by business transfers.19 France has had transfer 
provisions in place since 1928, which have only been minimally impacted by the 
                                                          
7 Hereafter referred to as “WWII”.  
8 Ibid, 2.4.2. 
9 Chapter 5, n51.  
10 Ibid, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6.  
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12 Chapter 5, section 2.4.7.  
13 Ibid, 3.2.  
14 Ibid, 3.5. 
15 Ibid, 3.5.2.  
16 Ibid, 3.5.1.  
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safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] 
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18 Chapter 5 section 3.3.  
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implementation of the ARD.20 However, the implementation of the ARD in the UK 
forced a shift in the common law position in which employment contracts followed the 
standard contractual rules. By requiring the transfer of employment contracts, traditional 
rules of contract were subverted.21 Thus, it is no surprise that its implementation in the 
UK was met with considerable resistance that continues to be felt today.  
1.1.5 The operation of the ARD in insolvency has caused significant controversy, both on a 
European level and within the UK.22 While the amended Directive contained an 
exception for those procedures instituted with a view to the liquidation of a company, 
corporate rescue procedures remain outside of this exception.23 France has not opted to 
take on the insolvency exception and its emphasis on social protection is reflected in this 
choice.24 While the exception was implemented in the UK, the wording of most 
corporate rescue procedures leaves them outside its remit. This is because, as a general 
rule, no rescue procedure will be engaged with a view to the liquidation of the company, 
as this is fundamentally contrary to the aims of rescue.25 While there is some alleviation 
for rescue procedures in terms of the ease of changing contractual terms and conditions, 
the possibility of making dismissals by reason of redundancy (i.e. for an economic, 
technical or organisational reason), and the availability of the National Insurance Fund 
to cover certain liabilities that do not transfer with employment contracts,26 the costs of 
employee transfers have continued to cause controversy.27  
1.2 Introduction to Conflict and Resolution 
1.2.1 The following Chapter will examine the path dependent relationships of social policy 
and corporate rescue that this treatise has explored thus far, with a focus on the 
differences between developments in the UK and France over time. This historical 
analysis will reveal the conflict between employment protection and corporate rescue, 
which will be analysed in detail in view of practitioner and academic commentary. 
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Surveys conducted among current practitioners will add an updated and practical 
element to the historic analysis and will also help to identify how this conflict may be 
balanced in the law. Reform of the ARD will be recommended to achieve the balance 
sought in the form of an amendment to the current wording of the insolvency exception. 
Such reform should effectively account for the importance of the rescue culture that has 
become an integral policy position within the EU today, a focus that was not present 
during the last iteration of the ARD. 
1.2.2 The comparison of the UK and France has illuminated a particularly interesting 
characteristic of their individual historical development. The governmental system of 
the UK has generally developed on a steady process of incremental adjustment, while 
France has tended toward sudden and catastrophic change.28 For example, although the 
English Civil War was a time of particular turmoil, it resulted in measured changes that 
were a logical result of the historical paths leading to that point in time. While similar 
could be said of the period leading up to the French Revolution, the results of the 
Revolution were explosive changes that would be followed by additional catastrophic 
changes over the century up to the First World War,29 illustrating a kind of “punctuated 
equilibria” of legal development.30 This form of legal development is reminiscent of 
long periods of the French status quo, punctuated by the many episodes of explosive 
revolution, similar in biology to periods of rapid adaptation in which changes occur only 
in fits and starts.31.  
1.2.3 The path dependency identified in the previous Chapters demonstrates how history 
influences the process of legal change, showing that the events of an earlier point in time 
affect the outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.32 The legal 
possibilities for today and for the future are determined by the evolutionary changes of 
the past, whether slow and steady or explosive and revolutionary. The effects of these 
changes in the UK and France have had a significant impact on how social policies, 
                                                          
28 Chapter 1 section 2.5.4. 
29 Hereafter referred to as “WWI”. 
30 See C Darwin, On the Origin of Species (first published 1859, OUP 2008). 
31 Chapter 1 section 2.5.5. 
32 WH Sewell, “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology” in WH Sewell, Logics of Historicity: Social Theory and Social 
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labour regulation, views of debt, commercial development, and insolvency laws have 
progressed.  
 
2 Parallel Path Dependent Developments: Summary and Analysis 
2.1 Comparative Historical Analysis of Path Dependent Development 
2.1.1 An analysis of how the historical context of the social and commercial developments of 
the UK and France has influenced approaches to corporate rescue and employment 
protection calls for a legal history methodology crossed with comparative law. This 
method reveals not only the systemic differences that have led to different approaches to 
the law, but also the factors that have contributed to those differences. Conversely, by 
using a comparative method in the service of legal history, assumptions depending 
solely upon the history of a single place can be avoided by examining them in the 
context of another jurisdiction during the same historical period. Because legal rules 
acquire their structure over time, comparative law needs a foundation in history in order 
to reveal the true context of legal development, while legal history is clarified by 
comparing laws of a certain time and place to other jurisdictions, thereby making it 
possible to identify which rules of a particular historical era were characteristic of it.33   
2.1.2 The methodological approach of the following analysis is therefore based on the concept 
of path dependence as a sub-category of legal history and comparative law. Path 
dependence suggests that established traditional legal approaches to resolving legal 
problems will determine how new situations are dealt with in the present and in the 
future.34 Decisions made by legislators or judges are shaped in specific and systemic 
ways by the historical paths influencing them.35 Thus, legal developments can be 
explained by reference not only to the specific characteristics of the legal system, but 
also by superimposing the social and economic pressures operating on the law from the 
outside, as well as the established, perhaps culturally motivated, ways of dealing with 
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legal issues within the system. While economic and social conditions may be similar in 
different countries, the differences in the paths on which legal systems have journeyed 
are not. An understanding of extra-legal factors connected to a country’s history assists 
in explaining why they do not approach similar, but new problems in the same way.36 
As such, an examination of the elements of law that have combined to form the current 
regimes of employment protection and corporate rescue in the UK and France are 
fundamentally dependent upon the historical paths of politics, corporate law, social 
protection law, and the influence of the EU.  
2.2 The Evolution of the State and Legal Systems of Governance 
2.2.1 The first major divergence impacting the historical development of the French and 
English states in terms of their approaches to social and commercial matters was the 
feudal system during the Middle Ages. The systems were differently constituted both in 
duration as well as structure. France’s feudalism was constructed as a multi-layered 
hierarchy of duties, resulting in a decentralised power centre. This differed significantly 
from the feudalism in England, wherein every vassal, regardless of his position in the 
power hierarchy, was required not only to swear allegiance to his direct lord, but also to 
the sovereign.37  
2.2.2 The structure of English feudalism led to the most unified institutional system in 
Western Europe. It also faded away with greater ease due to the retention by the English 
people of their culture and customs and the adaptation of the institutions introduced by 
Norman rule to English norms. The strictures of the system were never fully entrenched 
in the English state,38 while in France it remained so. Feudalism inhibited progress as 
there was no motivation for French serfs to innovate due to the inability to advance 
within the strict class structure.39 The persistence of French feudalism can be tied 
directly to the development of ancien régime privilege, the tumult of the French 
Revolution, and the relative lag with which France adopted industrialisation.  
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2.2.3 The reign of Henry VIII had a significant impact on the evolution of the English State. 
Albeit often from a self-interested perspective, he created a precedent for using the law 
to support an argument, due to the influence that concepts of humanism had on his 
thinking and philosophy, an early recognition of the importance of the rule of law. He 
also continued the tradition of his ancestor, Henry II, by pushing back against the 
primacy of Papal authority over state sovereignty. Henry VIII and the Tudor rulers that 
followed him changed the social, political, economic and religious aspects of the 
country, while France retained its Catholic and absolutist orthodoxy, a characteristic that 
would also serve to inhibit the reception of industrialism. 40  
2.2.4 As the English eschewed papal supremacy, France embraced what it viewed as universal 
values and applied state power to enforce them. While England looked forward, though 
often out of a self-interested desire to become a powerhouse of Europe, France looked 
into the past with a desire to recapture the glory of advanced classical societies, which 
was an influence on the Enlightenment ideals, originating in France.41 In addition, the 
Protestant Reformation had an enormous impact on the English legal system as 
regulation replaced ecclesiastical control. 
2.2.5 The late seventeenth century in England was a turning point of the English state 
structure as the English Civil War changed the power balance of English government. 
Constitutional concessions subjected the monarchy to parliamentary sovereignty. An 
early form of the constitutional monarchy and parliamentary sovereignty that is still in 
existence today was created and time has seen a steady reduction of any monarchical 
powers. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were periods of British expansion in 
the world as it embarked on colonial pursuits, industrialised on a massive scale, and 
encapsulated the high point of modernity. 42 
2.2.6 The French state followed over a century later, inspired in part by the revolutionary 
concepts introduced by the Glorious Revolution in Britain, though through a 
fundamentally different process resulting in a different form of constitutional 
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government. The French Revolution set the tone for the nineteenth century throughout 
Europe. The conflict resulted in fundamental change in French politics, economics, 
social policy and culture and would influence the approach to French legal thought. It 
resulted in the separation of government into three distinct institutions, implementing 
the “checks and balances” of power recommended by Montesquieu.43 France recreated 
itself, but it would do this on multiple occasions during the Long Nineteenth Century. 
The belief in popular sovereignty, democracy, and the importance of protecting human 
dignity influences socio-political ideals today. However, changing the French psyche 
took longer than the rhetoric indicates.44 While France struggled to find itself, Britain 
was taking over the world, both physically and economically. 
2.2.7 While the French republican system and British unitary democracy within a 
constitutional monarchy are not so very different functionally, the means it took to 
arrive at these systems varied drastically. The events that led to the modern states in 
both jurisdictions have affected approaches to legal regulation and the aims thereof. The 
socially democratic leanings of France influence the interventionist methods of legal 
regulation while the more liberal democratic style of the United Kingdom tends to avoid 
intervention in the market if possible. 
2.2.8 The legal systems of England and France also differ on a fundamental level. While the 
French legal system was originally based on the droit écrit, influenced by Roman law, 
and later reconstructed in the Napoleonic Code, the English system has been firmly 
entrenched within the developing common law system. This was influenced to some 
extent by the Medieval Germanic legal tradition owing to the numerous invasions and 
migrations, while France benefitted from Roman presence for a much longer period of 
time.45 In addition, predominance of the Catholic Church had a more lasting influence in 
France, attributing to the development of human rights, which became a constitutional 
matter in France,46 something that has yet to occur in the UK.  
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2.2.9 The lack of a written constitution and incorporated human rights have resulted in a 
flexible legal system that is capable of adapting with relative ease to changes in the 
needs of society. The codification of law, constitutionality of human dignity, and 
fundamental rights in the French system have led to a more rigid system of regulation 
with a fundamental guiding principle of protecting the individual from injustice. 
Codified law tends to be more difficult to amend as it is precise and rigid, while the 
common law system is generally more flexible, relying on less precise legislation. 
Further, the judicial interpretation available under common law tends to create a more 
malleable legal system 
2.3 Social Policy and Labour Regulation 
2.3.1 The roots of modern social policy and labour regulation lie in the process of 
industrialisation.47 Both jurisdictions underwent industrialisation within different 
frameworks due to their historical process of development. In England, hourly-paid 
wage workers derived from the day-labouring classes that were forced off their common 
lands following the dissolution of the monasteries and Acts of Enclosure formed the 
basis of the British proletariat.48 The UK benefitted from a more mobile labouring class, 
while French serfdom continued beyond the time when the UK was industrialised and 
did not stabilise in any significant way until the century of revolution during the Long 
Nineteenth Century finally settled.  
2.3.2 While enclosure in England created a disenfranchised proletariat that became the 
working classes, the peasantry in France enjoyed a reversal of fortune as wealthy 
landholders were deprived of their landholdings, which were distributed among the 
liberated serfs during the French Revolution. While this allowed more for movement 
between classes, and motivation to improve production methods, the goal of profit was 
rarely a driving factor by itself. Rather, the aims of profit were often to attain enough to 
engage in a life of leisure and security for family and future generations, rather than 
becoming part of a commercial class. As such, even though the French Revolution 
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provided an opportunity to completely break the class system, the French generally 
retained the ambition for achieving an aristocratic-like status.49  
2.3.3 Thus industrialisation occurred within different contexts due to the differently composed 
proletariat, the different aims of production, whether agricultural or industrial, and 
essentially conservative French ideals as opposed to generally progressive English, at 
least in terms of risk-taking and innovation. The UK developed industry quickly and 
with little resistance, while France took a more measured approach, protecting its 
traditional industries and modes of production.50 The UK essentially swept away the old 
and replaced it with mechanisation and mass production.51 The French government 
continuously intervened in the economy to protect its interests,52 while the UK 
embraced the free market. The free hand that the UK gave to economic growth, 
commercialism, and industry allowed the UK to become the economic superpower of 
the eighteenth century.53 Though France also grew and developed its industry, its risk-
averse nature, backward looking ambition, and protectionist stance made it difficult to 
compete with the British commercial machine.54 
2.3.4 While social policy legislation began upon a similar premise in both the UK and France 
with the protection of children and women,55 it soon diverged, due to different economic 
and social perspectives. Because the UK system was based on the freedom of contract, 
employers and employees were left to bargain freely, despite the inherent imbalance in 
that relationship.56 France recognised that the natural subordination of the worker 
needed to be mitigated by state intervention to preserve worker dignity and rights. As 
such, limits were imposed on employers in order to protect employees, lifting them from 
commodity to human being. Labour regulation in France has a market-correcting role as 
it introduces balance into the employment relationship.57 While the UK now also has 
legislation that protects workers in a similar fashion, its natural impulse was not to 
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intervene in the labour market, rather allowing individuals to create their own rights and 
benefits through collective bargaining.58 
2.3.5 The UK embraced a laissez-faire attitude toward workers’ rights, relying on 
collectivism, once legalised, to achieve rights and benefits from their employers.59 
During the nineteenth century, France recognised that collective bargaining would not 
be enough to achieve what it viewed was owed to French workers. Concepts of equality, 
fraternity and human dignity came to characterise the provisions of the French Code du 
Travail.60 These concepts were borne directly out of the French Revolution and have no 
parallel development in UK history. As such, the UK would lag behind France and the 
rest of Continental Europe in developing a cohesive social policy aimed at protecting 
workers until it joined the EC.  
2.3.6 Broadly speaking, the French legal system embraces an individualistic ideology, placing 
importance on individual freedom, liberty, and dignity over the collective. Thus labour 
regulation is present to ensure that these rights are protected.61 While such protections 
exist in the UK as well, frequently due to the implementation of EU directives, it is still 
more corporatist than individual in its nature. France had summarily rejected corporatist 
ideals, beginning with the Revolution of 1789 and continuing until WWI. The UK, 
however, while never engaging in corporatism to the extent that the fascist states did 
during WWII, retained a corporatist element that influenced how its labour market was 
regulated, with negative rights, such as the right not to be prosecuted for conspiracy in 
instances of strike action,62 while France favours positive rights.63 It is in the 
individualism of France versus the liberal yet corporatist characteristics of UK society 
where the aims of labour regulation are fundamentally different.  
2.3.7 France also has developed a structure of works councils that must be consulted on 
matters of import to employees.64 The UK has never evolved an obligatory system of 
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consultation. Rather, such obligations have arisen only due to the UK implementation of 
EU law such as the Collective Redundancies Directive and the Acquired Rights 
Directive.65 Such directives were often influenced by French social policy, as, generally, 
such provisions had already existed in France prior to their introduction into EU law.66 
As such, France has had a significant influence on the evolution of EU social policy and 
thus its impact on the UK. Implementation in the UK is challenging due to its 
fundamental differences from the rest of Continental Europe, as well as its common law 
system, which does not always transpose EU law in a way that is easily interpreted.67 
2.4 Views of Debt, Commercialism, and Insolvency 
2.4.1 English and French views on debt have helped to form their individual approaches to the 
corporate form and, subsequent to that, the aims of insolvency law. Prohibitions on 
usury in both jurisdictions initially slowed the progress of investment in business 
enterprises, which required funding, and therefore borrowing. Because interest was 
prohibited, there was little incentive to lend, making large scale business enterprises 
difficult to establish.68 The Protestant Reformation helped to break down the barriers to 
loaning with interest, but, because France retained its Catholic conservative character, 
debt retained the sinful aspect that had faded from the English system at a much earlier 
stage. While the French financial system eventually grew to accept the need for loans 
and interest in order to promote commerce, it continues to limit interest rates on 
individual and commercial loans, though the latter does benefit from some flexibility.69  
It could be argued that the limitation of avarice is not a bad thing, however the greater 
flexibility in the British financial system today continues to allow it to outpace the 
French. 
2.4.2 The English financial system was revolutionised well in advance of the French due to 
the political changes away from absolutism, as well as a less restrictive view of debt and 
a nature that was not so averse to taking business risks. In addition, the first investment 
bubbles had varying impacts on the UK and France, with the French economy being 
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destroyed by the monopolistic nature of the business structure of the Mississippi 
Company.70 As the French floundered in debt and unrest, the institutional changes in 
England toward a constitutional monarchy with the highest respect for parliamentary 
sovereignty permitted the drive toward British dominance in the world. The fact that the 
English could raise funds through debt also gave them the funds needed to succeed 
against France in war, further contributing to French sovereign debt and the concomitant 
increased taxation against the already bereft populace, a contributing factor of the 
French Revolution.71 France’s financial mishaps contributed to their suspicion of 
investment risk, debt, paper money and other attributes of a modern economy. French 
culture was also not favourable of business as an occupation, preferring to make money 
only in order to gain security and legacy such that future generations could enjoy the 
spoils of the upper classes.72 Thus France continued to lag behind England in financial 
and commercial progress as it refused to use the tools necessary to compete. 
2.4.3 The aims of corporate rescue and insolvency are heavily influenced by the views on the 
role of government and the position that social protection should occupy. Since the 
1980s, France has specified that one of the primary aims of corporate rescue procedures 
is the protection of employment.73 This emphasis can be traced back to ideals of human 
dignity and fundamental human rights derived from the French Revolution.74 Personal 
dignity and freedom are fundamental concepts of which all French law must account. It 
is not uncommon for social objectives to take precedence over financial objectives in the 
cases of business sales as well, at times to the detriment of an overall corporate rescue 
procedure.75 The UK has never placed employees at the centre of their corporate rescue 
regime, although the protection of employment is often a result of a rescue procedure. 
The rescue culture evolved in both jurisdictions contemporaneously, though the UK has 
continued to take a far more economically liberal view of the process, in line with the 
way in which it has evolved over the centuries as a liberal economy. The influence of 
Europe added another layer of regulation that has both complicated the analysis and 
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brought into sharp relief how the differences in historical paths have influenced that 
relationship.  
2.5 The European Relation 
2.5.1 France has been involved in the creation of a European community since the first days 
of the ECSC, at which time the UK typically chose to stand on the fringes, offering 
advice and encouragement while holding onto its Commonwealth Empire to secure its 
trade supremacy.76 However, as Commonwealth countries gained independence, the 
benefit of a European Common Market became more attractive. As the EU grew into an 
ever closer economic and social union in the 1970s, the UK joined with a fundamentally 
economic reason.77 This resulted in conflict due to the UK’s economically liberal stance, 
in opposition to the growing social policy of the EC.78  
2.5.2 France often tried to influence EU social policy with a view to raising standards of other 
Member States to meet its own, thereby levelling competitiveness that would otherwise 
be lessened by France’s higher social costs.79 One example of this influence is the 
introduction of the ARD, a legal regime that France adopted in 1928.80 The UK 
implementation was apathetic and led to problems in application and interpretation. 
While reforms in the EU and in the UK TUPE Regulations have cleared up some of the 
murkiness of the legislation, its drafting continues to cause problems. This is partly 
attributable to the fact that the UK labour system is structured differently to every other 
labour system in Continental Europe: there are no statutory collective groups. In 
addition, most EU law is based on a foundation of civil law, thus it is often drafted in a 
way that is unfamiliar to the UK’s common law system.81  
2.5.3 The fact that the UK is a common law system in the civil law orientated EU, has a 
differently composed labour system, and has the most liberal economy are some of the 
fundamental differences that have caused difficulties for UK implementation of EU 
social policy legislation. The UK has struggled continuously with the implementation of 
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social policy directives, resulting in many tribunal cases, references to the CJEU, 
practitioner and academic commentary, not to mention complaints by entrepreneurs and 
business owners. France has generally benefitted from such legislation as it has often 
been an innovator in the area of social policy. The creation of employment rights and 
benefits at EU level has helped to elevate the social policy of many other EU 
jurisdictions to what was often already present in France. The introduction of the EU 
into the equation has brought the UK and France closer together in what their legal 
systems offer, but fundamental differences attributable to their variable evolution can 
explain the different ways in which the conflict between employment protection and 
corporate rescue have been perceived and handled. 
3 The Conflict between Corporate Rescue and Employment Protection 
3.1 An Inherent Struggle 
3.1.1 There is an inherent struggle between the aims of employment protection and the rescue 
culture. Jurisprudence to date has weakened the ability of insolvency practitioners to 
negotiate freely with purchasers of going concerns.82 Collins posited in the early days of 
acquired rights jurisprudence that, although in Litster83 the House of Lords was anxious 
to ensure that employees were protected even in insolvency, such a policy was bound to 
subvert the rescue culture. Potential purchasers might be deterred from buying going 
concerns out of insolvency where acquired rights restrictions applied, due to the 
potential cost of compensation for infringing them. Fewer businesses were likely to be 
saved, resulting in an adverse impact on job security and on the economy. Prices paid 
for businesses would be lower to the detriment of all creditors, while employees would 
transfer with all of their contractual rights, giving them a super priority over all other 
creditors. Collins viewed this as tipping the balance toward employee protection and 
away from rescue, usurping the interests of normal creditors, and placing the welfare of 
the economy as a whole at risk.84 The suggestion that the rescue culture is hindered by 
the operation of TUPE 2006 has continued to resonate with both practitioners and 
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academics, particularly in view of the most recent case law making it impossible for 
administrators to escape its operation.85  
3.2 The Acquired Rights Conflict 
3.2.1 Shortly after the ARD was introduced, it was met with arguments that it distorted 
competitive forces in the Common Market. Successive British Conservative 
governments argued that the ARD would serve to restrict entrepreneurial freedom by 
championing employee rights, restricting the potential benefits from increased 
competition in the Common Market due to the progress of integration. The UK felt that 
this approach to the problem of employee rights in business transfers would result in the 
preservation of pockets of inefficiency, while inducing creative compliance behaviour 
that would produce further distortions elsewhere in the economy. This argument is not 
surprising, considering the position of the UK as a largely liberal economic state. 
However, the rest of the EU had effectively rejected the UK’s laissez-faire attitude for 
the conservative-corporatist model prior even to the creation of the EU, though this 
direction was based on political and social grounds, rather than the economic ones upon 
which the UK based most of their arguments.86 Thus, from the very beginning, the UK 
and the Continent were arguing on completely different premises, making any true 
compromise unlikely, if not impossible.  
3.2.2 The European social model has since been justified on an economic basis, though this 
argument is not without its critics. Employee rights are said to assist in creating high 
average tenure in the labour market, which encourages socially beneficial investment in 
human capital.87 This social model now provides regulations and institutions 
encouraging lasting relationships of trust. In order to develop these perceived 
economically efficient social relationships, employees had to be encouraged by the 
provision of some kind of security, such as the continuity of employment guaranteed by 
the transfer of employment contracts pursuant to the provisions of the ARD.88 It was this 
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cooperative aspect of the EU social policy model, and the hope of a more collectively 
collaborative future of labour relations, that led it to provide the protections that are now 
under analysis. However, given the foregoing Chapters and the extremely different 
contexts from which the aims of regulation derive in the UK and France, and indeed 
perhaps the rest of the EU, the same arguments for the social policy model in the EU do 
not necessarily translate.  
3.3 Criticisms of the Implementation of the ARD 
3.3.1 The Association of Business Recovery Professionals89 was quite vocal about the 
implementation of the ARD in the TUPE Regulations. While the government asserted 
that the adoption of the generic wording of the ARD was necessary to avoid legal 
challenges to the implementation of the ARD, R3 disagreed, arguing that the wording of 
the ARD was implemented inaccurately and that rote adoption of the wording was 
unnecessary and misconceived. Further, the ARD gave Member States discretion to 
adapt the spirit of the Directive90 to their particular insolvency procedures. The UK 
failed to make this determination by replicating the phraseology of the insolvency 
exception exactly, leaving it open to extensive and costly litigation. This has been 
particularly problematic for corporate rescue procedures,91 in particular administration 
as this procedure could often benefit from the insolvency exception. However, 
Parliament chose to distinguish administration from liquidation proceedings, the latter 
being termed specifically as a collective procedure undertaken for the benefit of all 
creditors, implying that the purpose of administration is not to achieve the same thing.92  
3.3.2 The judiciary has now determined that the main purpose of administration is not with a 
view to the liquidation of the assets, as the hierarchy of objectives places rescuing the 
company as a going concern as a priority. This is despite the fact that rescue would often 
not be a practical result. R3 argued that, while rescue is the first objective of 
administration, it is not necessarily the sole purpose, as rescue is not always feasible. 
The purpose of administration is frequently achieved through the second objective: to 
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achieve a better result for the creditors than if the company were wound up.93 The 
second objective is often achieved by the exercise of the third objective: the realisation 
of property. The property realised could be a particular business entity of the insolvent 
company.94  
3.3.3 R3 argued that it was difficult to see how the realisation of assets, in this case a specific 
identified business of the company, can be viewed as anything but a liquidation of 
assets, as a separate business can also be an asset of a company. Thus, according to R3’s 
explanation, the government incorrectly interpreted the insolvency processes in 
question, the result being a situation that makes the achievement of business rescue 
more difficult.95  While these arguments are meritorious, the jurisprudence is now 
certain: the insolvency exception cannot apply in corporate rescue situations where the 
business continues to trade at all.96  
3.4 Rover: A Concrete Example 
3.4.1 The sale of the Rover Group by BMW in May 2000 is an example of the potential effect 
of acquired rights on corporate rescue. Rover was set to be liquidated in the event that a 
buyer of the unsustainable business could not be found which would result in full 
payment to the creditors, but with thousands of job losses. Alchemy, a venture capital 
fund with a reputation of saving companies in financial distress, 97 began to negotiate for 
the sale of Rover in secret in 1999.98 Alchemy planned to rebrand the company, which 
would involve significant job losses.99 As such, its bid was opposed by the trade unions 
as well as by the local authorities who, in addition to opposing the job losses, did not 
approve of the rebranding exercise that would result in losing the affiliation of the Rover 
name with West Midlands industry.100  
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3.4.2 Despite a complex, multi-layered sale process involving a number of subsidiaries, share 
sales, and clever contractual ploys to ensure that the employees would not transfer with 
the subsidiaries to which they were actually associated,101 it was determined that it 
would count as a single transaction for the purpose of TUPE.102 Ownership of Rover and 
the associated employment contracts were imputed to the UK holding company. Upon 
the transfer of Rover to Alchemy, though on the face of it a share transfer, only part of 
the business would be sold and would take effect as an asset sale and include all 
associated employment contracts.103 
3.4.3 Due to the company’s plan to avoid the application of TUPE, no information or 
consultation was undertaken with the employees of Rover either in respect of the 
transfer or for the post transfer redundancies threatened by Alchemy. Failure to inform 
and consult could have amounted to substantial protective awards that would also be 
transmitted to the buyer of the business.104 Unions lodged applications for protective 
awards covering thousands of employees. Numerous applications for unfair dismissal 
were also made. The potential value of the claims exceeded £300 million.105 
3.4.4 It was against the background of the considerable potential liability that Alchemy 
withdrew from the negotiations a day before the deadline for finalising the deal. BMW 
was insisting on an indemnity from Alchemy requiring that it assumed liability for any 
compensation claims arising as a result of the Rover purchase, for which both parties 
would otherwise remain jointly and severally liable following the transfer.106 Alchemy 
was only going to pay £50 million for the company, making the acceptance of such huge 
liability commercially ridiculous.107 As a result of the operation of TUPE in this case, 
the sale of the business to Alchemy failed.108  
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3.4.5 Rover was eventually sold to the Phoenix Consortium for a nominal £10.109 
Unfortunately, the losses incurred during the four years following the sale resulted in 
Rover being placed in administration with a loss of 6,000 jobs.110 Thus, due to the 
operation of TUPE, in addition to rather unscrupulous actions by the company directors 
in relation to the structure of the sale attempting to avoid TUPE entirely, neither the 
rescue culture nor the preservation of employment were triumphant. The failure to 
complete the deal with Alchemy shows how significant the operation of TUPE liabilities 
could be on the sale of a business. This can only be compounded in the situation of 
insolvency as the failure to sell a business could result in the ultimate liquidation of the 
entire entity with considerable associated job losses.111 
3.5 Crystal Palace FC Limited and Another v Kavanaugh and Others112 
3.5.1 UK case law has determined that TUPE will apply in circumstances of corporate rescue, 
regardless of its final result.113 However, there is also now some judicial 
acknowledgment for the onerous burden this can place on businesses in financial 
difficulties going through the process of rehabilitation. In Crystal Palace, a question 
arose in relation to the dismissal of staff prior to a transfer of the undertaking and 
whether those dismissals were automatically unfair due to being related to the transfer 
itself, or if they could be described as being dismissals made for an economic, technical 
or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce.114 If the former, the 
transferee would inherit liabilities for any resulting claims. If the latter, any liabilities 
would be retained by the transferor.115 In the case of a purchase out of administration, 
the acquirer would need to be able to assess the extent to which it would inherit any 
liabilities as a result of dismissals made for a reason related to the transfer. Such 
liabilities could materially affect the price it then offers for the purchase of the business, 
which would then reduce the distributions that could be made to creditors on its sale. 
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Such liabilities could also affect a purchaser’s willingness to enter into a sale at all,116 so 
this element of TUPE obligations can be quite significant. 
3.5.2 In the circumstances of Crystal Palace, the reason for dismissal was not straightforward. 
The claimant employees were dismissed by the administrator at a time when the 
possibility of a successful sale seemed remote and complicated, thus it seemed that 
liquidation was a distinct possibility. The employees argued that their dismissals were 
made in order to make the club more attractive to a prospective purchaser, a classic 
example of a reason related to the transfer. The administrator argued that the dismissals 
were made because the club could no longer afford to pay all the employees, thus a 
reduction in the workforce was necessary in order to “mothball” the club until such time 
that a purchaser might be found.117 While the administrator’s reason has the hallmarks 
of an economic, technical or organisational reason, the intention still appears to be to 
sell the undertaking, even if at a later date. 
3.5.3 Despite the prima facie reason for the dismissals, the ET determined that, while the 
dismissals were connected with a subsequent future transfer, there was also an 
economic, technical or organisational reason for those dismissals. A distinction was 
made between the administrator’s reason for dismissing the employees as a need to 
reduce the wage bill in order to continue the business, and his ultimate procedural 
objective, to be able to sell the business in the future. Further, the employment tribunal 
found that the administrator’s reasoning for dismissing the employees was not 
specifically in contemplation of the fact that it would facilitate the sale of the business, 
as, at the time of the dismissals, the Club was facing considerable obstacles to this 
goal.118 
3.5.4 The EAT found the first instance decision to be untenable by reference to its own factual 
findings, following previous case law, given that on the facts the dismissals were for the 
purpose of selling the business, albeit in the contemplation of a future sale to an 
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unknown purchaser.119 The Court of Appeal,120 however, took issue with the blanket 
interpretation and application of the findings in Spaceright,121 upon which the EAT 
relied, which found that in order for an ETO reason for a dismissal to be available, 
there:-  
“...must be an intention to change the work force and continue to conduct 
the business as distinct from the purpose of selling it. It is not available in 
the case of dismissing an employee to enable the administrators to make 
the business of the company a more attractive proposition to the 
prospective transferees of a going concern”122 
 
The CA determined that this was fact specific, and did not apply to the facts of Crystal 
Palace. The dismissals were found to be due solely to cash-constraints in an effort to 
avoid liquidation. The EAT had relied too heavily on the “mothballing” concept of the 
administrator, which it viewed as indicating that the dismissals were in any event made 
with a view to a sale.123  
3.5.5 The determination of the CA essentially permitted a fact-sensitive, interpretative 
approach to cases involving pre-transfer dismissals. This decision was particularly 
valuable as it presents a legitimate, nuanced distinction, acknowledging that, while the 
ultimate objective of an administrator may be the sale of a going concern, the reasoning 
behind dismissals may at the same time be merely a reduction in the workforce in order 
to enable a company to continue.124 This decision had the capacity to give administrators 
the greater security that they could make dismissals for ETO reasons, despite their 
intention to sell the business, reducing the employee liability burden that would 
potentially affect the purchase price and concomitant distributions to creditors.  
3.5.6 The approach of the CA also revealed an acknowledgement of the balance that must be 
struck between the employment protection policy of TUPE and the policy of 
administration to achieve better results for creditors than would have been achieved in 
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liquidation.125 Further, the viability of transferee liability for pre-transfer dismissals was 
questioned in relation to its impact on distributions in insolvency. The court expressed 
concern that the propensity for TUPE to result in recovery against transferees by those 
dismissed pre-transfer by administrators called for “an anxious consideration of the 
relationship between the two regimes of TUPE and insolvency.”126 The position of the 
court in Crystal Palace is not surprising considering the reforms to TUPE that came 
later that year. 
3.6 Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Amendment) Regulations 
2014127 
3.6.1 While the findings of the CA in Crystal Palace appear to coincide with the recognition 
that TUPE can cause problems for the success of corporate rescue, it is constrained by 
the provisions of the ARD and its failure to take account of specific rescue procedures. 
Thus domestic reforms and judicial interpretation cannot dilute the safeguards provided 
for employees by the ARD.128 National law must be applied and interpreted, as far as 
possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve 
the intended result of the Directive.129 As such, the only circumstances under which the 
provision of TUPE can be disapplied are set out pursuant to Article 5 of the ARD, which 
unequivocally states that proceedings benefitting from the exemption must have been 
instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor. As such, no 
revision made to the TUPE regulations while the current ARD is still in force will be 
able to truly alleviate the weight of TUPE on corporate rescue provisions, as the 
preceding discussion of case law in this area has illustrated. 
3.6.2 The 2014 reforms have, however, instituted some relaxation in the TUPE regime in the 
area of corporate rescue. In particular, the 2014 TUPE Regulations have instituted a 
revision to Regulations 4 and 7 accounting for the concerns discussed by the Court of 
Appeal in Crystal Palace. These regulations have now been brought into line with the 
                                                          
125 Crystal Palace, per Maurice Kay LJ para 11. 
126 Crystal Palace, per Briggs LJ para 23. 
127 SI2014 No 16. 
128 Wynne-Evans, n116, 191. 
129 As initially determined in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 para 26.  
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wording of the ARD and with ECJ case law,130 providing that variations of contract and 
dismissals are only prohibited if the sole or principal reason for them is the transfer, as 
opposed to being a reason connected with the transfer.131 While this does not resolve the 
underlying issue of the impact of TUPE transfers of the success of corporate rescue, it 
does introduce legally certain security for insolvency practitioners to exercise more 
flexibility in relation to their treatment of employee contracts in the context of corporate 
rescue. 
3.6.3 The court’s approach and the recent reforms do, however, reflect a continuing concern 
as to whether the levels of employment protection contained in the ARD are still 
appropriate. Given the current focus of EU labour law on “flexicurity”132 following the 
financial crisis, and the fact that the ARD was borne out of the 1970s focus on the social 
face of the EU, it is questionable as to whether the strict approach to the transfer of 
acquired rights, particularly in insolvency situations, is still valid.133 In order to 
introduce a more modern approach to the social protections provided by the ARD while 
safeguarding the purposes of the rescue culture itself, reforms to the ARD itself will be 
necessary, proposals for which will be discussed in detail below. 
4 French Criticism - Chapitre IV: Transfert du Contrat de Travail 
4.1 The French Approach 
4.1.1 The French approach to social protection is unique in the EU. While it is true that 
France is a liberal and democratic country, developing its labour regime with a 
significant role to freedom of association and encouraging social dialogue, it also 
manifests a widely held reserve against capitalism. French tradition favours intervention 
of the state in social issues, explaining the peculiar development and the importance of 
French labour law codification as well as the importance of maintaining the rights and 
benefits granted to individuals throughout the history of the labour law regime.134 Thus, 
                                                          
130 See Case 32/86 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] ECR 739, para 31.5. 
131 J McMullen, “TUPE: Ringing the (Wrong) Changes. The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014” (2014) 43(2) ILJ 149, 155-156. 
132 Refers to a policy combining labour market flexibility in a dynamic economy and security for employees.  
133 Wynne-Evans, n116, 193. 
134 M Despax, J Rojot and J-P Laborde, Labour Law in France (Kluwer 2011) 33-34. 
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while the conflict between the social and the commercial exists in principle, it does not 
cause the controversy that it has in the UK.  
4.1.2 The foundation of the French labour code is based on the idea that the provision of 
social protection provides a balance to the natural subordinated position that employees 
must take in relation to their employer. One justification for a protective labour code is 
that it civilises social relations, replacing force and subjugation with rights, liberty, and 
equality. The natural position of subordination endured by an employee deprives him of 
liberty, placing him in an unequal position in relation to his employer who retains most 
of the power in the relationship.135 The descriptors used are emotive, illustrating a moral 
view of the obligation for a civil society to provide an embankment for the loss of 
liberty and equality that would otherwise occur in a purely contractual employment 
relationship.  
4.1.3 In the 1980s, France had similar discussions as the rest of the EC about the need to add 
flexibility to the labour market by deregulating it to some extent. Economically, 
diffusion of the sources of law from the state to enterprise level through collective 
bargaining would help enterprises to adapt more quickly to changes in technology and 
the modernisation of the institutions of business. Flexibility would also allow 
individuals to more easily diversify their ambitions, which corresponds with the 
disaffection with traditional institutional frameworks. Politically, flexibilisation of the 
labour market through deregulation correlated with a commonly held ideological 
preference for limited government, rather than remaining highly interventionist.136  
4.1.4 Despite these philosophical discussions, its system has retained an overall socially 
protective character relative to EU Member States.137 This separation of ideology from 
reality seems to be characteristic of the French culture. The greatest philosophers of the 
Enlightenment were French, but were forced into exile due to state opposition to their 
ideas. In similar fashion, the philosophies of French bourgeois revolutionaries were 
diametrically opposed to what occurred during the Terreur, using territorial expansion to 
                                                          
135 A Supiot, Critique du Droit du Travail (PUF 1994) 151-152.  
136 Ibid, 170-172. 
137 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n134, 51. 
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spread liberté, égalité et fraternité. There appears to be a frequent disconnect between 
ideas and actions in French culture and politics, which may in part explain why change 
is often so difficult to effect.  
4.2 French Employment Protection - Criticisms  
4.2.1 Despite the comfort that the French socially protective system provides, it is not without 
its critics. Enterprises complain that the costs of dismissals and the complexity and 
uncertainty of the current system make it difficult for them to adjust to technological 
changes and the rapid changes in demand that characterise the modern economy. While 
making enterprises responsible for their decisions to dismiss employees seems logical, it 
may also reduce the amount of positions that can be created due to social costs 
associated with those already in existence. Further, this responsibility may also lead to 
enterprises making risk-averse decisions when employing people, resulting in 
discrimination against those candidates who may present a greater risk, such as older 
and younger candidates and those with less experience. In addition, requiring that 
enterprises pay the costs of dismissal during times of financial stress can render their 
situation even more precarious. Such costs may inhibit their ability to finance such 
investments that are necessary in order for them to survive, or even cause the insolvency 
of that enterprise.138  
4.2.2 While most employees will argue for keeping their protections in place, maintaining the 
same level of employment protection, this has an adverse effect on the reduction of 
unemployment. This position is supported by the opinions of economists and 
multilateral organisations, such as the OECD139 and IMF140, who believe that overly 
high levels of employment protection produces inefficient results and adversely impact 
the reduction of the level of unemployment. It is, however, difficult to change the 
position in France, due to the political power of unions and employees who wish to 
maintain the status quo. The governmental reaction has been to compromise on reform 
                                                          
138 O Blanchard and J Tirole, « Protection d l’Emploi et Procédures de Licenciement » (2003) La Documentation Française, Report 
produced for the Conseil d’Analyse Economique 7-9. 
139 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
140 The International Monetary Fund.  
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in order to avoid the high political costs associated with anything more drastic. Any 
reforms in this area tend to be limited and poorly defined in their objectives.141 
4.2.3 Empirical evidence142 confirms that employment protection can have negative 
macroeconomic effects. A strong negative correlation is present between the level of 
employment protection and the flow between jobs and into and out of unemployment. 
The level of protection and the duration of unemployment also correlate; the duration of 
unemployment often being elevated in those jurisdictions that provide heightened 
employment protection. Essentially, high levels of employment protection reduce 
flexibility and the ability to reallocate employees in order to gain efficiency. In addition, 
it increases the duration of unemployment, is ineffective at reducing it, and renders it 
particularly difficult for those who are exposed to it.143 Thus, the evidence suggests that 
France is in need of reform in the general area of employment protection. However, 
little has been done to achieve this end due to the political risks associated with such 
changes, though the recent Loi Macron144 may see reforms occurring in this area in the 
near future.  
4.3 French Acquired Rights – A Conflict (?) 
4.3.1 Despite the manifestly more socially protective character of the French system, the 
transfer provisions in L. 1224-1 of the Code du Travail have not been without 
controversy, even prior to the introduction of the ARD in EU jurisprudence. The scope 
of the transfer provisions has been widened and narrowed a number of times. In the 
1980s, it was narrowed, recognising that the economic consequences that could ensue 
with too broad an interpretation might be too heavy a burden on businesses, resulting 
potentially in failure and job losses. Despite the sound economic logic, the narrowing of 
employment protection in these circumstances caused consternation among trade unions 
and workers, as it was perceived as introducing instability into employment security 
during a period of restructuring.145 However, subsequent EU jurisprudence allowed 
                                                          
141 O Blanchard and J Tirole, n138, 7-9. 
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France to widen its application yet again.146 In all cases, the French transfer provisions 
will apply in insolvency, though the administrator is permitted to modify terms and 
conditions in order to safeguard employment and to ensure the survival of the 
enterprise.147  
4.3.2 Some employers in France have found it difficult to harmonise benefits when 
transferring employees, though it is very difficult for purchasers to amend the conditions 
of the transferring employment contracts. While this limitation is alleviated in certain 
corporate rescue procedures,148 it does not completely solve the difficulties for 
employers. In addition, because French social policy mandates that all employment 
contracts must transfer, valid dismissals connected with the transfer are severely limited 
and must be for a:  
“non-personal reason stemming from the suppression or transformation 
of the employee’s position or from the substantial modification of the 
employee’s employment contract that are themselves induced by 
economic difficulties or technological mutations.” 
This reason is fairly close in definition to the “economic, technical or organisational” 
reason provided for by UK law. Dismissals connected with the transfers are liable to a 
claim for reinstatement with the transferee or may obtain damages from the 
transferor.149 
4.3.3 The focus of corporate rescue and insolvency in France is also centred on employment 
protection. Research has revealed that French administrators actively work to facilitate 
the continuation of a business and to preserve employment rather than opting for 
liquidation. Continuing the business remains the easiest and most direct means to 
preserve employment in insolvency situations. While there have been arguments that 
this focus on rescue does not always lead to efficient results, it has also been determined 
that on average, reorganisation plans and sales do not generate a lower global recovery 
rate for creditors than do liquidations. However, the French judiciary also has the ability 
                                                          
146 See Case 324/86, Tellerup v Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] ECR 739. 
147 P Rodiere, Traité de Droit Social de L’Union Européenne (Librairie Générale de Droit 2008) 390-391.  
148 See Code du Travail art L1224-2, noting the “Procédure de sauvegarde, de redressement ou de liquidation judiciaire”. 
149 CA Scott, “Money Talks: The Influence of Economic Power on the Employment Laws and Policies in the United States and 
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to choose between rival purchasers, a choice that is often made on the basis of which 
social plan is most beneficial to the employees, although the courts do still consider the 
financial aspects. Higher bids will often be selected as they will lead to a better outcome 
for all stakeholders.150 
4.3.4 A recent decree of 28 October 2014 on the application of the Loi sur l’Economie Sociale 
et Solidaire151 requires additional consultation obligations. In the event that a sale is 
affected through the transfer of a business or through the transfer of shares or other 
securities granting access to the purchaser of the majority of the shareholding, such 
actions must be disclosed to employees. They must be given an opportunity, whether 
individually or collectively, to make an offer to purchase the business or the shares. 
These new rules may impact future transfers as, in the event that such information is not 
disclosed, an employee can apply to the court for an annulment of the transfer within 
two months of the publication of the notice or the date on which the employees have 
been informed. This obligation may cause delay in any transfer process due to the two-
month grace period within which employees may apply for an annulment.152 Thus, the 
position of corporate rescue in France has been further complicated by adding another 
layer of consultation obligations due to employees in the event that an entrepreneur 
wishes to dispose of his business in some way.  
5 Practical Approaches to the ARD 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 A short online survey was undertaken to assess professional opinion with regard to the 
effects of the ARD in corporate rescue situations and query whether there are any 
practical methods of circumventing adverse effects. While the response was not 
statistically significant, the written responses offer interesting examples of real 
circumstances in which the application of acquired rights provisions have impacted the 
effectiveness of a corporate rescue procedure. In addition, the responses have offered 
                                                          
150 R Blazy and others, “Employment Preservation vs Creditors’ Repayment under Bankruptcy Law: The French Dilemma?” (2011) 
31 Int'l Rev L&Econ 126, 128.  
151 Loi n° 2014-856 du 31 juillet 2014 parue au JO n 176 du 1er août 2014. 
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interesting perspectives that might otherwise not have been available through a purely 
academic analysis.  
5.1.2 Out of 86 survey requests sent to individual French insolvency practitioners among 
personal contacts and from the INSOL International practitioner directory, 6 responses 
were received from France. Out of the entire R3 constituency in the UK, 17 responses 
were received. The survey questions referred to the specific implementation of the ARD 
in each jurisdiction (TUPE and Article L.1224). The table below generalises the 
questions by referring only to [the ARD]. 
5.2 Table of Survey Responses 
Questions 
English 
Responses 
17 
French 
Responses 
6  
1. Have you or your firm been involved in any business 
rescue procedures in which business transfer 
negotiations have been put at risk of failure due to the 
transfer of employment contracts occurring under [the 
ARD]? 
YES 
82% 
NO 
18% 
YES 
100%  
2. Have you or your firm been involved in any business 
rescue procedures in which business transfer 
negotiations have failed owing to the application of 
[the ARD]? 
YES 
59% 
NO 
41% 
YES  
100% 
3. In your experience generally, have TUPE transfers 
had an adverse impact on the rescue of businesses? 
 
YES 
53% 
NO 
47% 
YES 
50% 
NO 
50% 
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5.3 Examples of the Effects of TUPE on Rescue Outcomes 
5.3.1 The English survey revealed a number of examples in which the application of TUPE 
had adverse effects on the outcome of corporate rescue procedures. A common theme 
running through these responses was the fact that TUPE liabilities will generally affect 
transfer negotiations by lowering the purchase price, with the associated effect of 
reducing the distributions available to creditors following the sale. This situation can 
lead to liquidation being preferred by creditors over administration due to the greater 
recoveries that creditors can make by making the workforce redundant. This preference 
can influence the decisions taken by practitioners in their approaches to solutions for 
insolvent companies.  
5.3.2 There are also a number of examples showing that TUPE has been the central cause of 
the failure of transfer negotiations taking place in both administration and pre-pack 
procedures, leading to large scale redundancies. It has also had a negative impact on the 
interest of foreign investors in acquiring businesses out of insolvency. Retail businesses 
are a particularly vivid example as purchasers will not generally wish to inherit the 
entirety of a business operating from a number of retail locations, preferring only to 
continue to trade out of the more profitable branches. The risk of TUPE transfers from 
all locations has led to significantly detrimental impacts on the purchase price, lowering 
creditor returns, including the sums owed to employees who were made redundant. 
While businesses may have been successfully transferred, jobs were lost and creditor 
returns reduced as a result of TUPE liabilities, which have led to a result contrary to the 
aims of the ARD legislation with a negative impact on all stakeholders involved. The 
negative impact on employment also impacts public finances due to the reliance of 
employees on the National Insurance Fund to pay their redundancy entitlements.  
5.4 Strategies for Reducing the Impact of TUPE 
5.4.1 Most practitioners responded with suggestions that correlate to ensuring that the TUPE 
consultation and information requirements are satisfied as far as it is reasonably 
practicable within the time and resources available to the client company. They also 
suggest advising clients to that effect in order to avoid the risk of protective awards. 
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However, there is a conflict between the required consultation period and what is indeed 
possible. Notice periods may challenge the ability for a company to continue paying 
employees for the duration of the period. The requirements for pre-packs can also 
conflict with the required consultation periods, creating complexities that are a 
distraction during insolvency planning.  
5.4.2 Some have also recommended potential solutions such as resolving the situation through 
a pre-pack liquidation, though, if the end goal is to create a new business free of the 
liabilities of TUPE, this may be counter-productive, due to the need to sustain a non-
trading period that may result in a loss of goodwill. An insolvency practitioner may also 
negotiate compromise agreements with employees in order to avoid their transfer to the 
purchasing company, particularly high-earning employees, though this strategy also 
carries costs with it, while perhaps being of lower risk. Stakeholders’ expectations 
should also be managed with regard to expected returns that reflect the reality of risks, 
costs and price implications associated with TUPE. Attempting to circumvent TUPE is a 
high risk strategy that may attract liability that will transfer to the purchaser and, in the 
event of failure, to the creditors and the state.  
5.4.3 While one practitioner stated unequivocally that the principle of protecting employee 
rights should be maintained, most practitioners responding to the survey felt that the 
ARD and its implementation in the UK was contrary to the rescue culture. The UK 
regime provides insolvency practitioners with real problems due to the conflict between 
employment and insolvency law. The insolvency exception as implemented in the UK 
was also described as being inadequate to avoid this conflict. The suggestion was also 
made that TUPE should be relaxed further in insolvency situations in order to encourage 
more effective corporate rescues.  
5.5 French Practitioner Strategies for Reducing the Impact of Transfers 
5.5.1 French practitioners responding to this question have mainly listed the processes 
available within the legal framework of insolvency and the transfer provisions as it is 
difficult to circumvent any of the legal provisions implicated. Collective procedures 
favour corporate rescue, to which the transfer provisions will apply. A business transfer 
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will aim to ensure some or all of the jobs transfer with it and dismissals for economic 
reasons are difficult to contest, which is not problematic as the guarantee fund can 
support costs associated with economic dismissals. However, this does place an 
additional burden on the state and tax-payers. Business transfers and restructuring 
processes can only succeed through a collective negotiation procedure, but the negative 
impacts of transfers can also be mitigated through consultation with creditors and the 
authorisation by the court to derogate from the obligatory nature of transfers. A 
reduction of the impact of the transfer of employment contracts can be made with the 
consent and collective negotiation of all stakeholders.  
5.5.2 In business transfers, it is up to the court to decide among purchase bids. The issue of 
employment contracts is considered by the court among a number of other elements, 
including the amount of the offered purchase price, the continuation of the business, the 
characteristics of the recovery plan, and the transfer of business contracts such as leases, 
loan agreement, and supply agreements, as well as the number of employment contracts 
that the potential purchaser intends to retain. Once the purchaser and its offer is 
approved by the court, the rights and obligations of the employment relationship will be 
imposed on the new employer, including the advantages acquired as a result of the 
transfer regarding limitations on dismissals that by reason of the transfer.  
5.6 Practitioner criticism of the Transfer of Employment Contracts during Corporate Rescue 
Procedures  
5.6.1 The high level guarantees for unpaid employee debts accrued in relation to dismissals 
are a factor that favours corporate rescue. In one practitioner’s opinion, the difference in 
treatment between those procedures instituted with a view to liquidation and those 
engaged to save a business is justified as it prevents the use of the latter procedure as a 
means to avoid the application of employment protection rules. However, the obligation 
on administrators to attempt to reclassify employees and the formalities imposed are too 
severe. The role of administration can also constitute a factor that inhibits the transfer of 
enterprises. Consultation during administration is obligatory as is the approval of 
dismissals by employee representatives.  
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5.6.2 The maintenance of all employee rights following a transfer can result in the loss of 
jobs. The obligatory character of the contractual transfer can also limit the offers that 
may be made for the purchase of an undertaking, as well as reducing the overall 
potential value for which an undertaking may be purchased. The transfer of contracts 
can also be a factor of uncertainty in the transaction as the actual costs relating to 
potential dismissals are revealed at a later time and may then constitute a higher 
economic hazard than initially estimated.  
5.6.3 There is an abundance of jurisprudence that has turned around the decision to dismiss 
employees prior to a transfer, even in the event of liquidation judiciaire that has already 
been authorised by a judge. Dismissals made for economic motives by a liquidator prior 
to a transfer have been deemed at times ineffective and in violation of the public order 
dispositions of Article L.1224-1 of the Code du Travail. The foundation of these judicial 
decisions is that such a transfer authorised by a bankruptcy judge constitutes the transfer 
of the autonomous economic entity in which that activity is continued or resumed by the 
purchaser, consequently employment contracts should continue with the purchaser and 
any dismissals are rendered irrelevant. In such a case the employee whose dismissal has 
been rendered ineffective can demand that his contract should either continue or for 
compensation from the liquidator. Thus even when dismissals associated with a 
liquidation procedure are approved by a judge, this may not guarantee that those 
dismissals cannot be overturned subsequently. While the sauvegarde procedure 
alleviates this uncertainty somewhat, a sale is not always possible, in which case the 
transfer provisions provide a real obstacle to the resumption of the business, sometimes 
causing the buyer to choose not to continue the purchase.  
5.6.4 There are also some sectors in which the constraints on dismissals are heavier than in 
others, such as the journalism sector in France. Thus the criticism is not necessarily over 
the whole of the system, but only in relation to those sectors that are rendered 
particularly inflexible due to their specific protective character. However, practitioners 
have also acknowledged that any arguments against laws currently in force are pointless, 
given their place of importance in French social policy. Going against the status quo in 
France is difficult due to the primacy of vested rights. In addition, some practitioners 
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favour the maintenance of acquired rights, but would like to see a restructuring 
procedure that is more in line with the economic needs of a business rather than with the 
protected status of individual employees. The problem is not only the maintenance of 
acquired rights, but the impossibility overall of creating a framework that is compatible 
with every need within the system, in particular in the field of restructuring and with 
regards to workers, ensuring job security and rights of association.  
6 The Acquired Rights Directive: An Exemption for Corporate Rescue  
6.1 The Modern Rescue Culture: a Need for a New Approach 
6.1.1 When the last ARD was passed in 2001, the rescue culture was not quite a ubiquitous 
element of EU legal framework, though it was growing in importance. The European 
Insolvency Regulation only came into force in 2002 and, while the turn of the millennia 
saw a number of reforms among many of the original Member States, including the UK 
and France, these were occurring at the same time that the ARD was being 
implemented.153 The new emphasis on the rescue culture thus could not be accounted for 
in the amended ARD drafted in 2001. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 focussed 
legislators further on the need to provide a robust insolvency system that included 
corporate rescue as a preferred option. This focus was not only due to the need to 
combat insolvencies precipitated by the crisis, but also due to the requirements set by 
Memoranda of Understanding for some Member States who were forced to resort to the 
troika of the International Monetary Fund, European Commission and the European 
Central Bank for rescue packages to alleviate their sovereign debt obligations.154 Thus, 
since the introduction of the amended ARD in 2001, the rescue culture has changed 
significantly throughout the EU.  
6.1.2 The ARD does have a place in corporate rescue and restructuring as there has been a 
recognised need for social protection in this area since the foundation of the ECSC. 
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However, where the application of social protections risks total failure of a rescue 
process, resulting in liquidation and loss of all jobs, a balance must be struck that will 
save the most jobs and provide the best result for the economy as a whole by 
encouraging successful business rescues and reduce unemployment. The TUPE 
implementation of the ARD has been often criticised on the basis that it undermines 
insolvency procedures and interferes with the rescue process. French employers have 
also proffered complaints as to the onerous obligations required by their transfer 
provisions, with French practitioners citing the obstacles to sales that the transfer 
provisions frequently present.155 It is submitted that a better more balanced approach 
would be to allow employee acquired rights to be waived in certain circumstances in the 
interests of preserving employment overall. While the most preferred option for 
employers might be to transfer a business free of the burden of employee liabilities, this 
would be outside the protections provided for in the ARD.156 A more nuanced approach 
is required that fits in with the aims and purposes of EU social policy, the ARD and the 
rescue culture. 
6.2 Arguments on Social Policy, Employment Protection and the ARD  
6.2.1 There are a number of arguments in favour of employment regulation generally, as well 
as in favour of the ARD in particular. However, given the academic and practical 
criticisms of the ARD in its interference with the rescue culture, it is clear that some 
relief is needed. However, there remain economic and social arguments in favour and 
against the retention of some level of protection in the event of business transfers, if not 
its complete application in corporate rescue situations. 
6.2.2 The neo-classical economist’s commoditisation of labour is no longer an acceptable 
assumption for an economic system and should not therefore be relied upon in 
arguments for economic efficiency.157 While free market economists may decry the 
establishment of centrally coordinated labour standards, arguing that equity and 
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efficiency are best secured when labour markets are allowed to operate freely,158 this 
ignores the problem of human behaviour and the reality of imperfectly competitive 
markets. Marx described the commoditisation of labour as leading to exploitation and 
constituting a barrier to free human development.159 He also distinguished between 
situations in which commercial contracting parties negotiate under conditions of 
juridical equality, from an employment relationship in which the hierarchical relation of 
“master and servant” remains.160 Even Smith admitted that there was an inequality of 
bargaining power between employers and employees, particularly in relation to an 
employee’s ability to hold out for better terms:  
“Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, 
and scarce any a year without employment. In the long run, the 
workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; 
but the necessity is not so immediate.”161 
6.2.3 It has been argued by proponents of efficiency in the Law and Economics movement 
that social legislation is an illegitimate interference with market relations.162 While 
freedom, autonomy, liberty and individualism are central to the benefits perceived in 
following a neo-classical economic model, giving individuals choices free from 
constraint and coercion,163 these positive effects are not always accessible. It is not 
reflective of the real position of employees in the labour market. In terms of welfare 
economics, upon which the labour markets of the EU are built, if markets are 
competitive, information must be perfect in order to reach a true competitive 
equilibrium. This presumes that government intervention should not be necessary in 
order to maintain market efficiency in an optimal competitive situation.164  
6.2.4 The premise that perfect competition can exist within the labour market is spurious, at 
best. The labour market is imperfectly competitive due to inequality of bargaining 
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power, unequal access to information and resources, and unequal balance of rights that 
exist within it. While employment regulation often impedes the perceived efficiency of 
the free market, it is justified as restoring balance to an otherwise exploitative and 
imbalanced relationship that, without control, would be socially inefficient and unjust 
due to the unilateral reduction in wages and conditions of labour.165 The informational 
problems present in the labour market provide a justification for a welfare state that 
functions to correct the imbalance in competition that it causes. Market failures owing to 
informational problems that cause an inefficient allocation of resources provide a 
premise for the argument in favour of social policy as a factor for improving that market 
efficiency.166 The early days of the industrial revolution throughout Europe exemplify 
this imbalance in competition. While it could be argued that the same moral conditions 
do not exist today, it is only necessary to observe the exploitation of workers that occurs 
in developing countries to realise that such conditions persist. 
6.2.5 The welfare state also gives human dignity a place of central importance.167 Its presence 
coincides with the Marxist distaste for the exploitation tendency present in purely 
capitalist markets. Insofar as an unregulated market economy does not secure or protect 
human dignity, it falls to the state to do so.168 The concept of social justice, fair income 
distribution and even job security can be linked to the need of the welfare state to 
preserve and protect human dignity.  
6.2.6 Labour regulation can also be justified by reference to the stabilisation it can provide to 
the labour market. Unrestrained competition in the labour market can lead to adverse 
macroeconomic effects due to the potential for higher unemployment. Fuller 
employment allows for greater consumer purchasing power, and protection adds 
security that allows consumers to spend with less fear of losing their livelihood.169 
Employment regulation can also promote greater economic efficiency and growth. 
Research has demonstrated that when norms of fairness in the workplace are violated, 
workers will retaliate by reducing productivity, resulting in reduced profits and 
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efficiency in the company.170 Social policies allow a state to strike a balance between 
capital resources and labour and can be a productive factor that contributes to political 
stability.171 However, social protection must also be balanced with the needs of 
business, else a new imbalance is introduced that will have an adverse impact on 
economic efficiency.  
6.2.7 In justifying the existence of the ARD within EU law, the argument turns on equality of 
competition within the Common Market. Because the Member States of the EU all 
operate on differently constituted legal systems with diverse aims and purposes for 
regulation, their approaches to labour regulation also vary, sometimes significantly. If 
competition within the common market is to be maintained, it must be endowed with a 
level playing field and parity of costs must be established. Labour standards provide a 
“floor of rights” to prevent destructive competition.172  
6.2.8 Employers in one state operating at lower social standards gain a competitive advantage 
to those countries with higher standards due to the costs associated with the level of 
social protection.173 In addition, it is the creation of the common market itself and the 
competition that it embraces that presents risks for employees. The conditions of 
competition lead inevitably to restructuring and other changes to businesses, making 
dismissals and redundancies a reality. If there are no controls on those standards, an 
industry in a country with less stringent rules will be given an incalculable advantage 
within the common market.174 Thus, EU social policy is justified and, in particular, 
those regulations directly impacting the reorganisation of companies, such as the ARD. 
6.3 How to Approach Legal Reform: The Rawlsian Perspective 
6.3.1 Having established that there is a need for reform to balance corporate rescue and the 
application of the ARD, the question arises how best to approach it to balance the 
objective interests in it. If it were left only to businesses to decide how best to approach 
this reform, it is probable that they would choose to repeal the ARD in its entirety in 
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order to increase the flexibility with which they could approach reorganisation and the 
disposal of employees. However, if left only to labour and employment interests, the 
remit of the ARD might be extended in such a way as to remove the flexibility that 
already exists within it to alleviate the financial burdens borne by businesses due to its 
application. A middle ground is necessary to balance these countervailing interests. John 
Rawls offers a potential model that could be applied in these reformative circumstances. 
6.3.2 Rawls considered how individuals might approach the creation of a fair justice system 
from an original position of ignorance. The premise is that self-interested individuals, 
when coming together to create a system of rules that would treat all individuals equally 
could best achieve this from a position behind a “veil of ignorance” that obscures each 
individual’s characteristics that come together to define a person’s unique self-interest. 
The original position is intended to eliminate prejudice and self-interest in order to 
achieve a fair result, which is why the veil of ignorance is necessary. If every individual 
were allowed to bargain on their own terms in the circumstances of business interests as 
against employment interests, the inequalities of bargaining power would reassert 
themselves.175 While this hypothetical “original position” may not be a realistic premise 
upon which to construct an entire society due to its overly simplistic approach that fails 
to account for factors that, once in place, would cause the system to fail,176 Rawls’ 
theory may provide a tool with which to create balanced reform between two 
traditionally polarised interests,177 particularly if applied within a narrowly defined field 
of law. In this case, the ARD insolvency exception provides the narrowly defined legal 
area upon which this theory can be applied.  
6.3.3 The needs and wants of business interests as opposed to employment or labour interests 
can be described with reasonable clarity, particularly if this is done within one specific 
legal framework that is based on a distinct set of legal and moral values. The ARD 
within the framework of EU law provides just such circumstances. The aims and 
purposes of the Directive are reasonably clear, particularly if jurisprudence is included 
as interpretative guidelines, and, in general, the needs and wants of businesses and 
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employees as defined groups within the EU can be described with clarity. Knowing that 
both self-interested groups are likely to construct a model with their sole interests in 
mind, and the reasons for them, it may be possible to construct a reform that 
compromises between the two interested parties, thereby creating a balance that could 
be equated to the fairness of Rawlsian theory.178  
6.3.4 The Rawlsian conception of justice can be viewed as deriving from a basis of efficiency, 
which implies that achieving justice is a matter of weighing advantages and 
disadvantages, or specific interests, each having an intrinsic value in the satisfaction of 
the interests to which they are connected.179 Employment and labour interests will 
generally prioritise employment security, protected rights, protection from unequal or 
unfair competition in the labour market and, above all, remaining employed, over the 
interests of the business employing them. Businesses will want to take advantage of 
flexibility, maximise profitability, efficiency, success, growth and will also want an 
effective workforce. While these aims are not diametrically opposed, they will often 
conflict. However, the interests are clear and known. Rawlsian theory presumes that 
self-interested actors, in this case employee and business interest groups, will also act 
rationally in accordance with their wants and needs and with an understanding of the 
consequences of adopting one practice over another. If the knowledge to which group 
these “rational self-interested actors” belonged was obscured when negotiating reform to 
the ARD that would balance the conflict between corporate rescue and employment 
protection, but the understanding of the opposing interests of each group was retained, 
both groups would be forced to adopt a reform that achieved a middle ground between 
the opposing interests. Neither would want to create a reform that would provide an 
advantage to the other group, as no one would know at the time of negotiation which 
group would benefit from such an advantage. This balance could be considered on the 
level with the Rawlsian concept of “fairness”.180  
6.3.5 In the interests of continued employment and also presuming that knowledge of 
redundancy risk is also obscured, it is arguable that employees would agree to relinquish 
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their rights to the transferral of their employment contracts to the purchaser of a business 
were that business to be put at great risk of failure due to the contract transfers. While 
their employment security may be reduced, they would be more likely to retain their 
employment, particularly if the only alternative was liquidation. What the Rawlsian 
position does for business interests is that it forces them to acknowledge and experience 
the unequal position of employment interests by hypothetically placing them in the 
shoes of employees subject to the risks of reorganisation processes. It is unlikely that a 
self-interested employee would ever opt for fewer protections if that option did not in 
some way offer an alternative protection for their employment, i.e. a successful 
corporate rescue. By any analysis, employees as a group will be better off with a 
successful corporate rescue than with liquidation. On the basis of the foregoing 
discussion, it could be deduced that the “fairest” way to provide balance in the ARD 
with regard to corporate rescue would be to allow some relaxation of the transfer 
provisions in the event that the transfer of employment contracts puts a corporate rescue 
procedure at high risk of failure.  
6.4 EU Methods: Soft Law or Hard Law? 
6.4.1 EU legal reform can take any number of forms. Soft law approaches and the open 
method of coordination tend to be the preferred approaches in EU social policy 
regulation in the current political climate. The OMC radically differs from the top-down, 
rule-based, centralised approach used in the Community Methods181 of legislating social 
policy as it emphasises action plans, objectives, recommendations, and guidelines rather 
than legislation requiring implementation.182 Since 2010, coordination and 
benchmarking have become the preferred method; however, the financial crisis made 
this method difficult to use due to the more individualist character taken on by many 
Member States. In addition, the ARD is part of the old Community Method. Changing 
methods to reform it may carry obstacles to coordination that would otherwise be 
unforeseen due to its current implementation among the Member States.  
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6.4.2 The Community Method is not without its weaknesses. In particular, the adoption of the 
ARD was diluted in terms of the level of protection provided due to the need to agree 
with a final hard law format. This is due in part to the broad differences in Member 
States’ labour systems, including the extreme differences in collective labour law, which 
is likely to have led to a weaker version of the requirements for information and 
consultation.183 It is essentially necessary to reach some lowest common denominator in 
terms of what can be agreed among a disparately composed federation of sovereign 
states. The difficulty in agreeing this standard results in the aforementioned dilution, but 
also vagueness and difficulties in establishing fundamental concepts due to different 
perspectives of interpretation,184 as evidenced by the significant amount of litigation that 
has taken place with regard to the ARD. However, given that the reform suggested 
herein is a direct diversion from the ARD, though also in line with social policy and the 
rescue culture, it is necessary to create provisions that closely align with it. As such, an 
amendment according to the classic community method is likely the only approach that 
will suffice. 
6.5 Reforming the ARD 
6.5.1 It is recommended that an amending directive be drafted to include provisions that 
reduce the impact of the ARD transfer provisions on high risk corporate rescue 
procedures. This exemption carries with it the caveat that contracts must transfer unless 
it can be shown that to do so would cause the failure of the relevant procedure and result 
in business failure. This should appear within the insolvency exception located in 
Article 5 of the current ARD and specify a selection of corporate rescue procedures 
nominated by Member States and contained within Annex A of the European Insolvency 
Regulation.185 This annex is a readily accessible list of insolvency and rescue procedures 
that would provide a reasonable tool with which to apply the new derogation; however, 
the different aims of the EIR as opposed to the ARD may call for a bespoke list in the 
ARD itself at some point in the future.  
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6.5.2 The alleviation of obligations to retain contractual terms and conditions located in 
Article 5(2) remains an adequate provision for those corporate rescue procedures that 
are not at significant risk of failure owing to the transfer of employment contracts. It 
allows for bargaining among employee organisations and employers to reduce the 
liabilities that may transfer by changing the terms and conditions in contracts or 
agreeing to other flexible changes. This provision helps circumvent the otherwise self-
defeating aspects of the acquired rights provisions and has been seen to result in a 
successful business transfer that may otherwise have failed if employee liabilities were 
to be taken at face value without recourse to negotiated settlements or other changes.186 
6.5.3 The exemption will include several contingent conditions. Due to current EU policy 
regarding the more protective treatment of small and medium enterprises, the suggested 
derogation should provide for a blanket exemption for companies fitting the small 
enterprise definition.187 Medium sized enterprises will benefit from the exemption if it 
can be shown that the transfer of employment contracts to the purchaser of a business 
will cause the rescue procedure to fail and result in liquidation. Finally, larger 
companies will have to satisfy a threshold test to determine if they can make use of the 
exemption. The threshold determined below is based on the findings of various 
empirical studies;188 however, the determination of a perfect threshold will require a 
bespoke empirical study to determine the most likely ratio of costs to value that balance 
on the cusp between success and failure, which is outside the remit of this treatise. The 
recommendations contained herein are an example of a balancing provision that would 
satisfy the aim of resolving the conflict between corporate rescue and employment 
protection, based on the foregoing path dependent historical comparison of the two 
example jurisdictions that exhibit a range of differences in the evolution of their legal 
systems. 
6.5.4 The exemptions will be available as long as a company has made every effort to ensure 
that the actions taken do not unfairly deprive the affected employees of the protection of 
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the ARD, as stated in Article 5(4), which provides a legal basis for employees to 
challenge any actions taken or rights deprived as a result of the application of the 
corporate rescue exemption. Article 5 of the current ARD provides that Member States 
may exempt certain insolvency proceedings from the application the ARD transfer 
provisions if instituted with a view to liquidation of the transferor’s assets. It is 
recommended that an additional paragraph be added to the current ARD through an 
amending directive that accounts for the EU rescue culture and the impact that heavy 
social protections have upon it in the following format: 
“1A. Unless Member States provide otherwise, Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply 
to any transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business 
where the transferor is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or analogous 
insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to continuing 
the business of the undertaking and or rescuing the company as a going concern 
and are listed in Annex A of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 on insolvency proceedings if the circumstances of the relevant transfer 
satisfies one of the following conditions:  
(a) the undertaking employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover 
and or annual balance sheet total does not exceed Euro 2 million;189 or 
(b) the undertaking employs fewer than 250 persons and whose annual turnover 
does not exceed Euro 50 million or whose annual balance sheet total does not 
exceed Euro 43 million190 and the impact of the application of Articles 3 and 4 
to the relevant transfer would result in the failure of bankruptcy or analogous 
insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to continuing 
the business of the undertaking and or rescuing the company as a going 
concern; or 
(c) the undertaking employs more than 250 persons and whose annual turnover 
exceeds Euro 50 million or whose balance sheet total exceeds Euro 43 million 
and the cost of transferring employment contracts exceeds [25%] of the value 
of the undertaking and the impact of the application of Articles 3 and 4 to the 
relevant transfer would result in the failure of bankruptcy or analogous 
insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to continuing 
the business of the undertaking and or rescuing the company as a going 
concern. 
6.6 Reception of Reforms in the Member States 
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6.6.1 Transposition of EU law is affected by the interests, institutions and individuals of 
Member States: it is by and large a political process.191 Thus, in order to ensure that 
Member State laws in this area closely resemble each other following the transposition 
process, it is necessary to consider how individual states may implement them. 
Transposition depends upon institutional factors stemming from the characteristics and 
the configurations of the institutions involved in the implementation of the law; political 
factors relating to the interests, manipulation of power and choices between competing 
values; and substantive factors concerning the nature of the objective to be achieved.192 
These are complex factors influenced by a myriad of jurisdiction specific characteristics 
relating to their legal and political systems. To this end, the study of the historical, 
economic, social, and political contexts of the areas of law implicated in the suggested 
reforms to the ARD will assist in forecasting how individual states may choose to 
implement it. While it may not be possible to “break” the path dependent influences on 
implementation of the suggested reforms, it is submitted that the approach set out above 
will allow for a slow convergence of systems through market pressures to equilibrate 
competition.  
6.6.2 The UK would likely be more than willing to accept and implement a reform of this 
kind given the widely held view that the interference of the ARD in corporate rescue 
procedures has caused more economic and social harm than good. France, however, 
may choose not to change anything in their system given the fact that once a right is in 
place, it is difficult to reduce it despite the good it may do the French economy. This is 
due in part to the French concept of “vested rights”, a concept that is present throughout 
the EU but that in France has evolved to encompass a much broader spectrum of 
“rights”. Once a right has been created and used by individuals, it has essentially 
obtained the status of being “vested” in the populace. At one time statutory provisions 
and rights resting on a special title of acquisition, such as human rights, were 
distinguished from one another in France. However, over the course of time many 
French jurists became loathe to distinguish between the two, thus any right given, 
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whether by statute, which could by definition potentially be taken away, or by other 
means, becomes vested and difficult to reduce or destroy.193 Thus any reduction in the 
rights conferred by L.1224 of the Code du Travail, which has existed since 1928 and has 
suffered very few changes, will be difficult to implement from a political perspective.  
6.6.3 Despite the political obstacles that the French system of “droits acquis” creates, the 
financial crisis and rising deficits have forced France into the sights of the European 
Commission due to its failure to reduce its deficit in line with EU requirements. While 
the rest of the EU has continually reduced employment entitlements following the 
financial and sovereign debt crises, particularly those countries on the periphery who 
have been forced to resort to loans from the troika,194 France has introduced additional 
protections and assistance for their unemployed195 and has maintained the highest level 
of protection for temporary workers, despite an apparent need to deregulate temporary 
work to increase flexibility in the labour market to help reduce unemployment rates like 
the rest of the EU.196 France has not followed the same harsh prescriptions for cutting 
public expenditure to stimulate growth, preferring to protect its social welfare over 
reducing budget deficits. 197 France has continued to create obstacles for businesses 
through oppressive taxes, stultifying labour regulations, and complex regulatory controls 
on production, which has burdened the French economy and thwarted efficiency, 
depressed productivity and generally reduced France’s competitiveness in the Common 
Market. Its rigid labour rules tend to disrupt economic dynamism and efficiency by 
limiting the flexibility of French businesses.198 While the French implementation of the 
ARD reform would only be a small part of the problem, its reform would provide some 
level of increased flexibility, particularly in relation to the efficient rescue of viable 
businesses. Though sparse, the commentary gathered from practitioners on this matter 
supports this contention.   
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6.6.4 Given the push toward flexibility in Europe, and the importance laid at the feet of both 
robust rescue procedures and a flexible labour market, France may be forced toward 
closer convergence with the rest of the EU. The existence of a more flexible ARD in its 
application in corporate rescue situations, while only a microcosm of the overall social 
and economic issues facing the EU, may provide an impetus for Member States to 
voluntarily harmonise in the area of acquired rights by implementing the recommended 
reform. It may influence the direction that paths in this area take by creating a system 
that many Member States could eventually adopt, creating greater flexibility and 
encouraging less flexible states, such as France, to better align its rules in order to 
equalise competition in the common market. Competitive disadvantage due to higher 
social costs is something that France has often complained of over the history of the EU. 
While France generally adheres to a system with higher social costs, it is also 
dissatisfied with its lower competitive character within the EU. However, history has 
demonstrated that while on the surface France may exhibit commercial ambition, it is 
constrained by its social nature. Regardless, taken as a whole, the EU would generally 
benefit by a relaxation of the application of transfer provisions in corporate rescue 
procedures. Whether individual Member States take up this advantage is a matter of 
their relative flexibility with regard to their path adherence.  
7 Conclusion  
7.1 Conflict and Resolution: Path Dependent Legal Development 
7.1.1 The purpose of the foregoing Chapter was to examine the path dependent relationships 
of social policy and corporate rescue in the UK and France in the implementation and 
functioning of the ARD. French individualism and values of human dignity arising from 
the developments arising from the French Revolution have had a lasting effect on the 
place of social policy in the French legal system.199 The UK has retained its 
economically driven system with an emphasis on market freedom and efficiency, though 
under the EU it has had to raise its labour standards to the minimum standards required 
in the EU.200 While France has enjoyed the levelling of the competition that European 
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social policy has played in the common market, the UK has struggled and resisted the 
interference of EU social policy due in part to its fundamentally different conception of 
its place in the legal framework, as well as the way in which EU law is articulated, 
generally in line with civil legal structures. As a common law country, transposition of 
EU law out of a civil law framework has caused a number of problems, as the level of 
jurisprudence in the area of directive implementation has demonstrated.201  
7.1.2 The conflict surrounding the ARD is indicative of one of the fundamental dividing 
factors among EU Member States: those in favour of strong centralised government and 
those favouring a loose, con-federal format wherein Member States retain overall 
autonomy while enjoying the benefits of a free trade area. The conflict between the 
ARD transfer provisions and corporate rescue procedures is reflective of this dichotomy: 
social justice versus free enterprise. The implementation saga of the ARD in the UK 
evidences the fact that the jurisdiction fits uncomfortably within the EU, particularly 
with regard to “social Europe”.202 
7.1.3 In addition to obstacles to implementation, the ARD also presents an inherent conflict 
between the interests of the rescue culture and employment protection. A number of 
cases have demonstrated that rescue processes can indeed fail if the costs of transferring 
employment contracts are too high. Fact dependent jurisprudence has shown judicial 
acknowledgement of this problem when it was able to find that employees would not 
transfer in a situation where they were dismissed for the reason of the company no 
longer being able to afford to pay them, despite the fact that a buyer was found shortly 
thereafter. While this situation would seem to indicate that TUPE would be implicated, 
the CA opted for a fact-sensitive approach that inadvertently acknowledged the 
imbalance between the two policy areas. Recent reforms to TUPE have alleviated some 
of the onerous conditions of TUPE, but it remains difficult to reconcile with the rescue 
culture.203  
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7.1.4 While France has not had the same controversy, French employers have nonetheless 
complained about the restrictions that the provisions create for their ability to deal with 
their enterprise as they see fit. The French practitioner response has borne out this 
criticism, citing a number of problems caused by the transfer of undertakings provisions. 
The system causes complexity and uncertainty, making it difficult for entrepreneurs to 
adapt to changes in technology or to reorganise according to market requirements. The 
high level of protection in French social policy also have negative macroeconomic 
effects by creating rigidities in the labour market, keeping people unemployed for longer 
periods of time due to the inability to shift the workforce easily. While this has been 
acknowledged by French politicians, economists, academics and others, it retains its 
inflexible approach due to the social protection of “vested rights,” regardless of whether 
those rights are provided by statute or are natural.204  
7.1.5 The reactions of practitioners in both jurisdictions, the fact of the conflict, and the 
effects of the economic crisis have made it clear that reform is needed in order to 
alleviate the burdens that the ARD places on business.205 While it remains important to 
protect employees in situations of reorganisation, too stringent an application results in 
business failure on occasion, leading to a self-defeating result: the loss of all jobs. As 
such, reform was recommended that allows for an exemption from the application of the 
ARD provisions for micro enterprises, for medium enterprises that are at risk of failure, 
and for large enterprises subject to a specific threshold test on the ratio of employee 
liability costs to business transfer value.206 While the fact is that France is unlikely to 
implement any serious changes in this regard,207 a number of other EU Member States 
are likely to do so, especially the UK and other, more economically liberal countries, 
such as Germany and the Netherlands. Given the economic issues France is having 
following the financial crisis that are blamed at least in part on the inflexibility of its 
labour market, it is not unreasonable to suspect that over time even France will shift in 
order to find balance between the rescue culture and the ARD.208 
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CHAPTER 7: 
CONCLUSION 
 
“The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”  
~ Paraphrase of Aristotle in the Metaphysics  
1 Chapter 1: 
1.1 Path Dependency, Employment Protection and Corporate Rescue  
1.1.1 Economic disasters, financial crises, and sovereign debt in the EU have, since 2007, 
brought a renewed focus on the economic impact of business failure and unemployment.1 
While social policy regulation and corporate rescue procedures are not mutually exclusive 
in their aims, they are often seen to conflict where they intersect. A balance between these 
two often competing policy areas is necessary in order to cope with the impact of critical 
financial circumstances with greater economic efficiency, while promoting social justice 
in the modern socioeconomic context of the EU. As such, the social implications of 
corporate rescue must be considered, rather than taking a purely economic approach that 
emphasises creditor wealth maximisation as the fundamental goal of insolvency.2  
1.1.2 Underpinned by traditionally opposing socioeconomic values, the juxtaposition of 
corporate rescue and employment protection can be difficult to reconcile. As corporate 
rescue procedures often require the sale of all or part of a business undertaking, the rules 
dealing with the preservation of employment in business transfer situations are of 
particular importance; as such, the varied implementation of the ARD is significant. The 
UK and France provided particularly divergent examples of this implementation, also 
demonstrating the extreme variance in the fundaments of legal systems within the EU.  
1.1.3 In order to strike a balance between the rescue culture and social policy, reform is needed, 
but such reform that can be received by the Member States and closely align their legal 
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systems. Such an alignment should serve to encourage more level competition within the 
Common Market in relation to levels of social protection in this specific legal area. 
Aligned implementation should be achieved through a fundamental understanding of the 
jurisdiction specific elements that affect the reception of law and the aims of regulation. 
The foregoing Chapters analysed the legal position of employment protection and 
corporate rescue in the UK and France through a historical comparative analysis of the 
political, social, and economic developmental context of employment law and corporate 
insolvency law. Based on the understanding of each jurisdiction’s path dependent position 
within the legal framework of the EU, it recommended reform to the ARD aimed at 
balancing corporate rescue and employment protection in the precise circumstances of 
employment contracts transferring during corporate rescue procedures. The intersection 
of these areas of law is contentious due to competing interests of social and economic 
policy. It is necessary, however, to consider both social policy and economic efficiency in 
the analysis of employment protection and corporate rescue in order to account for the 
aims of both. Given that the regulation of this policy intersection is made within the EU 
legal framework, a comparative historical methodology assists in identifying the most 
effective reform that will fit within the varied legal systems of the EU Member States, 
and also helps to predict how such a reform may be implemented over time. 
2 Chapter 2: 
2.1 The Path to Labour Regulation and Corporate Insolvency Law  
2.1.1 The political history of nations has inevitably affected how the modern function of 
political systems, business and economics, social policy, and regulatory style evolved 
over time. The second Chapter explored the historical events that have had a direct impact 
on the approaches to legal regulation in France and the UK and the paths they have 
travelled to arrive at their modern employment and insolvency systems. Employment 
protection regulations evolved out of the need to first control, and then protect, the 
working classes through the development of labour laws. The modern employment law 
systems developed largely in connection with industrialisation and were influenced by the 
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characteristics of the working classes, which in turn affected and were affected by the 
social, political, and economic characteristics unique to each legal system.3  
2.1.2 The unique characteristics of insolvency laws in Britain and France and their modern 
corporate rescue elements could only be understood through their situation within the 
evolution of modern corporate law and the particular views that each jurisdiction has 
historically had regarding debt and credit. Regulations on business initially evolved out of 
a desire to protect capitalist endeavour within individual states and eventually to embrace 
certain free market ideals, though the extent to which this was achieved has varied over 
time among different jurisdictions. It is through the regulation of commercial transactions 
and their fundamental importance to modern economies that a need to normalise 
insolvency procedures was recognised; as such, an understanding of the social, political 
and economic characteristics that have affected the evolution of commercial and 
insolvency laws was necessary in order to fully understand their unique aims within the 
legal systems of Britain and France.4  
2.1.3 There are a number of historical events that have guided the approach and aims of 
employment protection and corporate rescue and, over time, the approach to the 
implementation of EU law. Diverse historical occurrences relating to the political, social, 
economic, and cultural characteristics of each jurisdiction have had a significant impact 
on legal development. Of particular importance are the diverse impacts and experiences 
of feudalism, absolutism, the Protestant and Counter Reformations; the impact of the 
Tudor rule in England including the dissolution of the monasteries; the Enlightenment; 
the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution; and the French Revolution. The impact 
of these events has helped to build the foundations upon which modern French and 
British approaches to social policy and corporate rescue are now based. It is the 
differences in these historical experiences and their influence that are of particular 
importance as they help to explain the differences in approach that exist today. 
2.1.4 While Britain and France evolved along parallel lines in terms of their statehood and 
political systems from Roman times through to the Middle Ages, they began to diverge as 
                                                          
3 Please see Chapter 3 of this Thesis for full development of these ideas.  
4 Please see Chapter 4 of this Thesis for a full development of these ideas.  
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early as the eleventh century.5 While both were feudal in nature, English feudalism had 
been imported and imposed by its Normans conquerors. The French feudal system 
evolved somewhat organically as the gifts of land and privilege were disseminated further 
and further from the centre, the Normans recognised this as a problem and created a 
system that circumvented it. The dispersal of central power was avoided by requiring that 
vassals accepting gifts of land must also swear allegiance to the supreme sovereign. Thus, 
by as early as the eleventh century, the English monarchy was effectively centralised 
while its French counterparts continued to rely upon a moral authority and loyalty 
purchased through royal gifts. 6 
2.1.5 The fifteenth century saw further differentiation. Although both regimes effectively 
consolidated power at this time, France and England diverged during the Protestant 
Reformation. In England, the creation of a non-Catholic state religion allowed it to sever 
Rome’s control and become a state of unlimited sovereignty over both politics and 
religion.7 The Catholic faith was retained as the national religion in France. The retention 
of Catholicism and a subtle intolerance for progressive philosophical or religious ideas 
kept the great French Enlightenment physiocrats from affecting their own country until 
their ideas were co-opted by the French revolutionaries of the eighteenth century.8 
However, English rationalism and individualism would see it through to the first 
Industrial Revolution well in advance of similar progress in France.  
2.1.6 The dissolution of the English monasteries had a profound effect on its economy. The 
riches gained from dissolution helped the English economy to grow and encouraged an 
enthusiasm for profit as theological attitudes began to change with the separation of the 
political and spiritual. The Reformation in England had a fundamental effect on attitudes 
toward capitalism as a focus on individuality and a belief in hard work became a more 
accepted way of life. As early as the sixteenth century in England, capitalist tendencies 
can be observed as the laws of the market steadily replaced custom and tradition. France 
                                                          
5 See Chapter 2 Section 2.1. 
6 Ibid, 2.2. 
7 Ibid, 2.3 & 2.4. 
8 Ibid, 2.5. 
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would never see a widespread acceptance of capitalism but it would be accepting of 
liberalism for certain periods during the French Revolution.9  
2.1.7 While England and France both had highly stratified class systems throughout the Middle 
Ages, France systematically destroyed its ancien régime in a series of more or less 
decisive acts of revolution.10 The class system in England endured, though its strict feudal 
character fell away as production methods advanced over time. However, there was not 
the same violent rejection of class as there was in France. Rather, the countrymen of the 
regions tended to desire to retain traditional ways rather than progress away from 
superstition and subservience.11 In a sense, the imposition of top down changes during the 
Tudor era12 seemed to instil a stronger loyalty to tradition in England while the opposite 
was true in France as evidenced in the tumult of the French Revolution.13  
2.1.8 Britain was able to evolve gradually toward a more liberal mind set while France suffered 
immediate and catastrophic changes during the French Revolution. The English Civil War 
was a learning experience for England that would influence its dealings with the royal 
executive in the decades to come, culminating in the Glorious Revolution and the English 
Bill of Rights.14 The Glorious Revolution in England provided some inspiration for the 
French Revolution, though it did not have the violently despotic leaders or significant 
death toll. By the time of the French Revolution the United Kingdom had formed with the 
combination of the English and Scottish crowns and had settled into a constitutional 
monarchy, though an electoral reform that extended the franchise outside of the wealthy 
would take nearly 150 years to arrive.15  
2.1.9 The French republican system and the British unitary democracy within a constitutional 
monarchy are today not so very different as their histories suggest. However, the events 
leading to their development differ such that it can be expected that approaches to legal 
regulation are affected. The socially democratic leanings of France influence the 
                                                          
9 Ibid, 2.7. 
10 Ibid, 2.8. 
11 Ibid, 2.9. 
12 Ibid, 2.3 
13 Ibid, 2.8.6. 
14 Ibid, 2.6. 
15 Ibid, 2.9. 
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interventionist methods of legal regulation while the more liberal democratic style of the 
UK tends to avoid intervention in the market if possible. France also places a 
constitutional value on the concept of human dignity and individual human rights, and 
although the UK recognises these concepts, it is not a central foundation of its legal 
system. This has led France to present a legal bias toward employees over businesses, 
while the UK tends to retain an outlook that espouses economically liberal ideals that 
prefer to leave employee rights to the free market. Thus, the diverse religious, social, 
economic and political historical experiences of Britain and France have had a direct 
effect on their approaches to social and commercial regulation. 16 
3 Chapter 3: 
3.1 Proletarianisation, Industrialisation, and Labour Regulation 
3.1.1 Theoretically, labour is a part of the capitalist market and could be treated as a 
commodity; however, its inherent human quality carries with it both moral implications as 
well as an uncertainty that undermine expected behaviours of commodities in the 
market.17 While both the UK and France have incorporated this ideology into their labour 
policies, there are a number of ways in which the jurisdictions continue to differ. The 
differences in approach taken by France and the UK toward labour regulation during the 
period of industrialisation have influenced their approaches and reactions to the social ills 
caused by it. While these differences are connected to historical experiences, 
industrialisation is an important turning point in French and English attitudes toward the 
working classes, business economics and labour regulation. These attitudes in turn feed 
into the political, legal, economic and social policies of each jurisdiction, influencing the 
aims and means of regulation.  
3.1.2 Britain moved organically into an economically liberal mode of production by the early 
eighteenth century, while France struggled with revolution and autocracy until the end of 
the First World War.18 By the time industrialisation occurred in Britain, it had already 
conquered its colonial and international markets and was largely devoid of any external 
                                                          
16 Ibid, 3.1. 
17 Chapter 3 Section 2.3 and 2.4. 
18 Hereafter referred to as “WWI”. 
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competitive pressures.19 France’s process of industrialisation was less revolutionary, 
resembling a slow evolution of systems, processes and ideas. As late as the 1880s, the old 
economic sectors remained the primary source of economic growth. Agricultural 
production was still a fundamental aspect of the economy while industry was divided into 
a small, concentrated, and dynamic modern sector, and a traditional sector that still relied 
on home craft work and the dispersion of industry in the rural areas. There was never the 
massive and rapid transfer of manpower from agriculture to industrial centres in the cities 
in France, such as occurred in Britain a few decades after industrialisation had begun.20 
3.1.3 Britain’s early industrialisation meant that the modern business enterprise began to 
emerge before the legal system could adjust from late-medieval or early modern forms of 
regulation. The contract of employment and companies limited by share capital had not 
yet fully developed when industrialisation was well under way. However, in France, 
private law codes were introduced decades before large scale industrialisation began and 
were therefore able to support the emergence of the large industrial enterprises. The 
differences in scale and speed of industrialisation had profound effects upon the legal and 
economic development of British and French societies.21  
3.1.4 The proletariat that evolved in France was composed differently than it was in the UK. 
Instead of a homogenous group of lower class peasants who were forced to flee the 
enclosed English countryside to find work in the cities and towns of industrial Britain, the 
population of French workers formed a diversified industrial proletariat issued from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds, constituted by successive waves of farm hands, 
part time peasants, migrant workers, women leaving home for work, craftsmen and 
former self employed handicraftsmen, which resulted in a segmented and diversified 
working class. The French labour movement therefore had to answer to diverse interests 
of a non-homogenous working class as well as the different ideologies which coexisted 
among them.22 
                                                          
19 Chapter 3, section 4.2.  
20 M Despax, J Rojot and J-P Laborde, Labour Law in France (Kluwer 2011) 209-210. 
21 S Deakin, P Lele and M Siems, “The Evolution of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes” (2007) 46(3-4) 
Int'l Lab Rev133, 139. 
22 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n20, 210 
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3.1.5 For Britain, one consequence of its unbalanced pace of industrialisation was the 
persistence of the quasi-penal master and servant model in the employment relationship, 
which served to institutionalise the conception of the enterprise as the unencumbered 
private property of the employer to which employees were subordinated.23 The industrial 
employment relationship was based upon the capital provided by the employer for the 
employee to use in order to perform the services for which he was being paid. The 
employee became wholly dependent upon the industrial employer, in some cases for food, 
shelter, and the education of his children as well as for the tools and place of his trade.24 
This can be contrasted with the French concepts of work relations, which moved quickly 
from penal sanctions to an imposed a juridical equality between worker and employer that 
was embodied in legal codes. The employer’s control over employees and an employee’s 
natural position of subordination was tempered by the development of mandatory social 
legislation, the ordre public social.25  
3.1.6 Collective bargaining became an important mechanism through which employment 
relations were managed in France by the official institution of enterprise level comité 
d’entreprises.26 In Britain, the organisation of the workplace was based on the voluntary 
organisation of trade unions and their negotiations with employers,27 continental 
workplaces tended to be organised according to legal principles.28 Thus, the function of 
trade union rights in the UK is similar to those of other European nations; the form that 
they take has traditionally been different. Rather than protecting the freedom of 
association through the granting of positive rights, the UK has generally granted 
immunities for certain trade union activities which could otherwise constitute civil law 
liabilities,29 such as conspiracy, emphasising the importance British courts and law 
makers place on the sanctity of contract.  
3.1.7 The resistance to regulation in the area of labour law in the UK is endemic to the nature 
of the labour movement in Britain. Given the development of trade unions outside the 
                                                          
23 Chapter 3 section 7.1. 
24 B Hepple and P O’Higgins (eds), The Making of Labour Law in Europe: a Comparative Study of nine Countries up to 1945 (first 
published 1986, Hart 2010) 12-13. 
25 Deakin, Lele and Siems, n21, 140. 
26 Chapter 3 Section 11.3. 
27 Ibid, 8.2. 
28 Ibid, 8.3. 
29Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, “The Social Charter in Britain: Labour Law and Labour Courts?” (1991) 54(1) MLR 1, 3. 
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political sphere and the far-reaching freedom to act that they had been given through 
immunities, it is not surprising that they were not supportive of the encroachment of the 
law into industrial policy. Britain’s adherence to orthodox economic beliefs in the free 
market, collective laissez-faire and the lack of political ambitions in early unionist dogma 
meant that there was little support for any progressive labour regulation.30 This non-
interventionist stance has remained popular in British politics, though successive Labour 
governments have tempered this with more progressive legislation, particularly in view of 
Britain’s acceptance of the EU Social Chapter.31 
3.1.8 In both jurisdictions labour regulation developed following or in parallel with 
industrialisation, reflecting the economic and social needs of each jurisdiction,32 thus 
relating directly to the path dependency of regulatory approach rather than market and 
social demands. The modern cultural and social values in France have led to a liberal and 
social conception of labour law, giving a great role to the freedom of association and 
union activities, encouraging social dialogue and fighting against every form of 
discrimination. It also ensures widely guaranteed incomes either at work or in the case of 
unemployment.33 British labour regulation; however, was instituted after labour interests 
had become able to wield real and damaging political power. Thus labour regulation was 
introduced first with broadly economic impulses aimed at tempering or even replacing the 
power of labour interests in order to take control of the labour economy, and later in order 
to meet minimum limits set by EU law.34  
3.1.9 In the UK, an emphasis has remained on the importance of some form of economic 
liberalism and the free market, while France has steadily drawn away from these ideas 
toward the social democracy which is characteristic of it today. France has manifested a 
reserve about the market economy and capitalism through its political and economic 
policies.35 Clearly, the French system has taken a view on the importance of social 
protections and this view is imposed upon any legislative act that may affect society. 
                                                          
30 R Lowe, “Hours of Labour: Negotiating Industrial Legislation in Britain, 1919-39” (1982) 35(2) Econ Hist Rev 270. 
31 Chapter 3 Section 12.1 
32 Hepple and O’Higgins, n24, 14-15. 
33 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n20, 33. 
34 Chapter 3 Section 11.4. 
35 Despax, Rojot and Laborde, n20, 33-34. 
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Britain, however, has continued to resist interference in the labour market where possible, 
despite the influence of EU social legislation.36  
4 Chapter 4: 
4.1 Historical Perspectives on Debt, Credit, Corporate Law, and Insolvency  
4.1.1 There are a number of differences between the UK and France in relation to how the 
elements of industrialisation, commerce, and big business evolved. Prohibitions on usury 
and the moral resistance to reliance on credit as a business mechanism lasted far longer in 
France.37 Further, France continues to retain resistance to unbridled debt as allowable 
rates of interest remain restricted.38 France was also more seriously affected by the results 
of the Mississippi Bubble as the French economy was tied to the company. Once it failed, 
the effect on the French economy were catastrophic, leaving another long memory 
influencing resistance to speculation and financial risk, and further entrenching French 
attachment to security and tradition.39 Britain’s more adventurous financial spirit led to a 
colonial and eventually corporate empire that would overshadow French growth for 
centuries.40  
4.1.2 Prior to large scale industrialisation, a financial revolution occurred in the Netherlands 
and England to accommodate the needs of colonial trade.41 Without the financial 
revolution as well as the evolution of paper money, credit, debt and banking, and the 
parallel development of the joint stock company, large scale industrialisation would not 
have been possible. It was in part England’s highly developed financial sector of the 
middle eighteenth century that allowed for rapid and massive industrial development. In 
addition, the modernisation of both credit and debt allowed for greater risks to be taken in 
business, which also led to a greater risk of insolvency. Thus, as modern financial markets 
evolved, providing a forum in which to invest in growing commercial enterprises, so too 
did the need for an insolvency system that worked not only on a national level, but also 
                                                          
36 Chapter 3 Section 12. 
37 Chapter 4 Section 2.1. 
38 Ibid, 2.5 
39 Ibid, 3.2. 
40 Ibid, 3.3. 
41 See JH Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes and Negotiability” (2003) 25(3) Intl Hist Rev 
505. 
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internationally. Cross-border colonial trade was a catalyst for the evolution of the modern 
global marketplace owing to the need for a financial system that could deal with a variety 
of currencies, products and legal systems.42 
4.1.3 Despite the differences in attitude toward business risk in the UK and France, both 
developed a species of modern corporate structure including limited liability and separate 
corporate personality in the mid-nineteenth century.43 Utilisation of these corporate forms 
varied, however, in no small part due to the significant restrictions placed on the creation 
of joint stock companies in France, a reactive characteristic also influenced by the 
experience of Law’s infamous investment scheme.44 This led to a variety of compromised 
corporate forms utilising some limited liability to encourage investment, while relying on 
unlimited liability to keep the person in charge of business operations honest.45 There 
were also a number of restrictions present in the British company law system influenced 
by resistance to separating company ownership from control, also influenced by the 
scandals of the 1720s.46  
4.1.4 As the corporate form evolved in complexity and eventually evolved a separate legal 
personality that protected corporate investors behind a corporate veil,47 so too did the 
need for effective insolvency law. Britain underwent numerous bankruptcy reforms 
during the Victorian age, though the reforms generally retained the creditor friendly 
approach that has historically characterised British insolvency system.48 Nineteenth 
century French insolvency law was no friendlier towards debtors. However, many 
insolvencies were resolved outside of the civil process in order to avoid the draconian 
results of insolvency procedures at the time, a characteristic that is reflective of the 
emphasis on collective arrangements that is a prevalent aspect of the French insolvency 
                                                          
42 Chapter 4 Section 3.1. 
43 Ibid, 3.4 and 3.5. 
44 Ibid, 3.2. 
45 See R Price, An Economic History of France 1730-1914 (Macmillan 1981); CE Freedeman, “Joint-Stock Business Organisation in 
France 1807-1867” (1965) 39(2) Bus Hist Rev 184; and F Caron, An Economic History of Modern France (Methuen 1979).  
46 Ibid, 3.2.  
47 Ibid, 3.4 and 3.5.  
48 Ibid, 4.4.  
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system today as evident in the blanket term that refers to French insolvency procedures: 
les procédures collectives.49 
4.1.5 Corporate rescue became an important aspect of insolvency systems for both the UK and 
France following World War II.50 Of the two, France was the first to recognise that the 
penal nature of bankruptcy laws was not good for business, which was reflected in the 
Law of 1955, which was followed regularly by reforms and the addition of procedures 
aimed at encouraging the safeguarding of companies in order to protect employment and 
bolster the economy.51Britain had generally espoused a Darwinian approach to corporate 
survival. Reforms to this approach were, however, heavily influenced by the UK’s 
prospective entry into the European Community, rather than any fundamental change in 
the UK perspective on insolvency, although the acceptance and continued prevalence of 
the Cork Report recommendations demonstrate the UK’s eventual, if begrudging, 
embrace of the rescue culture.52  
4.1.6 French society placed a higher value on individualism, which is evident from the slow 
and methodical approach to industry and its growth in parallel with the protection of 
traditional production methods. Insolvency laws developed with fundamentally different 
aims, the French taking pity on the unfortunate debtor while the UK retained a punitive 
approach favouring creditors who were owed by bad businessmen. France’s debtor 
friendly approach encompassed a concern for other stakeholders who would be affected 
by business failures, in particular employees. This approach led to a natural affinity for 
rehabilitating or rescuing businesses, sometimes at the expense of creditor entitlements. 
While the UK has also undertaken corporate rescue as an additional aim for insolvency 
procedures, its approach remains more focussed on resolving creditor debts, though the 
social aspects of insolvency have become a consideration in recent years. Membership in 
the European Union has had a significant effect on changes to the UK approach to 
                                                          
49 Ibid, 4.2 and 4.3.  
50 Hereafter referred to as “WWII”.  
51 Chapter 4, section  6.1. 
52 Chapter 4, section 6.2 and 6.3. 
261 
 
insolvency, particularly in relation to the social elements that had previously been left to 
other areas of the law. 53  
5 Chapter 5: 
5.1 EU Social Policy, Acquired Rights and the Insolvency Exception 
5.1.1 While the state of the British and French insolvency systems are not so very different 
today, the influence of EU policy and practices on domestic law is also evident. The same 
can be said for legislation in the area of social policy, particularly for the UK, though it is 
in this area that most of the modern controversy relating to UK membership in the EU 
resides. In addition, the UK and France have had significant influence on how policy has 
been implemented during the lifetime of the EC.  
5.1.2 The implementation of the ARD in the UK and in France differs fundamentally due to 
two very different approaches and perspectives on the need to protect employees over the 
interests of business. These approaches are heavily path dependent as evidenced in the 
examination of how both countries viewed their place and exercised their influence in the 
early days of the EC and on its approach to issues of social policy. Social policy in 
Europe has had a long and varied development and has been heavily influenced by the 
World Wars. The personalities involved in the peace negotiations at Versailles were 
singular microcosms of their particular jurisdictions, with the French highly concerned for 
specific French interests, an individualist perspective illustrative of the French cynicism 
toward any lasting change or, indeed, peace following the war. The British, while 
exhibiting some passing interest in international cooperation, were more concerned with 
maintaining their distance from Continental problems. While the outcome of the treaty 
contributed to the causes of the WWII, the treaty also created the International Labour 
Organisation, which would provide a catalyst for social policy in Europe, though each 
individual state would create their own jurisdiction specific regimes of labour and 
employment protection. This jurisdiction specific approach would be reflected in the EU 
approach to social policy in the 1950s.54 
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5.1.3 As WWI provided the catalyst for war socialism, most continental countries continued it 
to some degree during the interwar period, while the UK reversed direction, preferring a 
liberal economy during peace time, though this was not without some serious social 
consequences in terms of unrest. The development of a unifying process following WWII 
was supported by the UK and the US, though the UK has taken an outsiders stance from 
the very beginning of European integration processes, with Churchill recommending a 
“united states of Europe” of which the UK would not, admittedly, be a part. The lack of 
interest of the UK and the US for a European unification process meant that the French 
would take the lead, which would have significant impact on the form that the union 
would take, as well as its approach to social policy, though the latter would be tempered 
by the more liberal stance of the German government.55  
5.1.4 Since the first steps toward some type of European collective were taken in the European 
Coal and Steel Community,56 it has been recognised that the creation of a combined 
market would have far reaching effects on individual citizens, particularly due to the 
effects of market integration on European businesses. This led to specific provisions in 
the ECSC that allowed for financing activities aimed at mitigating the consequences of 
restructuring on workers affected by the integration of the coal and steel industrial 
markets.57 While this approach would not be fully utilised in the Treaty of Rome, which 
took a distinctly market-making stance to social policy in the Community, some of the 
first social policy directives occurring in the wake of the Social Action Plan of 1972 
would be passed specifically to deal with employees affected by the insolvency of their 
employers in the Collective Redundancies Directive, the Employers in Insolvency 
Directive and the Acquired Rights Directive.58 However, British liberalism and protection 
of its sovereignty would provide constant obstacles to any advances toward a market-
correcting role for social policy in Europe.59  
5.1.5 While the adoption of the Social Chapter by the UK would mean an end to any significant 
obstacles that the UK could present, its implementation strategies in terms of social policy 
                                                          
55 Ibid, 2.4. 
56 Hereafter referred to as the “ECSC”. 
57 Chapter 5, section 3.3.  
58 Ibid, 3.3.  
59 Ibid, 3.43.2.  
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directives has lacked enthusiasm and, at times, legal effectiveness.60 While France was 
actually the impetus for the creation of a law that would deal with employees’ acquired 
rights,61 the ARD was one of the many EU directives that caused problems for the UK 
legal system. The UK’s failure to implement it initially led to threats of a law suit by the 
European Commission, and then its inadequate implementation and failure initially to 
apply in cases of privatisation led to an ECJ decision requiring its application.62 Thus, the 
UK has struggled to comply with the requirements of EU social policy, due not only to its 
economically liberal stance and desire to maintain its sovereign power, but also to the 
differences in the Continental civil law systems as compared to the UK common law 
system, on the former of which much EU law is based.63  
5.1.6 The ARD has caused problems on a European level as well, in no small part due to its 
original failure to deal with circumstances of insolvency. A number of cases considered 
how the directive should apply in corporate rescue situations, which were eventually 
resolved with the distinction between those procedures entered with a view to liquidation 
or those that are initiated not with a view to liquidation. This distinction has meant that 
any procedure entered with a view to continuing trading, even in those situations that may 
eventually lead to liquidation, any business transfers occurring would not be exempt from 
the operation of acquired rights.64 The UK has also had a number of cases dealing with 
this problem, resulting in the application of TUPE to all insolvency procedures that allow 
the business to continue trading.65 This has caused controversy both on an EU as well as a 
national level, however, the current Directive and its implementation throughout the EU 
mean that this problem cannot be solved without significant reforms in the provisions 
relating to the insolvency exception.  
6 Chapter 6: 
6.1 Path Dependent Influences on Acquired Rights and Corporate Rescue  
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6.1.1 Chapter 6 examined the path dependent relationships of social policy and corporate 
rescue, with a focus on the differences subsisting between developments in the UK and 
France over time in this area.66 The conflict surrounding the ARD is indicative of one of 
the fundamental dividing factors among EU Member States: those in favour of strong 
centralised government and those favouring a loose, con-federal format wherein Member 
States retain overall autonomy while enjoying the benefits of a free trade area.67 The 
conflict between the ARD transfer provisions and corporate rescue procedures is 
reflective of this dichotomy: social justice versus free enterprise. The implementation 
saga of the ARD in the UK evidences the fact that the jurisdiction fits uncomfortably 
within the EU, particularly with regard to “social Europe”.68  
6.1.2 In addition to the conflict of implementation, the ARD also presents an inherent conflict 
between the interests of the rescue culture and employment protection. A number of cases 
have demonstrated that rescue processes can indeed fail if the costs of transferring 
employment contracts are too high. Fact dependent jurisprudence has shown judicial 
acknowledgement of this problem when it was able to find that employees would not 
transfer in a situation where they were dismissed for the reason of the company no longer 
being able to afford to pay them, despite the fact that a buyer was found shortly thereafter. 
While this situation would seem to indicate that TUPE would be implicated, the Court of 
Appeal opted for a fact-sensitive approach that inadvertently acknowledged the imbalance 
between the two policy areas. Recent reforms to TUPE have alleviated some of its 
onerous conditions, but it remains difficult to reconcile with the rescue culture.69  
6.1.3 While France has not had the same controversy, French employers have, nonetheless, 
complained about the restrictions that the provisions create for their ability to deal with 
their enterprise as they see fit. The French practitioner response supported this criticism, 
citing a number of problems caused by the transfer of undertakings provisions.70 The 
system causes complexity and uncertainty and makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to 
adapt to changes in technology to reorganise according to market requirements. The high 
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protections in French law also have negative macroeconomic effects by creating rigidities 
in the labour market, keeping people unemployed for longer periods of times due to the 
inability to shift the workforce easily. While this has been acknowledged by French 
politicians, economists, academics and others, it retains its inflexible approach due to the 
social protection of “vested rights”, regardless of whether those rights are provided by 
statute or are natural.71  
6.1.4 The reactions of practitioners in both jurisdictions, the fact of the conflict, and the effects 
of the economic crisis have made it clear that reform is needed in order to alleviate the 
burdens that the ARD places on business. While it remains important to protect 
employees in situations of reorganisation, too stringent an application results in business 
failure on occasion, leading to a self-defeating result: the loss of all jobs. As such a 
reform was recommended that allows for an exemption from the application of the ARD 
provisions for micro enterprises, for medium enterprises that are at risk of failure and for 
large enterprises subject to a specific threshold test on the ration of employee liability 
costs to business transfer value.72 While the fact is that France is unlikely to implement 
any serious changes in this regard, a number of other EU Member States likely do so, 
particularly the UK and those other countries with more liberal economies. Given the 
economic issues France is having following the financial crisis, blamed at least in part on 
the inflexibility of its labour market, it is not unreasonable to suspect that over time even 
France will shift in order to find balance between the rescue culture and the protection of 
employees.73 
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ANNEX 1: SURVEY RESPONSES 
Insolvency Practitioners from the United Kingdom 
Responses to Questions 1-3 
Questions 
English 
Responses  
17 
1. Have you or your firm been involved in any business rescue 
procedures in which business transfer negotiations have been put at 
risk of failure due to the transfer of employment contracts occurring 
under [the ARD]? 
YES 
82% 
NO 
18% 
2. Have you or your firm been involved in any business rescue 
procedures in which business transfer negotiations have failed owing 
to the application of [the ARD]? 
YES 
59% 
NO 
41% 
3. In your experience generally, have TUPE transfers had an adverse 
impact on the rescue of businesses? 
 
YES 
53% 
NO 
47% 
Please note that only those respondents who answered the question are listed below for 
questions 5-8.  
Q4: Can you offer any specific (anonymised) examples of the effects TUPE on the 
outcomes of business transfer negotiations? 
R1: A business that had been trading for 40 years with a significant amount of loyal and 
experienced staff was a failed rescue on the basis of the liabilities contained within the 
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contracts of employment. This created a liquidation with a significant cost to public 
funds through the Redundancy Payments Service. 
R4: No but generally a discount is necessary to reflect the acquisition of accrued 
employee rights. 
R5: Overseas business looking to acquire failing UK motorsport business. Was not 
prepared to take on workforce and so pulled out of negotiations. 
R6: Retail operator rescues have mean the most obvious cases I have been involved with 
where TUPE transfers have had detrimental impacts on the outcomes for creditors and 
proven the most problematic to overcome and secure a business transfer and rescue. 
Buyers from an insolvency do not want to just inherit the entirety of the business where 
it operates from a number of retail locations, where some locations are loss-making and 
part of the reason for business distress. They have wanted to rescue the viable operations 
and locations. The risk that all employees, from all locations, could have transferred 
under TUPE has led to significantly detrimental impacts on price, leading to a lower 
return to creditors including employees who could not be kept on. The cases I have been 
involved in have resulted in a much lower price, albeit the businesses were successfully 
transferred, but without helping keep the jobs of affected employees and still being 
detrimental to creditors, so no-one really gained from the issue. I have had other cases 
where administration rescue has been ruled out as a strategy, in favour of liquidation, 
because of the burden of TUPE transfer costs of employees for buyers interested in the 
business assets. 
R7: A purchaser of a business will discount the fair value of the assets to meet the TUPE 
liability. As a consequence, existing lenders to a business do better if the business is 
closed, employees made redundant and the assets sold piecemeal. 
R8: I cannot. The firm has had many examples but I am not personally involved in them. 
The general effect is that the purchase price is reduced (or an amount of it placed in 
escrow) to allow for the likelihood of TUPE claims. Clearly this can reduce the return to 
creditors. 
R9: £50k pre-pack but TUPE liability (mainly family not to be involved in newco) circa 
100k. Deal collapsed. 
R11: I can think of a case where the workforce was made redundant following the 
failure of negotiations to sell to a scaled down version of the trading business due to 
TUPE concerns. 
R16: When negotiating with government bodies, they often believe that TUPE does not 
apply to them. 
R17: Reduction in purchase price as redundancies were required short term. This meant 
there was less return to creditors. 
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Q5: Given the state of case law in this area and the view of the courts and tribunals 
that business transfers occurring out of administration procedures and pre-packs 
in particular will draw the application of TUPE, do you or your firm have a 
strategy for reducing the impact of the transfer of employment contracts and other 
protective employment regulations on business transfers occurring out of business 
rescue procedures? If so, what is your strategy? 
R1: No. Strategy in this area may attract liability and the problem remains with the 
purchaser or, if the rescue fails, the creditors and the state. It is not for the professionals 
to engineer a bending of the rules. 
R4: Careful consideration of whether liquidation is a realistic alternative. Generally it is 
not because of the need for a non-trading period and the consequent loss of goodwill. 
R6: Our advice is to consult so far as is reasonably practicable, within the time and 
resources available, and ensure key stakeholders' expectations of net returns reflect the 
reality and risks, costs and price implications associated with TUPE transfers. 
R7: Consult as early as possible and use compromise agreements for high earning 
employees who are not transferring. 
R8: Our strategy is to minimise the likelihood of claims. However, you should note that 
UK law is contradictory in this area and in particular it is not possible always to consult 
for the recommended time as there are insufficient funds to pay employees for that 
length of time. 
R9: Pre-pack liquidation. Try and compromise employees not to be transferred out. 
Reduce sale consideration. 
R10: Key problem is currently notice periods for consultation, and linking that with 
obligations under pre-pack legislation. Current strategy is to 'do the best we can', but 
given that it is rare for an insolvency process to be used purely to cut staff numbers, and 
given that most IPs seek to maximise the benefits for all creditors, TUPE and other 
protective legislation are an unnecessary distraction in the heat of insolvency planning. 
R14: In some cases, companies have been put into liquidation to avoid the TUPE 
implications. The liquidator might then sell the assets to a purchaser who takes his 
chances with the former employees. 
R17: We make every effort to assist the Company inform and consult. 
Q6: Are there any jurisdiction specific arguments for or against the application of 
TUPE in business rescue situations? 
R4: No. The principle of protecting employee rights should be maintained. 
R6: Not that I am aware of. 
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R8: The UK needs to recognise that, having refused to take advantage of the insolvency 
exemption in the EU legislation, it is now in a position where two different laws 
conflict. TUPE should be relaxed in insolvency situations. 
R11: Yes, I think there are. Different European Jurisdictions provide for employee rights 
in an insolvency situation in different ways and the conflict between employment and 
insolvency law in the UK provides insolvency practitioners with real problems, and is 
contrary to the rescue culture. 
Q7: Is there anything else in the British context that distinguishes the application 
of employee acquired rights provisions in those particular jurisdictions from 
others? 
All skipped, was not aware or referred to previous responses.  
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Insolvency Practitioners from France 
Questions 
French 
Responses 6  
1. Have you or your firm been involved in any business rescue 
procedures in which business transfer negotiations have been put at 
risk of failure due to the transfer of employment contracts occurring 
under [the ARD]? 
YES 
100%  
2. Have you or your firm been involved in any business rescue 
procedures in which business transfer negotiations have failed owing to 
the application of [the ARD]? 
YES  
100% 
3. In your experience generally, have TUPE transfers had an adverse 
impact on the rescue of businesses? 
 
YES 
50% 
NO 
50% 
Q4: Est-ce que vous avez une stratégie en réduisant l’impact du transfert des 
contrats de travail ou d’autres réglementations visé à protéger les travailleurs sur 
les transferts d’entreprises envisagés pendant des procédures de sauvetage 
d’entreprise ? Si vous l’avez, qu’est qu’il est ? 
R1: Difficile de contourner les dispositions légales En plan de cession, on peut réduire le 
nombre de postes de salariés repris et les droits sont pris en charge à la date de 
jouissance, sauf exception acceptée et pour des montant pouvant être plafonnés. 
R3: Les procédures collectives favorisent la restructuration de l'entreprise, car le motif 
économique du licenciement est difficilement contestable et le fonds de garantie des 
salaires peut prendre en charge le coût des indemnités de rupture et en faire l'avance à 
l'entreprise. En liquidation judiciaire, le plan de cession (art L 642-1 et suivant du code 
de commerce) est dérogatoire de l'article L 1224-1 du code du travail. Il n'est pas imposé 
au repreneur, le transfert de tous les contrats de travail. En effet, la cession d'entreprise a 
pour but d'assurer "tout ou partie " des emplois. Ainsi le liquidateur procèdera au 
licenciement des salariés dans le mois du jugement qui arrête la cession de l'entreprise. 
Le législateur fixe des objectifs à savoir la pérennité de l'activité, le maintien de l'emploi 
et l'apurement du passif. Le tribunal apprécie au regard de ces critères, l'offre la 
meilleure. 
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R4: Seule la négociation collective permet de sécuriser les transferts et les 
restructurations. Mais le maintien de tous les droits conduits de fait à plus de 
suppression de postes. Il y a des domaines et secteurs où les contraintes sont plus 
lourdes que dans d'autres. La critique n'est donc pas sur tous les secteurs. Les plus 
critiques sont liés à l'absence d'appréciation des critères sur le bassin d'emploi et non sur 
tout le pays. Le secteur des entreprises de journalistes est très difficile en raison de leur 
statut privilégié. 
R5: Avec le consentement mutuel de toutes les parties prenantes. 
R6: Les articles L 1224-1 et L 1224-2 du code du travail sont considérés d'ordre public. 
Ils s'imposent au nouvel employeur après le transfert de l'entreprise et s'imposent aussi 
aux salariés. 
En cas de procédure d'insolvabilité, ils s'appliquent aussi pour le cas où la procédure est 
une procédure de sauvegarde avant cessation des paiements (car cette procédure ne 
prévoit pas une cession de l'entreprise) (*). Le maintien des contrats de travail est écarté 
si la procédure ouverte est une procédure de redressement judiciaire ou de liquidation 
judiciaire : le transfert des contrats de travail est ici subordonné au choix du tribunal de 
commerce entre les offres de reprise.  
L'article L 1224-1 du code du travail ne s'applique pas ; il est écarté au profit des règles 
propres du code de commerce sauf certaines règles de consultation du comité 
d'entreprise et de l'administration (C com., art L 642-5). 
La question des emplois est prise en compte comme un élément du choix du tribunal 
parmi d'autres éléments : le montant du prix offert pour les actifs cédés, le maintien 
d'une activité sur le site, le caractère total ou partiel de la reprise, le transfert des contrats 
de fourniture (contrats de location, leasings, contrats de prêts, contrats d'abonnement...), 
le nombre de contrats de travail conservés (pour les offres, voir C com., art L 642-2). 
Cela conduit à une évaluation globale des offres (pour les critères du choix du tribunal, 
voir C com., art L 642-5). 
Les contrats de travail sont donc transférés dans la limite des offres. Ils s'imposent alors 
au nouvel employeur, y compris pour les avantages acquis (en cas de licenciement 
ultérieur, les indemnités sont calculées en fonction de l'ancienneté). 
Les autres salariés (non compris dans le plan de cession) sont licenciés par 
l'administrateur judiciaire (dans une procédure de redressement judiciaire) ou par le 
liquidateur (dans une procédure de liquidation judiciaire) (sur les licenciements, voir C 
com., art L 642-5 al 4). 
Q5: Sont-ils des argumentations parmi des praticiens contre l'application  des 
droits maintenus des travailleurs  aux transferts d’entreprise qui sont faits pendant 
les procédures de sauvetage, en plus des dérogations concernant l’insolvabilité qui 
sont déjà existant sous les codes légales domestique ? 
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R1: Les argumentations contre le droit positif sont inutiles. La procédure applique les 
textes en vigueur. 
R3: Aujourd’hui, le praticien doit toujours se poser la question suivante: la cession 
d'actifs doit-elle s’opérer dans le cadre d’une cession d’actifs de gré à gré autorisée par 
ordonnance du juge commissaire conformément aux dispositions des articles L 642-18 
et L 642-19 du code de commerce ou dans le cadre d’une cession d’entreprise en 
application des dispositions de l’article L 642-1 dudit code ? Dans l’hypothèse d’une 
cession d’entreprise, quelles sont les incidences de ce jugement de cession à intervenir 
sur la procédure de licenciement initiée et sur le sort des contrats de travail des salariés 
qui seraient repris par le cessionnaire. 1- Rappel des dispositions légales et 
jurisprudentielles sur la cession d’entreprise intervenant dans le cadre d’une liquidation 
judiciaire et la remise en cause des licenciements opérés antérieurement à la cession La 
problématique des cessions d’unités de production dument autorisées par le juge 
commissaire a donné lieu à une jurisprudence abondante et ancienne de la Chambre 
sociale de la Cour de cassation qui estime les licenciements pour motif économique 
notifiés par le liquidateur antérieurement à la cession, dépourvus d’effet car notifiés en 
violation des dispositions d’ordre public de l’article L 1224-1 du Code du travail. Le 
fondement juridique de ces décisions est le suivant : une telle cession autorisée par le 
juge commissaire emporte transfert de plein droit d’une entité économique autonome 
dont l’activité est poursuivie ou reprise et en conséquence, la poursuite chez le 
cessionnaire de l’ensemble des contrats de travail attachés à l’entité cédée, rendant sans 
effet les licenciements notifiés antérieurement. Le salarié dont le licenciement est 
dépourvu d’effet peut au choix, demander la poursuite de son contrat de travail chez le 
cessionnaire ou au contraire, demander réparation au liquidateur pour le préjudice né 
d’un licenciement dépourvu d’effet (Arrêt Maldonado du 20 mars 2002). L’arrêt Voisin 
a restreint l’option du salarié sous certaines conditions : la poursuite du contrat de travail 
s’impose à lui si « le cessionnaire l’informe, avant l’expiration du préavis, de son 
intention de poursuivre, sans modification, le contrat de travail » (Cass. Soc. 11 mars 
2003 bull civ, 2003, V, n°86). L’arrêt de la chambre sociale de la cour de cassation en 
date du 19 novembre 2008 emploie une formule plus large « avant la fin du contrat 
rompu par le licenciement ». Cette jurisprudence a été confirmée depuis lors notamment 
au terme d’un arrêt en date du 4 mai 2011 (Cass. Soc. 4 mai 2011, Droit Social, p 997) 
qui n’exige pas que cette information soit réalisée exclusivement par le cessionnaire, le 
liquidateur pouvant tout aussi bien informer le salarié de la poursuite de son contrat de 
travail chez le cessionnaire. Les cessions d’actifs autorisés par le juge commissaire ne 
permettent pas de sécuriser la procédure, cédant et cessionnaire dans la mesure où il 
n’existe aucune dérogation permettant de déroger aux dispositions de l’article L 1224-1 
du code du travail et le juge commissaire n’ayant pas qualité pour autoriser le 
licenciement du personnel non concerné par la reprise (Cass. Soc. 11 octobre 2006, 
n°04-45212 rappelant que le juge commissaire n’a pas ce pouvoir). Les dispositions de 
la loi de sauvegarde ont partiellement résolu cette problématique en permettant, dans le 
cadre d’une liquidation judiciaire avec poursuite d’activité autorisée, la mise en œuvre 
d’une cession d’entreprise homologuée par le Tribunal, dont le jugement, conformément 
aux dispositions de l’article L642-5 et R 642-3 du Code de commerce, autorise le 
licenciement du personnel non repris, permettant ainsi de déroger aux dispositions de 
l’article L 1224-1 du Code du travail. En pratique, le plan de cession n'est pas toujours 
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possible, car la poursuite d'activité est parfois impossible. Dans cette hypothèse les 
dispositions de l'article L 1224-1 du code de travail sont un véritable obstacle à la 
reprise du fonds de commerce et poussent le liquidateur ou le repreneur à renoncer au 
projet. 
R4: non je suis favorable au maintien des droits acquis mais à avoir une procédure de 
restructuration qui soit plus en phase avec les besoins économiques et non avec les 
statuts protégé individuel 
Q6: Y at-il des arguments spécifiques de juridiction en supportant ou contre 
l’application des droits maintenus des travailleurs dans les cas de sauvetage des 
entreprises ? 
R5: la difficulté est la double contrainte : non seulement le maintien des droits acquis 
mais surtout l'impossibilité de parvenir à une liste qui soit compatible avec le besoin 
(pbe des champs d'application des restructurations et des critères.) pour le maintien: 
gage de sécurité et d'adhésion pour les travailleurs. 
R6: Le maintien des droits des salariés est lié à l'ordre public social et économique. La 
garantie des droits des salariés limite les pertes d'emplois et maintient le pouvoir d'achat 
des salariés concernés.  
Le transfert des entreprises qui serait ordonné sans un transfert des contrats de travail 
serait un facteur de fraude; la nouvelle société peut être une société créée pour 
poursuivre l'activité par les dirigeants de l'ancienne société. A l'inverse, le caractère 
obligatoire (d'ordre public) du maintien des contrats de travail limite la possibilité 
d'offres concurrentes sérieuses. 
Dans les faits, le transfert obligatoire des contrats de travail  entraîne une diminution du 
montant des offres de prix par les candidats à la reprise.  
Enfin le transfert obligatoire des contrats de travail constitue parfois un facteur 
d'insécurité juridique pour le cessionnaire : les coûts réels (des licenciements 
nécessaires) sont révélés tardivement, ce qui peut constituer un aléa économique plus 
élevé. 
Q7: Avez-vous aucune chose à ajouter concernant le système Français et son 
approche aux droits maintenus des travailleurs qui est distinct par rapport aux 
autres juridictions? 
R1: Le système français est protecteurs des droits des salariés. Il peut être détourné 
comme une arme par certains d'entre eux. Il peut être utilisé comme un instrument de 
motivation dans la reprise par d'autres. L'approche dépend de la prise en compte du 
facteur humain dans le redressement de l'entreprise, en fonction de son activité. 
R5: trop de lourdeur pour la mise en place des procédures de restructuration (notamment 
applications des critères, contraintes géographiques, cout des pse, pouvoir de blocage 
des institutions du personnel (trop nombreuses).) 
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R6: Le niveau élevé de garantie des salaires impayés en cas de licenciement est un 
facteur favorable au sauvetage.  
La différence entre la procédure de sauvegarde (avant cessation des paiements) et les 
procédures de redressement et de liquidation judiciaire (en cas de cessation des 
paiements) est justifiée : elle a pour but d'éviter que la procédure de sauvegarde soit 
utilisée comme un moyen d'écarter l'application des règles de protection.  
Par contre, l'obligation de chercher une solution de reclassement des salariés, qui 
s'impose à l'administrateur judiciaire et au liquidateur, est négative.  
Les formalités sont également trop importantes. 
 Le rôle de l'administration peut aussi constituer un facteur de frein pour le transfert de 
l'entreprise. La consultation de l'administration est une formalité obligatoire. Son 
autorisation est, de plus, imposée pour le licenciement des salariés bénéficiant d'un 
statut protégé (représentants du personnel et délégués syndicaux). 
Comme complément aux questions précédentes, l'impact négatif des droits des salariés 
est variable selon la procédure ouverte.  
Si la procédure ouverte offre une solution de continuité (if the company is rescued as a 
going concern), les droits des salariés imposent de limiter les licenciements 
économiques de rechercher une solution de reclassement dans l'entreprise, dans le 
groupe ou à l'extérieur du groupe et d’indemniser les salariés licenciés.  
Si la procédure prévoit la cession de l'entreprise insolvable, les inconvénients sont moins 
importants : l'entreprise est cédée à un candidat qui fait une offre contenant les contrats 
de travail qu'il pense possible de conserver en fonction du développement de son 
activité. Les autres salariés sont licenciés et indemnisés. Le précédent employeur étant 
insolvable, le coût n'est pas pour l'entreprise mais pour le fonds de garantie (AGS).  
Enfin, lorsque l'entreprise est importante (150 salariés ou 20 millions € de chiffre 
d'affaires, C com., art L 626-29 et R 626-52), des comités de créanciers sont constitués : 
ils sont consultés sur les offres.  
Pour réduire l'impact négatif du transfert des contrats travaille plusieurs solutions sont 
possibles dans les limites du droit positif que de commerce et code du travail : limiter les 
obligations de reclassement aux véritables possibilités existant jurisprudence consultées 
les créanciers autorisent le tribunal a dérogé au caractère obligatoire des transferts. 
